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My thesis assesses the state of the French collective memory of the Second 
World War, during the period from May 1981 until July 1995 (when the new 
president, Jacques Chirac, made his first public speech on the topic). It deals with the 
major themes thrown up by the intersection of subject matter and time scale, and also 
discusses the nature of collective memory and commemoration more generally. 
Particular attention is paid to the series of commemorations marking the fiftieth 
anniversaries of the crucial episodes of the war years. These fell between 1989 and 
1995, roughly coinciding with François Mitterrand’s second septennat. The form and 
content of the commemorations themselves, the public reaction to them, and the 
peripheral discussions they stimulated, are all analysed, in many cases with input 
from those involved in organising or coordinating them.
First of all the commemorations that took place during my period are seen from 
the perspective of a "national narrative" that organises and inteiprets the common 
past in such a way that it can foster a sense of national unity and belonging. This is 
the traditional mode of commemoration within the nation-state. However, 
undermining that approach were the harsh facts of war and occupation, which set 
Frenchman against Frenchman in a re-enactment of an intermittent "guerre franco- 
française". The "national narrative" was also threatened by a sense of guilt over the 
consequences of Vichy's policy of collaboration with the Nazis. Where once that 
guilt was suppressed or argued into abeyance, during our period it could no longer be 
avoided.
That process went hand-in-hand with the resurgence of those memories that 
had always been seen as potentially detrimental to national unity. Foremost among 
these was a specifically Jewish memory which was rib longer willing to be coy about
apportioning blame and responsibility. The state's representatives, and France's 
collective conscience, had to take account of a new balance of power in which 
communities within the nation had increased their power and influence.
More pressure was being applied to the national commemorative framework 
from alternative ways of thinking about war and its remembrance. It was becoming 
more common to view the war in terms of human rights and the rights of minorities, 
rather than in terms of national sovereignty. Also, wai' remembrance was often seen 
as a tool in the service of European integration and international cooperation rather 
than national identity.
Finally, the state had to accept that it did not have the means to determine the 
composition of French collective memory. Often it could only give or withhold an 
official seal of approval to initiatives and trends instigated by pressure groups and 
fomented by the press and the media.
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By the 1990s it had become commonplace to point out that the French collective 
memory of war and occupation had changed since 1945. The general consensus was that 
Ophuls' 1971 film Le Chagrin et la Pitié marked a watershed, after which the taboos 
and myths that had taken hold since Liberation, or to be more accurate since de Gaulle's 
return to power in 1958, could and should be brought down to size. It was widely 
accepted, too, that during the 1980s and 1990s the iconoclastic impulse had become 
rather tyramiical, and that during this period "les années noires" were more present in 
the public imagination than they had ever been.
While many commentators simply made this observation in passing before 
moving on to the thrust of their argument, others made a genuine effort to analyse the 
phenomenon, and to explain why it had occurred. Thus, among the huge number of 
works dealing historically with aspects of the war years, there appeared a number of 
books and articles analysing how those aspects were commemorated,^ and, at the third 
remove, a smaller number dealing with the whole issue of commemoration and 
collective memory of that period. Their approach might be described as meta-historical, 
in that they were not dealing with the events themselves but with the way in which those 
events had been recounted subsequently. Pre-eminent in this last group was Henry 
Rous so, whose books and articles continuously returned to these themes. Le syndrome
In this category I w ould  place the CNRS's collection  o f  studies entitled 40  ans de com m ém orations de  
la  deuxièm e gu erre m ondia le  (Paris: éditions du C NR S, 1986), Gérard Namer's L a com m ém oration  en  
F rance de  1945 à  nos jo u r s ,  and the many studies o f  specific com m em orations, such as Sarah 
Farmer's O radour: A rrê t sur m ém oire  (Paris: Calm ann-Lévy, 1994), N ico le  Racine-Furlaud's article, 
'M ém oire du 18 juin 1940', based on a paper delivered at the com m em orative conference o f  1990 (see  
bibliography); or R ém y D esquesnes' articles on the D -D ay anniversaries in C on tem porary  French  
C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, rC2 (1995) (referred to in chapter three o f  this thesis). And, casting its im m ense  
shadow on all o f  these works, is Pierre Nora's Les Lieux de M ém oire  (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992), 
the defin itive study o f  a nation's relationship with its own past.
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de Vichy^ published in 1987, was the first attempt to chart the evolution of France's 
national wartime narrative from the 1940s to the 1980s. In 1994 Rousso joined forces 
with Eric Conan to produce Vichy: un passé qui ne passe pas^  in which there was 
palpable exasperation at the inability of France to "get over" Vichy. The previous year, 
Henri Amouroux had published La page n'est pas encore tournée,^ which framed a 
similar message. Amouroux made his point even more bluntly in 1998, when he 
published Pour en finir avec Vichy (Paris: Robert Laffont), whose title needs no 
explanation.
However, while many of these authors were astute in putting their finger on the 
Zeitgeist, there were a number of gaps. In particular, the relationship between, on the 
one hand, specific instances of commemoration, and, on the other, that elusive set of 
received ideas and half-remembered facts known as "collective memory", was seldom 
addressed fully. Detailed studies of commemorative events rarely took on board the 
question of how they related to collective memory, while philosophical musings on 
collective memory rarely stopped to consider the impact of specific commemorative 
ceremonies, speeches, and parades.
An exception to this rule was Serge Barcellini, who directed the commemorative 
arm of the French ex-servicemen's ministry from 1981 to 1993. He was preoccupied 
with the way in which commemoration expressed and impacted upon collective (in this 
case national) memory and identity. His position gave him valuable insights into the 
procedures by which the state tried to frame and contain collective appreciations of past 
conflicts. Barcellini published a number of articles before undertaking, with Annette
 ^Paris: Seuil, 1987.
 ^ Paris: Gallimard, 1994.
4 Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993.
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Wieviorka, a systematic inventory of French memorials of World War Two entitled 
Passant, souviens-toi,^ which was published in 1995.
Yet it was difficult for someone working for an official body to form a completely 
balanced view of the situation, and to comment objectively on the role of the state. This 
thesis, then, is first and foremost an attempt to analyse the relationship between the 
common past as it is expressed in official commemorative discourse and the common 
past as it exists in people's minds. The question that underpins the thesis is, is it possible 
to express the collective memory of a hugely complex war, and if so, what is the true 
expression of it? Is it most faithfully expressed by commemorative ceremonies, by the 
media, by historians, or does any attempt at expression traduce its true nature? Did these 
means of expression evolve during our period (1981-1995), and, if so, how did that 
affect the way the common past was perceived?
This implies, first of all, a consideration of what collective memory is, and also a 
consideration of what commemoration is, and what it is for. This reflection forms the 
first chapter of the following study. The subsequent chapters are divided into different 
themes, but they all feature analysis of the commemorations themselves alongside 
manifestations of attitudes to the commemorated events. My primary sources, then, are 
accounts, descriptions or recordings of the commemorations themselves. Secondary 
sources are any documents which, from a more detached, philosophical standpoint, 
consider the wider issues involved in the act of remembering a past event collectively. 
However, both primary and secondary sources can take the same form: books, articles 
in the press and in periodicals, television programmes, interviews with the parties 
concerned, opinion polls. Some of these sources attain a higher level of detachment by 
dint of their being British or American.
Paris: Plon, 1995.
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Opinion polls are of course a contentious source to use in scholarly studies, for a 
number of reasons. Most obviously, the wording of the question, and of the choices 
available, can have a significant influence on the responses elicited. Another problem 
lies in what Alfred Grosser has called the "terrible dichotomy" which demands that, in 
the end, these surveys produce a yes/no or a for/against division.^ Thus those who agree 
"a little" with the statement are herded into the "yes" camp, while those who disagree 
mildly are classed alongside those who disagree wholeheartedly. This modus operandi 
neglects the fact that those who agree tentatively are often much closer to those who 
disagree tentatively than those who agree completely. Yet, for the sake of the argument, 
this fact is ignored when the results are presented. In view of these problems, opinion 
polls are used with caution in the following study. They are used only in conjunction 
with other sources, and, where possible, several polls dealing with the same issue are 
used for comparison. That said, we have not yet devised a better method of finding out 
what the general public thinks about specific issues, and poll results can be useful in 
confirming attitudes suggested by other methods of analysis, especially where several 
polls give similar results. If due caution is exercised, they can make a valid contribution.
The period covered by this study runs from 1981 until 1995, that is to say from 
François Mitterrand's election victory until Jacques Chirac's speech at the Véf d'hiv' on 
16 July 1995, in which he officially recognised French culpability for crimes committed 
against Jews. It seems pertinent, therefore, to point out that this is not another 
biographical study of Mitterrand the soldier turned Vichyite turned Resistance hero. 
Certainly, the fact that there were question marks over the president's war record had an 
impact on the issues discussed, but that war record in itself is not our main concern. 
Rather, the period was chosen primarily because of the series of major fiftieth
Les iden tités d ifficiles  (Paris: Presses de Sciences-P o, 1996).
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anniversaries which fell between 1989 and 1995. These gave rise to commemorations 
on an unprecedented scale, with the inevitable debates about the past that significant 
amiiversaries spark off. Quite simply, much more was written and spoken about the war 
years than ever before.
Also, one could argue that the new post-1981 governing ethos encompassed a 
different attitude to the remembrance of war, and to related issues. There was certainly 
less attacliment to the Gaullian myth of unified, heroic resistance, and to the French 
tradition of using "la France" to denote an ideal, rather than a real entity. Instead of 
ignoring what had been happening since Le Chagrin et la pitié, the new administration 
was more inclined to deal with it head on. Indeed, Ophuls' film was broadcast for the 
first time a few months after the socialist victory.
The new administration was characterised, too, by a droit-de-Vhommiste 
sensibility which implied a preoccupation with the rights of France's ethnic and 
religious minorities. This was bound to have a bearing on collective memory, since 
some of these minorities were pushing for more recognition of their specific experience 
of war and occupation, and found that the political climate was suddenly more 
favourable. Finally, the socialist government introduced measures which liberalised 
television and radio in France. These measures had a significant impact on the 
relationship between collective memory and the state. Put simply, the state could no 
longer rely on a compliant media to put its message across, and to avoid the 
controversial issues.
In this changing climate the generation that had lived through war and occupation 
was disappearing, and was putting the finishing touches to the version of the past it 
wanted to leave behind. This set the stage for a "bataille de mémoire" in which the 
different parties tried to ensure that their version would be accepted as the definitive
Xll
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one, or that their experience would remain, or become, an integral part of the collective 
memory. There was, then, ample scope for analysis of the complex issues surrounding 
collective memory and commemoration of the war years.
xni
C H APTER ONE  
DOES THE PAST MATTER?
"Les souvenirs sont nos forces. Ils dissipent les ténèbres. Ne laissons jamais s'effacer les 
anniversaires mémorables. Quand la nuit essaie de revenir, il faut allumer les grandes 
dates comme on allume des flambeaux."
-Victor Hugo
War and Occupation: a fragmented memory
Although the immediate focus of the following study is the period during which 
François Mitterrand was president of France, the subject matter - collective 
remembrance of war and occupation - clearly demands a longer view. It is apposite, at 
times, to compare and contrast commemoration of the events with the events 
themselves, and also to compare commemoration during our period with 
commemoration of the same episodes in earlier times, that is to say between the end of 
the war and Mitterrand's election victory in 1981. But as a starting point, it is useful to 
go back further, and compare France's experience, and the memory of that experience, 
from 1939 to 1945 to its experience from 1914 to 1918.
For one of the first things that must be said about commemorations of the Second 
World War in France is that they differ significantly from those marking the previous 
world war of 1914-18, even if many of the outward forms - wreaths laid at cenotaphs or 
memorials, solemn remembrance of heroic sacrifice, public celebration of victory - 
remain largely in use. The fundamental difference is that, broadly speaking, there exists 
a single, undisputed French national memory of the Great War (even if that memory
includes regret at the futility of all the killing), whereas there are a plethora of distinct 
memories subdividing the national memory of World War Two. One of the major 
themes of this study will be the manner in which collective forms of remembrance have 
attempted to deal with that fragmentation.
Initially, the French state did its utmost to "nationalise" collective memory of the 
war years in France. This entailed transposing the unanimity of the Great War onto 
World War Two. De Gaulle, especially, did not see the Second World War as radically 
different from the First. For him, the two conflicts marked the begimiing and the end of 
a "thirty years war" which France had fought against German imperialism. In 1945 de 
Gaulle organised a grand ceremony during which the two wars were symbolically 
linlced together; fifteen coffins bearing the remains of World War Two heroes were 
brought together at the tomb of the unknown soldier - symbol par excellence of selfless 
sacrifice for the fatherland - before being laid to rest at Mont Valérien, shrine to "la 
France combattante". In 1964, during de Gaulle's second spell as president, a double 
anniversary was celebrated: the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of the Marne, and the 
twentieth anniversary of the Liberation. Also in 1964, the ex-servicemen's ministry 
produced a film entitled Trente ans d'histoire, 1914-1944}
It may seem odd, also, that a French experience involving so little combat should 
have given rise to so much rhetoric exalting "la France combattante". (The term was 
employed in order to bring together the London Free French, the maquis and the regular 
army under one banner, alongside all the soldiers who had defended France throughout 
history.) Yet in one sense this is a natural reaction. The humiliating defeat of 1940 was 
attributed in part to the pacifism that took hold after the First World War, a pacifism 
that propagated the idea that all war was futile and evil. In the 1930s the army did not
' Serge B arcellin i in 'Resistance et m ém oire, d'Auschwitz à Sarajevo. A ctes du colloque de Lyon, octobre 
1992', I, ed. by E m ile M alet (Paris: Hachette, 1993), p .170.
have the unequivocal backing of the people and politicians that it had traditionally 
enjoyed. After 1945, then, France's leaders, de Gaulle foremost among them, wanted to 
ensure that the nation's capacity for self-defence should never again be undermined in 
this way. France was indebted to its fighting men and women, and they would always 
be indispensable, militarily and politically. If there was one thing that had to be avoided 
in the future, it was another military invasion of French territory. Hence, the policy of 
"independence", the well-equipped army, the "force de frappe", the culture of military 
grandeur, and the glorification of "le monde combattant".^
Despite such rhetoric, the discourse of a continuation of the union sacrée in 
defence of the nation simply did not ring true for the Second World War, The First 
World War was, for all its enormity, a straightforward fight between sovereign nations 
over territory, wealth and status. Tilly's observation that "war makes the state (and the 
state makes war)" can be applied readily to France's experience from 1914-1918/' The 
nation-state emerged from the conflict free of many of the divisions that had plagued it 
beforehand -  or so it seemed. There were rough edges to the much-vaunted unity, but 
the indisputable contribution of the "poilus" to the defence of the homeland provided a 
stabilising factor. Memorials to the Great War all looked the same, and were distributed 
uniformly throughout the country. There was no distinctive socialist, or conservative, or 
Catholic, or Jewish, or provincial, or Parisian memory.
However, the nature of France's predicament during the next war was such that its 
people were divided into an unusually large and diverse number of distinct categories, 
each with its own experience and consequently its own memory. It brought ideological 
elements into play which cut across national frontiers, and which, in France, opened 
wounds that would not be easily healed. In the preface to their book on memorials of the
 ^ See Robert Frank, 'La m ém oire em poisonnée', in L a F rance des années noires, 2  vo ls , ed. by Jean-Pierre 
A zém a and François Bédarida (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993).
Second World W ar/ Serge Barcellini and Annette Wieviorka explained that they felt 
compelled to use the expression "lieux du souvenir" instead of the more common "lieux 
de mémoire", because they considered that the latter had overtones of coherence and 
unity which did not fit their subject matter. This subject matter was, they said, 
particularly atomised and fragmentary, and merited a special approach. They judged, in 
other words, that the title of a work spamiing every aspect of the collective memory of 
France - Pierre Nora's Lieux de Mémoire - was too narrow for a work covering the 
memory of a episode that lasted five years!
Their approach may of course be questioned like any other, but it serves to 
illustrate the perplexing diversity of collective memories of the last war. A non- 
exhaustive inventory would have to include Vichy officials, economic collaborators, 
"attentistes", members of the different interior resistance movements, de Gaulle's Free 
French, deportees, prisoners of war, hostages, STO workers in Germany,^ "malgre- 
nous" from Alsace and Lorraine, and volunteers who formed the Charlemagne division 
of the Waffen SS.^ And the single category of deportees, for instance, could be 
subdivided; after the war there were at least six different former deportees associations, 
each containing its own blend of communist or Gaullist resisters, Jews, hostages, and so 
on.^ In Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris, there are nine different deportation memorials, 
corresponding to the different concentration and extermination camps.
 ^Quoted in A nthony D. Smith, N ation a l Iden tity  (Penguin: London, 1991), p .27.
P assant, sou v ien s-to i (Paris: Plon, 1995).
 ^ B etw een  June 1942 and July 1944, 732 626 workers w ent o ff  to Germ any under the S ervice  du trava il 
ob liga to ire .
 ^Around 7000  Frenchmen fall into this last category. Jacques Doriot, notably, w on the Iron Cross for his 
bravery on the Eastern Front.
’ T hese w ere the FND IR P {F édération  nationale des déportés internés, résistan ts e t p a tr io te s), the 
F N D IR  {F édéra tion  n ationale des déportés in ternés de la  R ésistan ce), the U N A D IF  {U nion nationale des  
associa tion s de déportés e t d'internés et fa m illes) , the FIAP {F édéra tion  in tern ationale  des anciens 
p riso n n iers  p o litiq u es), the A N FR O M  {A ssociation  nationale des fa m ille s  de résistan ts e t o tages m orts 
p o u r  la  F rance) and the A D IR  {A ssociation  des déportées internées de la  R ésistan ce).
During our period "I'oubli" was conceived of as a danger to humanity, and "la 
mémoire" (which sometimes translates as "memory", sometimes as "remembrance") as 
an end in itself, something that had to be defended at all costs (more details in chapter 
six). There was certainly no shortage of battalions willing come to its defence. The 
extent to which those battalions were capable of pulling in the same broad direction is 
another matter. On 7 Mai'ch 1993 the Journal Officiel carried the decree establishing the 
new national commemoration of Vichy's "antisemitic and racist crimes and 
persecutions". Article Two dealt with the composition of a "comité national" whose task 
would be to defend the memory of these misdeeds. Clause three provided for the 
inclusion on the committee of no fewer than nineteen "représentants des principales 
organisations qui ont pour objet d'entretenir le souvenir des victimes des persécutions 
racistes et antisémites et la mémoire de l'internement et de la déportation". On the one 
hand, the proliferation of so many associations was in itself an argument "for memory" 
that could not easily be ignored. On the other, this facet of war memory had been 
divided up into so many different protectorates that all but the uninitiated risked losing 
their way completely.
Whereas in the aftermath of the war the diverse associations had devoted much of 
their energy to practical problems such as official status, pensions and allowances, as 
time wore on memory became the number one priority. The race was on to leave a mark 
on the memorial territory, permanently if possible. At the close of our period, the site of 
the former internment camp at Drancy, for example, was bristling with plaques and 
monuments, erected by different associations to commemorate different aspects of a 
phenomenon that was itself only one of many aspects of the war. At Drancy the 
inventory was impressive: there was a sculpture with inscription, a "wagon-témoin", a
"conservatoire historique"/ and no fewer than six memorial plaques, commemorating, 
respectively, the victims of racist and antisemitic persecution, the route of an escape 
tunnel, the poet Max Jacob, the British troops held at Drancy for a time, the Jews 
interned there prior to deportation, and, finally, the other prisoners of war who passed 
through the cam p/
Defeat and occupation gave rise to a situation in which groups and individuals 
were forced to make complex political and moral choices, or to accept an ambiguous 
role composed of a number of variables; it produced the diverse collective traditions 
already mentioned, and also a large number of individual heroes, villains and martyrs. 
De Gaulle, Moulin, Pétain, Laval, Touvier, Papon, Aubrac, St. Exupéry, Mitterrand, 
Marchais: each of these household names represents a distinct experience and a distinct 
tradition. Even more significant is the number of memorials, usually plaques, dedicated 
to individuals who are not at all well Icnown. For World War One there are very few 
memorials to individuals. It was the war of collective sacrifice, the war of the unknown 
soldier.
Some of the diverse experiences of World War Two were complimentary and 
reconcilable. The memory of people who were taken hostage and executed by the 
Germans was generally subsumed within the memory of the Resistance, for example. 
(This process had the double merit of turning death into heroic martyrdom, and swelling 
the ranlcs of the Resistance). Others, such as membership of the milice and 
imprisonment in an internment camp, were deeply contradictory. Plainly, finding a 
method of integrating all these parts into a homogeneous whole in a synthesised 
national memory was always going to be fraught with difficulties. Therein lies the
O pened in 1989.
 ^There is now  a w ebsite devoted to Drancy.
problematic but by the same token intriguing nature of the relationship between the 
French and this aspect of their past.
In contrast to World War One, then, the French have been unable to settle on a 
durable official memory of les années noires with the capacity to satisfy popular 
memory. Symptomatically, the date of a national day of commemoration has never been 
entirely consensual, unlike Armistice Day. The anniversary of the end of the war in 
Europe, on 8 May, cannot be said to have captured the imagination of the nation in the 
same way as 11 November. Valérie Giscard d'Estaing even decided to remove its 
official status in 1975. Such a decision would have been unthinkable for Armistice Day. 
The unpopularity of his measure could be taken as proof that the French were firmly 
attached to this commemoration; but this would be to neglect a welter of complicating 
factors - opposition to Giscard's quest for a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation, 
for example - allied to the simple fact that people rarely react positively to state 
interference in "their" national holidays. Although the Mitterrand administration 
reinstated the 8 May as a. fête nationale, this date has had to compete with other, more 
populist, anniversaries, like those of the Normandy landings, and of course Paris's 
liberation and local liberations, as well as more poignant occasions such as Deportation 
Day or the Véf d'Hiv' commemorations.
National memory and identity under pressure
In addition to the centrifugal forces inherent in the events of 1939-45, the idea of 
the nation was becoming less sacred in Mitterrand's France. It was no longer the 
uncontested reference point for collective identity. Ethnic, religious and other 
"differences" within French society were being proclaimed vocally, and the government
had to take account of the trend. In particular, as we shall see in chapter five, French 
Jews were insisting more vehemently than ever on the distinctiveness of their 
experience during the Second World War. This had important consequences for the 
forms of commemoration that had traditionally been used.
The rise of an ideology based not on national sovereignty but on universal human 
rights brought more pressure to bear on the "national narrative" approach to war and 
occupation (chapter six). The rights of individuals and minorities featured prominently 
in the discourse of the newly empowered socialists, and France ratified the European 
convention safeguarding "human rights and fundamental dignities" in 1981. Human 
rights was also one of the media's favoured topics. An important consequence was that 
France's experience of the Second World War was increasingly viewed as a struggle to 
safeguard basic human rights rather than as a question of national independence and 
dignity.
Similarly, the accelerated drive towards further European integration, powered by 
the "Franco-German motor", meant that German sensibilities had to be considered when 
war was remembered. More than ever, the war was reinvented as a symbol of the 
progress made in the relationship between the two countries, and commemorative 
speeches put forward the European project as an antidote to further conflict. It was no 
longer appropriate to talk of "les martyrs français" on one hand, and "la barbarie 
allemande" on the other.
Another striking feature of the collective memory of World Two, highlighted by 
most studies of commemorative practice, is the dominance of "le fait l o c a l " p e o p l e  
have felt more comfortable remembering events and protagonists directly related to the 
experience of their commune or region. This is a topic which has produced hundreds of
L a m ém oire des F rançais: 40  ans de com m ém orations de la  2èm e gu erre  m on dia le , ed. by CNRS  
(Paris: éditions du C NR S, 1986), p,49.
books and articles, so it would be unwise to include it in a study of national forms of 
commemoration and remembrance. However, it is worth recording that the local 
dimension constituted another strain on the national synthesis. During the Second 
World War, different regions found themselves in vastly different predicaments. France 
was divided territorially, not only by the line drawn between zone occupée and zone 
libre, but by politico-regional affinities that can often be traced back to the Revolution. 
Some areas were barely affected by war and occupation; others have become 
synonymous with it. These regions in particular are sometimes reluctant to play along 
with a national synthesis that may sit awkwardly with local experience. France 3's 
commemorative television series "La France libérée" attempted to do justice to the 
diversity of experience by devoting a programme to one each of twelve regions. 
According to the makers of the series, they had started from the principle that "il n'y a 
pas une, mais des France libérées".
Indicative of this phenomenon is the lack of a national resistance memorial or 
museum, in spite of the proliferation of local and regional ones. (The national memorial 
at Mont-Valérien is dedicated to "la France combattante", not specifically the 
Resistance.) In 1989 the Comité d'action de la Résistance, an umbrella organisation for 
diverse groups, attempted to launch an initiative which would have resulted in a national 
Resistance memorial. There was also a plan to install a museum of "national defence", 
in which the Resistance would feature prominently, in the Hôtel des Invalides. 
However, by the end of our period, and to this day, neither project had been realised.’^
The makers w ere Pierre A zém a, François Bédarida and Olivier W ieviorka. D etails in L e M onde, 26-27  
June 1994.
Jean Kahn's personal archives, held at the Institu t F rançois M itterrand. (Jean Kahn w as a m em ber o f  
the C on seil d'E tat and an Ely see adviser, with special responsibility for the fiftieth anniversary 
com m em orations w hich fell during Mitterrand's second septennat. He draughted m any o f  the president's 
com m em orative speeches. M. Kahn is currently vice-president o f  the Institu t F ran çois M itterrand .)
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Why does the past matter?
So the question that interests us is, how do national forms of remembrance, whose 
task it is to promote cohesion and unity, cope with such diversity and division? In order 
to answer that question, we must try to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and 
functions of commemoration. But even before doing that, it is useful to ask why the 
practice loiown as commemoration exists in the first place. In other words, why is the 
past important to collective entities, and why do they bother to organise the 
remembrance of that past?
It is no great revelation that the French are particularly attached to history, above 
all their own history. At a cabinet meeting in 1982, François Mitterrand declared that 
"un peuple qui n'enseigne pas son histoire est un peuple qui perd son identité".'^ His 
statement met with general approval, as one might expect. In France, the idea that 
history has some primordial significance is so firmly established that it is considered to 
apply universally. From a French point of view, it is difficult to comprehend a collective 
entity like the United States, whose coherence is drawn essentially from a stake in the 
present and a vision of the future. In France, historical periodicals such as l'Histoire, 
Historama and Historia, boast a total circulation of around 600 000. In the United 
Kingdom, by way of comparison, equivalent titles sell in the region of 30 000 copies.'"' 
Yet because France's past has often been divisive, because national history has often 
been the story of national schism, the fascination has a problematic side. How does the 
collective consciousness come to terms with this paradox?
A popular solution has been escapism. In the early 1980s Marc Ferro observed 
that the Asterix stories were by far the most popular "historical" texts in France. He
D efence m inister Jean-Pierre C hevènem ent backed the Invalides project, but he resigned in 1991 before it 
could be im plem ented. A  m usée de la  F rance com battan te  is planned at the In va lides  for the year 2000 .
Q uoted in A ntoine Frost, D ouze leçons sur l'h istoire  (Paris: Seuil, 1996), p. 16.
''' Prost, p. 15.
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concluded that this was because Asterix was the "hero of a period of which the history 
is not a matter of contention". Ferro drew attention to the uproar that had invariably 
greeted contentious films and other cultural material. He asserted that "the fear of the 
past in France is still clear, in whatever form it is written" and that "history-as-problem 
has a smaller audience in France than history-as-dream".'^ More recently, in April 1994, 
the journal Autrement grouped together a series of articles on a range of historical topics 
under the heading, "l'amnésie nationale; une spécificité française?"'^ Although 
conclusions varied with each article, the general consensus was that the French were 
particularly prone to a form of collective amnesia. It was felt that, in certain 
circumstances, fascination could transform itself into phobia.
One cannot but feel that such language is anachronistic. To claim that the French 
were only interested in the positive aspects of their history, and that self-esteem and 
civil peace invariably came before the historical facts, was a cliché that could no longer 
be glibly applied to our period. With regard to World War Two, indeed, one might even 
claim that the situation was being reversed. As we shall see in what follows, during the 
Mitterrand years there was an obsession with the "difficult" history of 1939 to 1945, 
while anything too positive was, increasingly, eyed with suspicion, and in some cases 
debunked. History-as-dream was becoming passé; history-as-problem was, it seemed, 
what the public demanded.
Famously, the schools of the Third Republic immortalised the formula, "nos 
ancêtres les Gaulois". It was applied even where patently inappropriate, notably to 
African children in the colonies. And because of the integrating zeal of the republican 
tradition, for a significant number of French people, too, "nos ancêtres" were certainly




not the Gauls. In its rather surreal way, however, this fallacious profession of common 
ancestry points to the unbreakable bond that links collective identity and collective 
memory. The "nos ancêtres les Gaulois" formula is best understood as a sort of 
metaphor, meaning not that French identity is contingent on a direct biological link to 
ancient ancestry, but that it is stronger and more durable if cemented by a knowledge of, 
and affinity with, the nation's past. In 1997 the leading French intellectual Edgar Morin 
wrote a newspaper article in which he described how he came to identify with France, 
the land to which his parents had come as immigrants: "cest à l'école et à travers 
l'histoire de France que je me suis identifié à la personne France. J'ai souffert de ses 
souffrances historiques, j'ai joui de ses victoires, j ’ai adoré ses h é r o s " . In other words, 
he began to feel French as he became imbued with a sense of the nation's past, a past of 
which neither he nor his forebears had any direct experience.
Yet it must not be forgotten that memory can also be an obstacle to collective 
identity. The totalitarian régimes of the twentieth century were all too aware that their 
subjects' attachment to their common past was deep enough to hamper the creation of 
the desired "new man". They therefore went to great lengths to cut people off from that 
past. Books, archives, and other documents were destroyed or altered: these classic 
methods had been used in previous centuries. But the likes of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot, 
realising that a popular, collective memory existed beyond the domain of books and 
documents, took things a stage further, and tried to reach into people's minds in order to 
cleanse them of any material that might be incompatible with the new order. At the 
same time, they realised that it was not prudent to leave a void where the old ties used to 
be: The gaps were to be filled with a state-produced historical identity. A particularly 
efficient method of instilling this was the practice of commemoration, which offered the 
convenience of being easy to stage and control without having the shrill quality of
Le M onde, 5 July 1997.
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blatant propaganda. Hence Jacques le Goffs observation that "la commémoration 
connaît un sommet dans l'Allemagne nazi et l'Italie fasciste".'^
It would be naive, however, to believe that only dictatorships try to manipulate 
collective memory. Democracies, too, attempt to cover up or obscure the troubling 
parts of their own pasts, just as they endeavour to accentuate the parts that do them 
honour. But unlike under totalitarian régimes, there is less centralised control in 
democracies; in fact one often finds that the collective relationship with the past is 
largely that which the majority of people have wanted. In many cases the priority given 
to certain aspects of the common past, far from being forcibly applied from above, is a 
matter of general consensus. Indeed one of the features of democratic systems is their 
in-built disincentive to political leaders to grapple with truths which reflect badly on 
their electorate or with which that electorate identifies strongly.
The stubborn reality of human nature obstructs both the noblest and the most 
dastardly designs. Those political regimes -  from the Jacobins to the Khmer Rouge - 
that have experimented with a radical, "year zero" approach to history, have ultimately 
foundered. The traditions in which collective memory is sustained usually prove to be 
resistant. People do seem to want to look backwards to work out who they are. The past 
counts. Even the leaders of the French Revolution must have realised this deep down. 
True, the Revolution was presented as heralding a new chapter in the history of 
manlcind. Human history was to be reset at zero: the Gregorian calender was replaced 
by the Revolutionary calender. Yet at the same time the revolutionaries took care to 
advertise their historical credentials: France was reconnecting with a mythologised age 
of freedom, that of the Gauls, which pre-dated the tyranny of absolute monarchy. There 
was also a change of emphasis from the lives of kings and queens that constituted
Tzvetan Todorov, Les abus de la  m ém oire  (Paris: Arléa, 1995), p.25. 
Ferro, The U se and  A buse o f  H istory, p .97.
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history under the Ancien Régime to the story of the development and origins of the 
newborn nation. Thus the past was not eradicated but democratised, and a crucial idea - 
that history includes not only the rulers but the people they rule - was introduced, 
however tentatively. Ever since, and in spite of their professed confidence in man's 
intelligence and reason, French republicans have often had recourse to this instinct to 
seek comfort in "ancestor-worship" in order to instill a sense of belonging. They have 
realised that a nation is not so much the sum of a territory and an ideology as the sum of 
a territory and a memory.
So memory, routine and tradition have always had to be rehabilitated in the end. 
Dismissed by "progressive" thinkers and politicians as a hindrance to improvement of 
the "new man", this cultural baggage has been impossible to discard. There is nothing 
extraordinary about this. After all, collective memory carries the accumulated 
intellectual capital that has permitted the survival of the group until the present time. 
Even if it had the necessary material capital, no group would be able to function without 
its stock of custom and tradition. As André Levi-Gourhan has remarked, "La tradition 
est biologiquement aussi indispensable à l'espèce humaine que le conditionnement 
génétique l'est aux sociétés d'insectes".
Collective memory
So what is the nature of this "collective memory" we are dealing with? Collective 
memory is not like memory in the normal sense. In France, no one actually remembers 
the storming of the Bastille, but we say that the event is part of the nation's "collective 
memory". This is not just a matter of laziness of thought or language: while no 
individual French person remembers what happened in 1789, he or she forms part of a
14
15
clearly defined group which has retained the memory as part of its heritage. Indeed, it is 
for this reason that people are willing to dissolve their individual identity in that of a 
group. The memory of the individual is alarmingly short -  shorter even than his or her 
life. That of the group, on the other hand, extends far beyond the individual existence; it 
precedes it, and will keep on running after it has e n d e d . I t  acts almost like a secular 
form of immortality of the soul, guaranteeing that each brief, fragile, individual 
existence will live on in some form within a continuous collective tradition.
Collective memory, which helps to form collective identity, is not just a collection 
of individual memories. Its very nature is different. As Vincent Engel has pointed out, 
in a healthy society the individual has access to both an individual memory and a 
collective m e m o r y . I f  the latter is totally dominant, the society could be described as 
totalitarian. If, on the other hand, individuals have no access to a collective conscience, 
then society does not meaningfully exist.
Commemoration under Mitterrand
The degree to which individuals have access to that collective conscience can be 
measured by attitudes to commemoration. Therein lies one motive for studying 
commemorations during the Mitterrand years. Another justification is, quite simply, that 
the commemorations were so numerous. In 1990 Michel Kajman wrote an article in Le 
Monde entitled "l'obsession commemorative" in which he asked, "à quoi rime cette 
fièvre commemorative qui ne cesse de monter, qui a ses institutions, ses stratégies, ses 
rythmes, ses points aveugles?"^^ Robert Gildea observed in 1994 that "the taste for
Jacques Le G off, H isto ire  et M ém oire  (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 174. 
Smith., N a tion a l Identity, p. 160.
22 M alet, éd., R ésistan ce e t m ém oire, 1993. 
24  N ovem ber 1990.
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commemorating anniversaries has not faded". What is more, he added, "so long as 
anniversaries are celebrated past struggles, past achievements and past heroes will be 
dredged up to define, publicise and legitimate political cu l tures" .The  weekly news 
magazine Le Point attempted to come to terms with, and coin a phrase for, the 
phenomenon with a special dossier, in July 1995, on what it termed "la 
commémomania". It was only the latest in a long line of newspapers and magazines to 
do so.^  ^ Writing in 1996, Liliane Lazat had the following complaint to make about 
contemporary mores: "Un des maux de notre société contemporaine est ce besoin de 
commémorer à tout propos. On commémore, rend homage, célèbre les plus grands 
hommes comme les plus insignifiants".^^
During the Mitterrand era the communicative potential of commemoration was 
indeed utilised to the full. The tone was given right at the outset, with Mitterrand's 
famous visit to the Pantheon on 21 May 1981, when he laid a rose at the tombs of Jean 
Jaurès, Jean Moulin and Victor Schoelcher. Gérard Namer wrote that "la première 
année du nouveau septennat sera donc caractérisée par une reprise de toutes les 
anciennes formes de commémoration", allegedly gone to seed under the modernising 
liberal Giscard d'Estaing.^^
If anything, the commemorative frenzy increased during Mitterrand's second 
mandate, thanks to a busy anniversary calendar. The cycle of anniversaries took its toll 
on the head of state. In September 1994 Elysée adviser Jean Kahn acknowledged this in 
a note to Mitterrand: "J'ai bien compris", he wrote, "que l'accumulation des cérémonies 
du cinquantenaire vous a laissé comme un sentiment de saturat ion".The catalogue
24 The P a st in F rench H istory  (N ew  H aven and London: Y ale U niversity Press, 1994), p.343.
22 July 1995.
Liliane Lazat review ing Bernard-Henri Levy's L a P u reté  dangereuse  in The F rench R eview  vol. 69  
(February 1996).
La com m ém oration  en F rance de 1945 à nos jo u r s  (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1987), p .207.
N ote o f  23 Septem ber 1994. Jean Kahn's archives.
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published annually by the Délégation aux célébrations nationales, a branch of the 
ministry of culture, is a good ready-reckoner. When it was launched in 1986 this 
catalogue, which lists the events of the year which have been officially recognised as 
"célébrations nationales", was still nothing more than a leaflet, although it was already 
clear that it would have to be enlarged. In 1988 the brochure took up one hundred 
pages; by 1997 there were 238 pages, with an index and illustrations.^^ On the whole, 
the French people seemed happy enough with this state of affairs. In April 1994, 67% 
considered that "les commémorations historiques sont une bonne chose car c'est ainsi 
que l'idée de la nation reste enracinée dans notre pays".^^
What is commemoration?
Commemoration permits reappraisal or reaffirmation of the connection, 
sometimes undervalued or taken for granted, between past, present and future. 
Commemorations are historical debate (even if promoted as consensus) conducted in 
public, with all the politicisation and manipulation this implies.^* Of the very public 
nature of these commemorative debates, there can be no doubt. As a measure of the 
interest they stimulate, it is sufficient to point out that, in 1989, around half of all 
opinion polls commissioned in France were related to the French Revolution's 
bicentennial; in 1994, the same proportion took some aspect of the Second World War 
as their su b je c t.In  bringing "our past" so clamorously into the public domain, these 
commemorations are also about identity, since they both express and help to determine
Article by Jean Leclant (president o f  D éléga tion  aioc célébra tions n a tionales) in L a  R evue des sc iences  
m ora les e t po litiq u es , n ° l (1998).
Sofres for L e F igaro-M agazine, 30 April 1994.
M. W oolacott, G uardian , 25 M ay 1994,
A ccording to CEVIPOF data base.
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a collective view of a common past. Any collective identity, any sense of belonging 
which extends beyond the individual, has a vertical and a horizontal context: we define 
ourselves with reference to what exists around us at a given time, but also with 
reference to what has gone before, and with an eye on what will come after. 
Commemoration has a privileged position on the intersection of the vertical and the 
horizontal axes. It is of its time, but necessarily reaches back into the past and forward 
into the future.
The very existence of the practice of commemoration testifies to the importance 
which our society accords to the "vertical" definition of its identity. Even more 
revealing perhaps is the fact that we consider it perfectly natural to want to mark the 
anniversaries of certain events every so often. Anniversaries punctuate our lives in a 
seemingly natural way, taking their place among the other notable dates in the diary. 
Serge Barcell ini has spoken of "la vertu pédagogique du rythme régulier des 
anniversaires, qui permet de faire entrer la mémoire nationale dans le temps de la vie 
quotidienne des F ra n ç a is " .Over time, regular anniversaries act like points fixed on a 
graph, which one can join with a line and then project into the void, forming a figure 
that lies beyond what is empirically known, beyond the domain of "what has happened". 
So it is essential that commemorative events leave a lasting impression on the 
consciousness, just as the stelae and plaques associated with them leave a lasting 
impression on the landscape. "La commémoration est un message épique que l'on 
envoie vers le futur, vers des commémorations futures, vers des public f u t u r s " . To 
look at things from the other direction, we see that commemoration tends to become not
Former director o f  the D éléga tion  à la  M ém oire e t à  l ’inform ation h istorique, then d irec teu r de  cab in et 
at the ex-servicem an's ministry (now  part o f  the ministry o f  defence). Interview in Pierre-François 
Raim ond, 'Un exem ple de politique publique de la mémoire: la délégation à la m ém oire et à l'information 
historique' (unpublished masters dissertation, Fondation nationale des sc ien ces politiques, Paris, 1994),
p4.
Namer, La C om m ém oration  en F rance, p. 154.
18
19
just a moment when an important event is remembered, but a moment when all the other 
commemorations in between are also remembered, if only involuntarily. Indeed, the 
form and content of commemorations sometimes depend more on a previous 
anniversary than on the event that is ostensibly being remembered. Not only does this 
make their organisation easier, it provides a crucial sense of continuity from anniversary 
to anniversary.
We are always seeking to leave an imprint, physical or mental, which will remain 
when we are gone. In 1945 the Fédération nationale des déportés, internés, résistants et 
patriotes produced a brochure for ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversaries of the 
liberation of the concentration c a m p s . T h e  slogan it used, "Notre mémoire, une 
garantie pour l'avenir", sums up the close relationship between one's memory of the past 
and one's vision of the future, and gives an indication of the importance people attach to 
transmission of their experience. We seem to need to remind ourselves regularly that we 
are not floating in a void, that we are fixed on a straight and continuous course, that 
there is a relatively coherent link between our past, our present and our future. Yet there 
is nothing that obliges us to consider the passage of blocks of time - which has no 
intrinsic form - to be of any significance, nor is there anything that makes an event more 
relevant fifty years after it took place than it would be fifty one years later, or forty eight 
years and two months later.
Our modes of commemorating the past seem to be connected to the complex view 
of history that characterises late twentieth century western society. In one sense it is 
seen in terms of progress, and expresses confidence in our capacity to learn from and 
build on what has gone before. And yet a pre-condition of this ability to progress is our 




from our ancestors because we are made of the same stuff or invested with the same 
values, whether this "stuff be specific to a nation, to a religion, to a political 
organisation or to a football club. Commemoration is based on a central contradiction 
which assumes that the future will function according to the same basic principles as the 
past, but that its direction can be changed according to lessons drawn from that past.
It is important to bear in mind, also, that we can only conceive of the future in 
terms of what we have already experienced. The truth about the past experience of the 
group we belong to, and the significance we choose to attach to it, is therefore crucial. 
And of course this debate about the past would be futile, and would certainly lack the 
passion so often in evidence, if the world was going to end tomorrow. If that were the 
case, there would be no posterity to pass one's history on to, there would be no future to 
imagine. Commemoration, allowing as it does for a more public airing of historical 
debate than is customary, matters because it frames the image of the past that is 
projected into the future.
The value of past events as foundations on which the future may be built becomes 
all the clearer in the "post-modern" (a term which seems to be no more than another 
way of expressing a state of confusion) context of the end of a century during which the 
steady march of history has accelerated to a sprint before fragmenting into a chaotic 
free-for-all. When the reality of the present is elusive and self-contradictory, and the 
future appears to open out in a million different directions, the reference points provided 
by a common past, even if these, too, are not as stable as they once were, take on the 
allure of precious assets. So the conception of commemorative events as a method of 
transferring identity, values, and lessons from the past to the future via the present is, 
amidst the confusion, more firmly rooted than ever. This is something that will become 
more evident as specific instances are analysed.
2 0
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That, at any rate, is the more positive reading of the status quo. It may be that 
commemoration has started to serve quite simply as a refuge from the future. There is a 
long-held tradition that emphasises the mysterious, cyclical nature of history, and 
engenders a feeling of helplessness in the face of the tribulations "fate" or "destiny" 
holds in store. If this is the attitude that prevails, the significance of commemoration 
may be that enables those who would rather bury their heads in the sand to do so more 
easily.
Applying this last theory to, say, French party politics in the Mitterrand era, we 
can appreciate its pertinence. By the mid 1990s some commentators were claiming that 
the mainstream parties, bereft of ideas, had retreated into a sort of commemorative 
cocoon. Politics were dominated less by memorable achievements than by memory tout 
court. Ideological argument was replaced by historical discussion (not without passion, 
on occasion). To borrow Thomas Ferenczi's succinct résumé, "la gauche, qui a perdu sa 
foi dans le socialisme, se partage entre la nostalgie et le reniement. La droite, qui se 
divise, hésite entre le gaullisme et son contraire".
Yet this phenomenon does not mean that all the forward-moving energy of 
modern democracy was simply abandoned in favour of a return to ancestor worship and 
the cyclical laws of nature. In an important sense, Mitterrand’s France still considered 
itself superior to what had gone before. For commemoration gives us the right to pick 
and choose the aspects of the past we wish to revisit, and we reserve the right to filter 
them through our modern consciousness and represent them using modern media. As 
Gilles Lipovetsky has explained, "L'ancien n'est plus un modèle. Nous commémorons, 
autrement dit, ce que nous ne prenons pas pour m o d è l e " . While this is perhaps going a
Le M onde, 29 A ugust 1994. 
P oin t, 22  July 1995.
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little too far, in the final analysis we are often tacitly thankful that we are in a position to 
commemorate, in other words that we have moved on since then.
2 2
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C HAPTER TW O  
NATIONAL NARRATIVES
"Tant que les lions n'auront pas leurs propres historiens, les histoires de chasse 
continueront de glorifier les chasseurs."
-African proverb
Collective identity
It was Ernest Renan who said that "la nation est une âme, un principe spirituel".* 
What he meant is that collective life is not only about the policies employed to deal with 
taxes, employment, education, state institutions, and so on, it is also about shaping or 
galvanising collective identity. Doing so involves mobilising forces, often historical, 
that talk the language of belonging. The most renowned politicians in all ages have been 
so not because they have lowered taxes or overhauled the social security system, but 
because they have been able to tap into the soul of the nation, they have been able to 
give to that nation a sense of style and purpose uniquely suited to its inclinations and 
traditions.
These themes have always preoccupied French statesmen and intellectuals. 
Michelet wrote in 1846 of the people of France sustained "by our heroic legend, the 
invisible spirit of the heroes of our wars, the wind of the old flag".^ Conversely, France 
had never been so prosperous as she was in 1968, yet the whole country nearly 
imploded because the coherence of the collective entity was lost. In our time Jacques
' L es lieux de m ém oire, ed. by Pierre N ora (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), vol.II, parti, p .328.
 ^ Hans K hon, M aking o f  the M o d em  F rench M in d  (N ew  York: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), p .4 1.
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Attali, former adviser to François Mitterrand at the Elysée, has said that the role of élites 
in a given society is to produce for its people "une idée claire de son histoire", without 
which "aucun peuple ne peut vivre longtemps".^ Alain Duhamel wrote that "Une nation 
ambitieuse ne se contente pas de pain et d'eau. Il lui faut un supplément d'âme, c'est-à- 
dire un style, un dessin et une spécificité."* Man does not live by bread alone, especially 
if he is French. That is why the past, and people's conception of it, is not of merely 
academic interest.
Robert Gildea was evidently directing his thinking along these lines when he said 
of commemoration that "the sacralisation of its triumphs and defeats, its heroes, its 
martyrs, is the obvious way in which a political community defines itself, establishes 
consensus, and legitimises its claims."^ The past is not merely the sum of persons and 
actions which happen to have preceded us in time, but an inventory of interacting ideas, 
values, heroes and heroines - potential or ready-made identities - that can be deployed in 
the political battles of the present day. Hence the common spectacle of politicians 
squabbling about which group "owns" which hero of national history. Jeanne d'Arc, 
who seems to have been claimed by every political formation at some point, is a prime 
example. But the phenomenon is always with us. So it was that in 1994, when the time 
came to remember the heroic resistance fighters of the Vercors, the prime minister 
Edouard Balladur decided to make a personal appearance. This caused François 
Mitterrand's advisers at the Elysée to react. Jean Kalin, who advised on war 
commemoration, told the president that "le Vercors est une affaire nationale, qu'il ne 
serait pas opportun (. . .) d'abandonner à M. Balladur".^
 ^ L e M onde, 15 D ecem ber 1995.
A lain D uham el, L es P eu rs F rançaises  (Paris; Flammarion, 1993), p .267.
 ^ 1994, p.lO.
 ^N ote  from Jean Kahn to François Mitterrand, 10 June 1994. Jean Kahn's archives.
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So commemoration and collective identity are intimately linked. By definition, 
collective -identity needs a public forum in which to express and consolidate itself. Like 
anything belonging to the world of ideas, it only exists meaningfully in so far as it can 
be expressed in words or deeds. Commemorative ceremonies provide for such 
expression. They also provide an opportunity to deconstruct these collective identities, 
which are socially constructed (as opposed to naturally occurring) in the first place. 
What is constructed can always be deconstructed, even if it does present itself as 
timeless and natural. As Eisenstadt and Geisen explain:
M em bership of, and partaking in, a collective identity depends on special processes o f  induction, 
ranging horn various rites o f  initiation to various collective rituals, in w hich the attributes o f  
"similarity" am ong its mem bers, as against the strangeness, the d ifferences, the distinction o f  the 
other, is sym bolically  constructed and defined.’
One of the key aims of official commemoration, then, is to reinforce a sense of 
unity among members of the group, by recalling, within a controlled framework, an 
instance or instances when its core values were brought to the fore. Thierry Gasnier, 
writing in 1994, complained that official commemorations were nothing more than "une 
machine de plus à fabriquer facilement du consensus".^ It is worth noting that the 
"grands hommes" to whom Mitterrand paid homage at the Pantheon (see above, p. 16) 
were not exclusively of the left. The group that was "rassemblé" was intended to be 
wider than a single political party and its electorate. Jean Moulin in particular had come 
to be regarded as the ultimate unifier, having formed the different branches of the 
Resistance into a coherent force destined to save the honour of the nation. Also, it is
’ 'The Construction o f  C ollective Identity', m  A rch ives européennes de so c io lo g ie , 36 (1995), p.74. 
® 'La France com m ém orante', in L e D éba t, n°78 (January-February 1994).
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often forgotten that on 18 June 1981, the new president visited the crypt at Mont 
Valérien, shrine to "la France combattante". He meditated for a full five minutes -  much 
longer, it was noted, than any previous president -  at the tombs of the fifteen martyrs 
inhumed there since 1945. In doing so, said Gérard Namer, "le président témoigne 
auprès des Français de Vobligation morale qu'il y a à se souvenir".^ Even amidst the 
euphoria of a landmark election victory, amidst all the neo-revolutionary bravado, 
Mitterrand's choice of symbols was designed to mclude rather than exclude; or, at any 
rate, to balance the alternative discourse which prioritised the "glorious rupture" with 
the "ancien régime".
The main protagonists and episodes of national history are powerful because they 
appeal to what is already implicit, to what does not need to be said; they do their deftest 
work under the surface, calling on a set of values, prejudices and emotions that form the 
shared cultural hinterland of a given group. Successful politicians generally possess a 
symbolic sense, which tells them which gesture or reference is appropriate at which 
moment and for which purpose. By and large Mitterrand had a keen sense of symbolic 
value, and the symbolic figures he invoked in 1981 have in due course become part of 
the mythology of that time. Nadine Gautier and Jean-François Rouge justly observed 
that "François Mitterrand est passé maître dans l'art de manier les symboles historiques 
ou préhistoriques: la roche de solutré, le combat désespéré de Vercingétorix, autant d' 
épisodes érigés en parangons de l'unité nationale et du terroir français".***
Ail this lends credence to Arnaud Teyssier's observation that, by 1995, "la 
démocratie contemporaine française est prisonnière de symboles".** The imprisonment 
was secured with the aid of the media, through which politicians and others must
 ^N am er, L a C om m ém oration  en F rance, p .207; my italics.
A utrem ent, n°88 (1987).




channel their messages to the wider public. Political and collective organisations were 
increasingly adept at feeding the insatiable appetite of the media, particularly television, 
for concise but powerful images, words and pictures that catch the imagination in an 
instant. Mitterrand and his advisers loiew that his visit to the Pantheon would be 
followed by reporters and television crews whose remit would be to crystallise the 
moment in a few lines or in a few seconds, to capture and convey its essence briefly, but 
to make the moment last.*  ^The same can be said of the many other instances during the 
Mitterrand era where past and present were brought together and charged with meaning.
Traditionally, then, one of the key functions of official commemoration has been 
to distract attention from the fact that the whole is made up of many different parts, not 
all of them complementary. While, in France, this role may have evolved in recent 
years, this is essentially what happens when any group remembers as a group. A 
selection is made, and those elements which are to be recognised as "our" memory are 
retained, while others are discarded. This process has been lucidly described by Robert 
Frank:
La fonction de la m ém oire o ffic ie lle  (. . .) est précisém ent de doimer une unité à cet ensem ble  
hétérogène, agité de forces centrifuges. C'est e lle  qui donne ou refuse le droit de cité aux m ém oires 
de groupes. M ém oire structurante, elle est particulièrement sélective, et sa choix  du passé est m ise  
au service de sa fonction de base; assurer l'union et maintenir l'identité de la communauté.*^
Thus official commemoration complements the group's formal institutions, one of 
whose functions, to quote Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is to "transporter le moi dans l'unité
Les Lieux de M ém oire, II, part 2 , p. 145.
'La m ém oire em poisonnée' in L a F rance des années noires, vol.II, ed. by Jean-Pierre A zém a and 
François Bédarida (Paris; Editions du Seuil, 1993).
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commune".*"* This is easy enough to see when the event commemorated is a "positive" 
one - a victory or an outstanding achievement. Commemorations of "negative" 
episodes, apart from being less frequent, have a less straightforward relationship to 
collective identity. When the French Republic commemorates Vichy, the values 
celebrated are those which were momentarily betrayed, but which are all the more 
precious for that betrayal. In this way has commemoration of unpleasant events come to 
be presented as crucial to maintaining a state of watchfulness that will prevent them 
from recurring.
Commemoration, in short, is often a reminder of what makes us "us" and them 
"them". It seems particularly well suited to a geopolitical arrangement in which each 
state has its own space in which to govern its own people and cultivate its own culture 
and identity. Thus most nations see themselves as the product of a unique heritage in 
which is inscribed a unique bank of national attributes. These things fit in to a "national 
narrative" which reaches back into the past and brings order and meaning to the jumble 
of characters and episodes. The national narrative is employed even when manifestly 
inappropriate; the election of Hugues Capet or the baptism of Clovis are remembered 
retrospectively as part of "national" history, even though the concept of the nation is 
largely irrelevant to the periods concerned. It is as if there is a fear that, if not 
incorporated into the solid and recognisable framework of National History, they will be 
condemned to float in some unidentifiable limbo.
During our period people began to seriously doubt that the Second World War 
fitted into that national template. Nonetheless, certain episodes still lent themselves to 
the "national narrative" approach. French unity and French heroism were far from 
obsolete when the time came to commemorate.




"Ce n'est certes pas de beauté et de sens que manque l'aventure de la France 
combattante, on la soupçonne plutôt de manquer de réalité".*^
Whatever the net military contribution of the Resistance to the Allied victory, it 
was negligible compared to its contribution to the post-war reconstruction of a positive 
national identity. In this case "what happened" mattered less than the interpretation of 
"what happened". Without the Resistance, or rather, without the national narrative 
subsequently built around the Resistance, it is doubtful that France could have emerged 
from the war with its self-respect and unity intact. In the words of Jacques Semelin, "si 
la résistance d'un peuple hier martyrisé par un envihasseur n'existait pas, il faudrait 
l'inventer".*^
So every effort was made to hold up the Resistance experience as representative 
of the national experience of the war years. Throughout France, plaques and memorials 
in remembrance of Resistance martyrs sprang up almost immediately. In 1995 it was 
calculated that these still accounted for between 50% and 80% of all memorials relating 
to the Second World War.*^ These figures are eloquent when one considers that roughly 
1% of the population was involved in active resistance, and that it was only one of many 
facets of an immensely complex period.*^ But of course, collective memory does not 
operate on a system of proportional representation.
Although there are nuances to be added (see chapter tliree), it is clear that French 
public opinion during our period certainly did not regard the Resistance as insignificant.
Paul Thibaud, 'La R épublique et ses héros', in E sprit n ° l9 S  (January-April 1994).
‘^"E sprit, n°198 (January-April 1994).
”  B arcellin i and W ieviorka, Passant, sou vien s-to i p .238.
A ccording to H em y R ousso in L ’H isto ire  n°41 (January 1982), 220  000 cards for "combattants
volontaires de la Résistance" w ere distributed after liberation.
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A survey commissioned in 1994 found that 56% of French people thought that the 
Resistance played a "very important" role in the outcome of World War Two.*^ Another 
revealed that 84% thought that the Resistance had been very effective or fairly effective 
after the Allied landings.^** And according to another fiftieth anniversary poll, for CNN 
and Le Monde, 64% of French people were of the opinion that the Resistance and the 
Allied intervention contributed "à part égale" to the liberation of France.
Perhaps the same questions would have been answered less positively in 1993 or 
1992, when the commemorative profile was lower. However it is precisely because the 
major commemorations fell in 1994 that the polls were conducted around that time. "A 
new survey to coincide with the forty-eighth anniversary" feels rather forced. The 
"perhaps" is an extremely tentative one, though, for the capacity of a nation to continue 
to believe in its own heroism in the face of evidence to the contrary ought never to be 
underestimated. This capacity was resolute enough to defy apparently solid evidence to 
the contrary. With regard to the Resistance's contribution to the war effort, opinion had 
remained remarkably stable throughout our period. A survey published in L'Histoire in 
1983 illustrates this point.^* Asked which of the Allied forces contributed most to the 
liberation of France, some 34% chose the French Resistance (15% for the London Free 
French, 19% for the maquis). Only the United States received more plaudits (40%). The 
Soviets, in spite of their heroic sacrifices on the Eastern front, were credited by a mere 
6%, while the British polled only 4%.
It is entirely natural that a nation should remain attached to its past heroes and 
heroines; yet in this case it seems to contradict the process of "demystification" that had 
already been going on for perhaps twenty years by the 1990s, and which one might have 
expected to register during our chosen period. While certain uncomfortable truths, such
Scotsm an, 25 M ay 1994.
In L e F igaro  M agazine, 17 D ecem ber 1994.
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as Vichy's complicity in the persecution of Jews and other minorities had been taken on 
board, others had not. Evidently, the books, articles and programmes produced by 
specialists have a limited impact on the consciousness of the nation as a whole. Human 
beings are reluctant to accommodate themselves to new ideas, and derive a certain 
comfort from those with which they are familiar, however vague that familiarity may 
be.
Part of the Resistance myth had always been the union between de Gaulle's Free 
French and the heterogeneous groupings of maquisards. Gaullist ex-servicemen's 
minister Jean Sainteny spoke of a "symbolique fusion de deux actions convergeantes de 
la France combattante, nouvelle union s a c r é e T h e  theme of union sacrée, whereby 
all baser concerns are set aside for la patrie, sets the memory of the Second World War 
alongside that of the First, which had been fought and commemorated as a unified 
nation. If there was one thing to be avoided, it was any official acknowledgement that 
France had been unable to fight as a unified nation in the Second World War.
The importance of that unity was retained by collective memory, which focused 
particularly on the unifier and martyr Jean Moulin. Barcellini and Wieviorka have 
evoked "un véritable culte" of Moulin's m e m o r y . H e  had been "Pantheonised" on 19 
December 1964, and, as we have seen, his was one of the tliree tombs visited by 
François Mitterrand when he made his famous pilgrimage to the Pantheon on 21 May 
1981.
Throughout France, 37 monuments or stelae, 119 plaques, 978 streets or squares, 
and 281 educational establishments were dedicated to him by the mid-1990s. Like de
’ * Henry R ousso, L e syndrom e de Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p.296.
Speech at the Liberation m onum ent at B ay eux, June 1964. In L e M onde, 7-8 June 1964.
23 Passant, sou vien s-to i, p.203.
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Gaulle, he had become part of the physical as well as psychological landscape. In the 
inscriptions that featured on the various forms of memorial, he was invariably referred 
to as the "unificateur" or the "organisateur" of the Resistance. It had not been forgotten 
that unity was a precious commodity in a nation prone to schism.
Moulin's courage and skill in carrying out his unifying mission was, not 
surprisingly, one of the main themes of the presidential address delivered to mark the 
fiftieth anniversary of Moulin's capture and execution. On the 17 June 1993, at the 
montagne Sainte-Geneviève in Paris, François Mitterrand spoke of the first meeting of 
the Conseil national de la Résistance. The significance of that event lay not in the issues 
that the delegates had discussed, but in the fact that "il portait témoignage de cette unité 
tant cherchée, enfin atteinte, même si elle était encore fragile, unité de la France 
combattante, de l'ensemble des mouvements de Résistance, auxquels s'étaient associés 
tous les partis républicains".^"*
18 June
No one was more acutely aware of the need for a "national narrative" than Charles 
de Gaulle himself. He realised that the very fact that France's role in the war had been
Text o f  speech kindly provided by Jean Kahn at the Institu t F ran çois M itterran d.
A TO U S LES FRANÇAIS  
L a F rance a p erd u  une bataille!
M ais la  F rance n'a p a s  p erd u  une guerre!
D es gou vern an ts de rencontre ont p u  capituler, cédant à la panique, oublian t l'honneur, livran t le p a y s  à  
la  servitude. C ependant, rien  n'est perd u !
R ien n'est perdu , p a rc e  que cette guerre est une guerre m ondiale. D ans l'univers libre, des fo rc e s  
im m enses n'ont p a s  encore donné. Un jou r, ces fo r c e s  écraseron t l'ennemi. I l fa u t  que la  France, ce  jo u r -  
là, so it p ré sen te  à  la  victoire. A lors, elle  re trou vera  sa  liberté  e t sa  grandeur. Tel est m on but, m on seu l 
but!
Voilà p o u rq u o i j e  convie tous les F rançais, où qu'ils se trouvent, à s ’unir à m oi dans l'action, dans le 
sacrifice  et dans l'espérance.
N o tre  p a tr ie  est en p é r i l  de mort.




ambiguous rendered a unified, heroic memory all the more necessary. In 1941 de Gaulle 
was already commemorating his call to resistance of the previous year. Right from the 
start he wanted to mark out the 18 June 1940 as the initiation of a vast movement of 
resistance. Although he was completely isolated at the time, he insisted that he spoke for 
a united majority of French people. On 18 June 1941 de Gaulle stated boldly that "Nous 
avons ranimé l'esprit de résistance de la France et rassemblé les espoirs d'une 
majorité".
For de Gaulle, the appel was essentially a call for unity, and he was keen that no 
political party should monopolise its remembrance. Therefore the Chancellerie de 
l'Ordre de la Libération was given the task of organising the commemorative 
ceremonies. Many of its members were of course de Gaulle loyalists, but the 
Chancellerie itself was not a political formation.
In theory, then, the 18 June was to be a non-partisan, national celebration. Its 
forms were in the classic, "France combattante", mould: the keystone was the 
"ravivage" of the flame under the Arc de Triomphe, at the tomb of the unloiown soldier, 
which had been placed there after the First World War. The flame was then taken to the 
crypt at Mont-Valérien, where fifteen heroes of "la France combattante" killed in World 
War Two were laid to rest. It was on 18 June 1960 that de Gaulle inaugurated the 
Mémorial de la France combattante at Mont-Valérien.
So the commemoration was non-partisan in theory. In practice, commemoration 
of 18 June would give rise to a series of "batailles de mémoire", nourished by the 
political squabbles of the day. During de Gaulle's exile from power there were often 
shouts of "vive de Gaulle" and "de Gaulle au pouvoir" at the ceremonies. In 1946 the 
communists tried to establish an alternative 18 June commemoration. In 1949 the
(fl'om R evue de  la  F rance libre, special edition June 1940). 
N ico le  Racine-Furlaud, 'M ém oire du 18 juin 1940', p.550.
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parties of the "third force" (SFIO, MRP, RGR) protested against the partisan nature of 
that year's 18 June celebration, and refused to participate.^^ Subsequently interest in the 
commemoration waned, only to be revived when de Gaulle returned to the Elysée 
Palace. De Gaulle also started the convention whereby it was the president of the 
Republic who took in hand the commemoration, giving it a truly national dimension.
The communists had ended their hostility to the 18 June commemoration by the 
mid-1970s. From then on they talked of the "complimentarity" of the appel of 18 June 
and that of 10 July.^^ Attitudes were beginning to soften with regard to de Gaulle, and a 
relative consensus was taking the place of political bickering. In 1980 Max Gallo had 
written an article asking whether "nous sommes tous devenus gaullistes?"
After the alleged "betrayal" of the "monde combattant" by Giscard d'Estaing, it 
fell to Mitterrand and the socialists to do justice to the memory of the war. The priority 
was to revive the 8 May commemoration but there was a feeling that war remembrance 
ought to be put back on track, and that all the important anniversaries ought to be 
commemorated with good grace. In 1981 much was made of the fact that, for the first 
time since 1968, the ceremonies were presided over by a former member of the 
Resistance. From then on it was no longer a "fête de famille" for Gaullists but a 
celebration of the Resistance in its entirety. The 18 June was, according to Nicole 
Racine-Furlaud, being "nationalised" again.
De Gaulle as 'Thomme du 18 juin" was embedded deep within the national 
consciousness; in opinion polls this aspect of his career was consistently placed more 
prominently than a later one, of which France is still living with the direct consequence:
”  A bove taken from N ico le  Racine-Furlaud, 'M émoire du 18 juin 1940', p .550. 
N ico le  Racine-Furlaud, 'M ém oire du 18 juin 1940', p .561.
N ico le  Racine-Furlaud, 'M ém oire du 18 juin 1940', p .561.
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the establishment of the Fifth Republic.^** The de Gaulle of 18 June had long ceased to 
be a political figure who could be criticised and contested like any other. While certain 
high profile Resistance figures, such as Jean Moulin and Henry Fresnay, were being 
fought over by rival factions, de Gaulle's position in the national memory became more 
and more exalted. Neither this, nor the fact that the Gaullists had ceased to dominate 
French politics since 1974, appeared to have jeopardised that position.
Pierre Lefranc, president of the Charles de Gaulle Institute, made this clear in an 
article heralding "l'année de Gaulle" in February 1990.^* The gist of his argument was, 
quite simply, that France had finally become Gaullist in spite of itself: "Ses prévisions 
s'accomplissent et ses vues sont reprises par la majorité de la classe politique et, parfois 
même, avec conviction par certains, qui s'y étaient opposés". Around the time of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the general's call to arms, there was eulogy from some unusual 
sources. The left-wing writer and sometime politician Régis Debray published his A 
demain, de Gaulle, in which he expressed regret for having despised de Gaulle when the 
latter was in office, and for his lack of gratitude for the general's actions during the war. 
Le Canard Enchaîné brought out a special edition for the June anniversary, in which the 
tone was almost affectionate: "Ce n'est pas que de Gaulle nous manque. Mais il faut 
bien l'avouer, une tête de Turc de cette trempe et de cette envergure, en n'en a pas 
re tro u v é " .L'Humanité carried a celebratory account of the process of rapprochement 
between the head of the Free French and the communis ts .On an occasion such as this
For exam ple, in a Sofres  survey for l'E xpress o f  10-16 N ovem ber 1975, 38%  o f  those polled  said that 
de Gaulle was "avant tout", 'Thom m e du 18 juin; 16% saw him first and forem ost as "le fondateur de la 
C inquièm e République"; in a Sofres survey for l'Institut C harles de G au lle  in February 1990, he was 
"l'homme du 18 juin" for 44%  o f  those polled.
Published in L e M onde  1 February 1990. A m ong som e o f  the other notable events that took place 
during "I'annee de Gaulle" were: a U N E SC O  conference on the them e o f  "de G aulle en son siecle" (19-24  
N ovem ber 1990); a conference at the N ational A ssem bly organised by "le carrefour du gaullisme"; a 





one they couldn't but call for "rassemblement", even if it was really an invitation for 
"tous ceux qui se prononcent pour la souveraineté nationale" to revolt against the pro- 
European consensus.
De Gaulle had become synonymous with the most positive vision of "la France", 
and had thus been removed from the political fray. No matter what indices one choses, 
the conclusion remains the same: the memory of Charles de Gaulle united the French 
people in non-partisan appreciation. In 1990 one survey found that 50% of French 
people considered de Gaulle to be "en dehors des partis".^"* Another revealed that 62% 
thought that he had been "au-dessus des partis" when in power! When one considers 
that he was in his time one of the most divisive and even detested political figures in 
French history, this comes as something of a surprise. It is easy to forget how often de 
Gaulle was on the outside looking in during his political career, how many times he was 
abandoned by his countrymen. Virtually no one took him seriously in 1940; he resigned 
in 1946, leaving the nation indifferent; he was only allowed back because he was the 
last resort; and he felt compelled to step down because he had lost the support of the 
people, in 1969.
Raymond Barre was not alone in drawing attention to what he saw as a 
distinguishing feature of the French mindset: a compulsion to "canonise historically" 
men who were "au coeur des grands événements, au centre des controverses et même 
des affrontements, et dont le rôle national devient incontesté avec le recul du temps". 
An IFOP opinion poil published in 1990 revealed that 81 % of French people were 
satisfied with de Gaulle’s record.^*’ Another, a few months later, corroborated the first:
L ibéra tion , 18 June 1990. 
Sofres, TEtat de l'opinion 1991. 
L ibéra tion , 18 June 1990.
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84% took a postive view, only 4% a negative one.^  ^ In a similar survey in 1970, when 
the memory of de Gaulle in power had not yet mellowed into nostalgia, the figure was 
"only" 67%.
The French seemed to have talked themselves into perceiving de Gaulle-as- 
historical-figure quite differently from the way in which they perceived de Gaulle-as- 
political-figure. Collective memory does not welcome politicians as they are in reality - 
governed by impulses that are not always noble, embroiled in uneasy compromises, 
riven with doubt and confusion. It prefers to deal with public life as it often appears in 
the rhetoric of the leaders themselves - heroic, momentous, a battleground in which the 
fate of men, nations, and ideas is played out.
Nor was de Gaulle's popularity a mere blip brought about by that year's 
celebrations. Very few historical or political figures consistently received the approval 
ratings that he did. In 1980, just before the start of our period, when France was 
preparing itself to vote for the Fifth Republic's first socialist president, 81% of those 
polled had considered that de Gaulle's record was either very or quite pos i t ive.Only 
7% held an opinion that was in any way negative.^^ And the phenomenon proved itself 
to be durable, lasting from the 1970s right through to the 1990s. By 1995 those approval 
and disapproval ratings had moved only one point in each direction, to 82% and 6%. 
Also, in 1995, when asked to nominate "les plus grandes personnalités de ce siècle" 
from a prepared list, 67% of respondants chose de Gau l le . The  general had become, to
”  Le M onde, 9 N ovem ber 1990.
Sofres!H isto ire-m agazin e, N ovem ber-D ecem ber 1980. An IFOP poll published in VSD the sam e year 
corroborated this; 80% o f  respondants described de Gaulle as "un hom m e, une personnalité sympathique" 
(12-18  June 1980).
D e G aulle h im se lf had predicted in 1952 that every Frenchman w ould  becom e a G aullist i f  he wasn't 
already -  because G aullism  was nothing other than the continuity o f  the "essential France".
Sofres, VEtat de l'opinion 1995,
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use Pierre Nora's phrase, "champion toutes catégories de la mémoire collective des 
Français
Even before 1990 de Gaulle had been part of the very landscape of the nation, 
both in a psychological and a physical sense: 63 of the 127 communes making up the 
banlieue parisienne had a street or square named after the general/^ The mythical date 
of 18 June was also popular as a street name. To herald the fiftieth anniversary, another 
fifty or so streets and avenues were rebaptised with that name."^  ^ One might also 
mention the "opération plaque du 18 juin 1940" that had been launched in 1986 by the 
Association des Français libres and others. It sought to encourage municipalities to 
erect a plaque bearing the text of de Gaulle's speech. By 1990, there were more than a 
thousand of these plaques. Every arrondissement in Paris had one, as did a number of 
lycées. There were eleven plaques in Neuilly alone.
However, not everyone saw the consensus in a positive light. Serge July, in 
Libération, thought that the "quasi-unanimisme" was symptomatic of a society 
desperate to recognise itself in the heroes of its history,"^  ^ Jean-Luc Pouthier regretted 
that legend had defeated history, and that there had been no real debate about the 
circumstances of de Gaulle's broadcast, that is to say the political, moral and military 
collapse of the Third Republic."^  ^Prominent Gaullist Georges Broussine concluded that 
the main reason for the general's posthumous popularity was r e m or s e . He  claimed that 
the French felt retrospective guilt for their unappreciative treatment of him in 1940, 
1946 and 1969, and, ever since, had been trying to make amends.
Lieux de M ém oire, III, parti, p .347.
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p. 189.
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p. 165.
D e Gaulle's entire W orld War Tw o itinerary, including offensives he led at the fi'ont, the aerodrome 
from w hich he took o f f  for Jersey, his tem poraiy hom e in Khartoum, etc. is recorded on mem orial 
plaques.
L ibéra tion , 18 June 1990.
L ibéra tion , 18 June 1990.
L ettre  de la  N ation , 19 June 1990.
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Certainly it seemed that a balanced view of de Gaulle's life and times had not been 
attained. The myth surrounding the appeal on the BBC was left largely intact, because 
this epic tale offered a gallant role to the nation as a whole. Which is not to say that the 
myth was presented as gospel truth, simply that few people showed any inclination to 
destroy it. The French seemed to have come to the conclusion that it was not such a bad 
thing to leave some myths intact. Writing in the Gaullist newsletter Lettre de la Nation, 
George Broussine asked rhetorically whether France was witnessing "l'apogée d'un 
m y t h e In a different context, one might have expected a debunking to follow; but 
Broussine was of course writing in complete approval of de Gaulle and his legend. It 
suited everyone to commemorate the origins of Resistance without asking the difficult 
questions. This, after all, is what sets commemoration apart from history.
The organisers of the commemorative events insisted on their non-partisan 
character.Pierre Lefranc, general secretary of the Charles de Gaulle institute in 1990, 
was especially keen to stress this point. He pointed out that the international conference 
organised in November gave a forum to all shades of opinion. The temptation to turn it 
into a Gaullist celebration was avoided, he said, in the interests of academic 
objectivity.^^
The prevalent apolitical perspective was typical of an era in which overt ideology 
was viewed with suspicion, in which politicians fought for control of the middle ground, 
leaving the fringes to their own devices. Politics no longer had much to do with 
ideology: the "tournant de la rigueur" of 1983 had put paid to leftist economics;
19 June 1990.
Interview s w ith Pierre Lefranc (11 M ay 1999), Jean-Jacques de B resson (21 M ay 1999). B etw een these 
tw o there w as a distinct difference in appreciation o f  the role o f  president Mitterrand. Lefranc had  
absolutely no com plaints about the president's conduct and attitude, w hile de B resson w as m ore critical, 
and felt that the president had been a half-hearted participant.
Interview o f  11 M ay 1999
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following the socialist scandals of the mid-1980s, "les partis" were as unpopular as de 
Gaulle could have wished; Jacques Chirac's confrontational term as prime minister, 
between 1986 and 1988, had been badly received. It was exploited by Mitterrand in the 
1988 presidential elections; proof, if proof were needed, that the French people wanted 
a unifier, not a divider. For his second septennat Mitterrand proposed a particularly 
timid form of unity - he wouldn’t do anything that was likely to upset too many people.
Nevertheless there had been a fear among non-Gaullists that 1990 would be 
"confisqué" by the RPR and used for overtly political purposes.^' However as Jean 
Kahn said bluntly, "on a laissé confisquer". Among the governing socialists it was 
thought that it would have been counter-productive to indulge in any sniping against 
Gaullist initiatives. The traditional guardians, loyal to the general, were given a free 
hand. The organising committee was made up of representatives from the Institut 
Charles de Gaulle, the Chancellerie de l'Ordre de la Libération, the Association des 
Français Libres, and the Association des Médaillés de la Résistance. It was allowed to 
carry on with its work without interference from central government. In fact André 
Méric, ex-servicemen's minister, while acknowledging that "le comité ( . . . )  a souhaité 
garder son autonomie par rapport à l’E t a t " , promised that "mon Département 
ministériel apportera l’aide qui lui sera demandée".The promise was honoured, since 
the organisers were given the funds they requested.
On the fiftieth anniversary of de Gaulle's celebrated "appel" of 18 June 1940, 
Mitterrand presided over a national ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe during which a 
bronze casting of the text of the appeal was unveiled. In an interview published in Le
For exam ple in a letter o f  30  January 1989 from Jean-Mathieu Boris, the nephew  o f  a left-w ing  
résistan t, to Jean-Louis B ianco at the E lysée. Boris wrote that, "il conviendrait d'éviter que cet événem ent 
soit confisqué par le RPR". Jean Kahn's archives.
André Méric's statement to con seil des m inistres, 2 N ovem ber 1989. (From Jean Kahn's archives.) 
Letter o f  8 N ovem ber 1989. (From Jean Kahn's archives.)
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Monde the same day, he said of de Gaulle that "du début à la fin, il fut grand". The 
mutual enmity between de Gaulle and Mitterrand has been well documented, but if the 
1990 commemoration was difficult for the latter to embrace, he was too politically 
astute to show it at this stage. Although it seems that the decision to participate in the 
above ceremony was only taken after "some hesitation" at the Elysee,^"  ^ Mitterrand 
plainly understood that the stature of de Gaulle could command almost universal 
recognition in France, and that to disturb the consensus would have been political folly.
Illustrating further the apolitical direction that remembrance of de Gaulle had 
taken, the exhibition devoted to de Gaulle, which opened on the 15 June 1990 at the 
National Library, was inaugurated by culture minister Jack Lang and prime minister 
Michel Rocard, both of them socialists. Michel Rocard also gave a speech at the 
opening ceremony of the conference that was held in November that year.^^ He was full 
of praise for de Gaulle, and recalled that his own father had been aligned with de Gaulle 
during the war, giving him a personal incentive to embrace the commemorative events. 
One of the lessons he had learnt from his father was, he said, that there were times when 
political divisions had to make way for "unité et rassemblement". "La conduite de mon 
père m'empêche de commettre jamais l'erreur de croire que la division gauche-droite 
puisse recouvrir celle du bien et du mal, des bons et des méchant s .Rocard ' s  time as 
prime minister was indeed marked by a spirit of openness. His government's policies 
were driven by pragmatism rather than pure ideology. This took the sting out of Freneh 
politics, and undoubtedly facilitated an atmosphere of consensus and rassemblement for 
the anniversaries of 1990.
A ccording to Jean-Jacques de Bresson, w ho in 1990 was treasurer o f  the Charles de G aulle Institute 
and president o f  the A ssocia tion  des M éda illés de la  R ésistance. (Interview o f  21 M ay 1999.)
The title o f  the conference w as "de G aulle en son  siècle"; it was held at the U N E SC O  headquarters in 
Paris from 19-24 N ovem ber.
A ctes des Journées in ternationales, introduction.
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As far as mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac was concerned, 1990 was a godsend: a 
chance to celebrate Gaullist values through one of the few personalities that united the 
French people. Chirac was a driving force, ensuring that the opportunity would be 
maximised. Substantial sums of money were released to permit celebrations worthy of 
their subject: the Mairie was particularly generous, releasing 50 million francs for the 
capital's commemorations.
The themes and vocabulary of June 1990 were unmistakably Gaullian: unity, 
grandeur, independence, rank, rassemblement, destiny. One thing can be said about de 
Gaulle without any qualification: his message was loud and clear. It was clearly 
understood by France in 1990. A survey identified the thi'ee most important strands of 
his message as France's independence (45%), the rassemblement of the French people 
(17%) and France's role in the world (12%).
For "political" Gaullists the familiar catchphrases were certainly not, in 1990, 
tired cliches. The RPR was beset by internal problems at this time, and its leaders 
needed to squeeze all the inspiration they possibly could out of this fiftieth anniversary 
and the entire "année de Gaulle". So there was both a national and a political dimension 
to Jacques Chirac's message that "Même lorsque les circonstances se conjuguent pour 
conduire le pays à douter des valeurs morales qui cimentent son unité, à douter de son 
destin, subsiste en son tréfond, une irréductible ressource de sursaut n a t i o n a l Such 
rhetoric was especially apposite in a commemorative context, when the past was 
presented in a double form, both as a constituent part of "what we are today" and as an 
example to follow or to avoid following. Jacques Chirac was not only saying, "these 
values do exist in us as a nation", he is also saying, "these values ought to be more 
apparent than they are at the present time".
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Not surprisingly, Paris in June 1990 was a living memorial to de Gaulle: "Partout: 
sur les panneaux d'annonces établis par la municipalité à travers la ville, sur les murs 
des stations de métro, d'immenses affiches montrent les exploits du général de 
G a u l l e " . This poster campaign, reminiscent of an election, was timed carefully to build 
up interest the week before the actual anniversary.^^ Also, from 13-19 June a three 
minute film devoted to de Gaulle was shown in 475 cinemas in the Parisian region; 
from 14 to 23 June images of the Liberation (not, strictly speaking, what was being 
commemorated) were projected every evening onto the façade of the Hôtel de Ville.
The day of 18 June itself was of course entirely given over to de Gaulle: from five 
o'clock in the morning, a massive replica of an old-style radio, built around the obelisk 
at Place de la Concorde, repeated the historic message non-stop. There was Mass at 
Notre Dame; wreaths were laid at 700 plaques dedicated to those who died at the 
Liberation (again not strictly relevant); a plaque inscribed with the text of the appel was 
unveiled at each of Paris's twenty town halls. Later in the evening, the mairie organised 
a show entitled simply "Hommage", staged on the Seine between Pont-Neuf and the 
pont du Carrousel. Two hundred boats carried symbolic tableaux relating to de Gaulle 
and Gaullian themes. The day of celebration was warmly welcomed by Parisians, 100 
000 of whom turned out to attend.
It was important to the organisers that the fiftieth anniversary of 18 June be a truly 
nation wide occasion, and events were organised throughout France. More than 3500 
towns and villages across France decided to organise some sort of ceremony to 
celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the appel.^^ So Paris was not the exclusive site of
In L ettre  de la  N ation , 18 June 1990.
'Histoire et M émoire', in C om m entaire, winter 1990-1991.
It was launched on the 11 June.
Bruno G oyet, 'Etude des com m ém orations en France dans les années 1980' (unpublished D EA  thesis, 
Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1991), p.67.
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commemoration, even if it was inevitably the focal point. That role was symbolised by 
the torches which were brought to the Arc de Triomphe from all corners of France, 
where they had been lit in local ceremonies. The headline in Le Monde of 19 June was 
prosaic but emphatic: "La France quasi unanime rend hommage à l'homme du 18 juin".
The Allied landings in France
Rémy Desquesnes, writing about the series of fiftieth anniversaries celebrated in 
1994, maintained that, as far as official commemoration was concerned, it was a heavily 
edited version of history that was propagated. He protested about the one-sided nature 
of the narrative that prevailed. "Pourquoi", he asked, "ne conserver que certains 
éléments de notre passé et refuser tout ce qui ne flatte pas notre amour propre?"^^ He 
was vindicated by certain aspects of the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy landings, 
although there was a limit to how much credit French leaders could take from an Allied 
operation on their territory. Indeed, it is because most of the credit must go to the 
"Anglo-Saxons" that de Gaulle had always been less than enthusiastic about D-Day 
commemorations.
To mark the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, there was a proliferation of press 
articles which revisited the events in question. In most of these the epic tone was to the 
fore. Of course, heroism was very much in evidence on the beaches of Normandy, but 
there was a natural tendency for the French to claim more than their fair share. Often the 
Resistance was added wholesale to the mixture, giving the impression that the Germans 
had a mass uprising within France to contend with as well as the landings on the coast. 
Henri Amouroux's account in Le Figaro described a Resistance movement primed and
In C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, iT2 (1995), p .149.
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ready to spring up and destroy the enemy in a burst of activity: '"II fait chaud à Suez'. 
'Le chamois a bondi'. En quelques heures, les messages de Radio-Londres provoquent la 
levée en masse des résistants.
The official French interpretation had always been that Resistance, D-day and 
Liberation were part of a trinity, and were not to be seen as independent elements. The 
logo of the Mission du cinquantenaire, set up to coordinate the commemorative 
projects, was a montage of three symbols: a beret, a military helmet, and an untamed 
horse. These symbols were held to represent the three elements mentioned above, and 
they were brought together in the logo in the colours of the French flag. Philippe 
Mestre, the minister for ex-servicemen, explained that the choice of design was intended 
to underline the interdependent nature of the three notions. "Rien n'est séparable", he 
affirmed.
The same effect was achieved by the practice of paying homage to the Free 
French alongside the Allied liberators during D-day commemorations. No one said so 
bluntly, of course, but the aim was surely, in part, to provide some kind of 
counterbalance to the alternative narrative, the one that told of an occupied territory 
being freed by an invading military force. At Ouistreham, which was liberated by Free 
French units integrated into the British army, the 1994 commemorative ceremony was 
graced by an astonishing galaxy of dignitaries. The prime minister, several members of 
the government, two ex-prime ministers (Pierre Mauroy and Pierre Messmer), as well as 
the presidents of both houses of parliament, all came to hear Mitterrand praise the 
Resistance fighters who "représentent la France au premier rang". The emphasis, as
11 June 1994.
Interview in L e F igaro , 26  April 1994.
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always whenever the Resistance is evoked, was on the spirit of unity that enabled the 
disparate parts to come together at the decisive moment.
During this time of anniversaries France's political leaders, and the "monde 
combattant", were conspicuously keen to stress the importance of the "débarquement en 
Provence", codenamed Operation Anvil, then Dragoon. The first of these landings in 
Provence took place on 15 August 1944. The 1994 commemorative ceremonies were 
organised jointly by the Mission du cinquantenaire, the "Provence '44" association and 
the local authorities. The heavy commemorative emphasis was by no means a new 
departure: in the period since the end of the war there had been a perception among the 
French that the significance of the operation in Provence had been played down by the 
British and Americans, who had consistently promoted D-day as the sole military 
operation worth remembering. One cannot dismiss this purely as paranoia. In 1964 even 
Le Monde had carried an article in which it was claimed that British and American 
historians had been suspiciously consensual in denouncing Operation Anvil-Dragoon as 
an error, when "en fait, le succès du débarquement en Provence est évident".
The French desire to "prove themselves" with regard to the Allies was evidently 
still alive in 1994. On 1 June 1994, François Léotard gave an address to mark the 
opening of an exposition entitled "Ensemble ils ont libéré la France". He drew attention 
to the efficiency of the mission on the Provençal coast, and pointed out that Toulon was 
liberated only eight days after D-day, not the twenty days foreseen by the Allied 
command; and that the liberation of Marseilles was accomplished in fourteen days, 
instead of forty. He followed up with a rather dubious comparison between France and 
the United Kingdom. In spite of the fact that the latter had already fought -  for a time 
practically alone - for five years, and in doing so had sustained a huge number of




casualties, François Leotard saw fit to recall that "lorsque les hostilités s'arrêtent, les 
troupes françaises de notre armée reconstituée seront, en Europe, plus nombreuses que 
celles du Royaume-Uni".^^ Earlier that year, Paul Thibaud had defended the French 
military's preparations at the start of the war. In an article for Esprit, he compared the 
French army's role favourably to that of the British: "Pour ce qui est de s'armer, les 
Français ont été moins défaillants que la Grande-Bretagne qui avait, en juin 1940, 
quatre divisions sur le continent contre quarante en août 1914".^^
Whereas the Normandy landings were essentially an Anglo-North American 
venture which happened to take place on French soil, the landings in Provence were 
conducted by France and her empire, with Allied support. It was a French army, under 
the direct authority of French generals, which was to liberate Marseilles and Toulon. In 
the interests of national unity and morale it was essential that the distasteful memory of 
rapid defeat and inglorious collaboration be sweetened by the memory of victorious 
combat. As usual de Gaulle and his generals understood perfectly the implications for 
the future dignity of the nation, and strove to ensure that France would have some share 
of the glory. He wrote in his Mémoires that
il s'agissait que notre armée, reconstituée en Afrique, rentrât dans la m étropole, contribuât avec 
nos forces clandestines à la libération du pays, prît part à l'invasion du R eich et s'assurât en chem in  
des gages voulus pour que le règlem ent final ne pût s'accomplir sans nous.^^
This became the standard commemorative discourse. Speaking at a ceremony to mark 
the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Toulon, François Léotard echoed de Gaulle 
when he said that "la victoire de Toulon est la victoire des armées de la France et du
Il y  a 5 0  ans, la  libération . A llocu tions de F rançois L éotard, M in istre de la  D éfen se  (Paris; M inistère 
de la D éfense, 1994).
E sprit, n‘^ 198 (January-Apr il 1994).
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peuple tout entier. Décisive pour la campagne militaire, cette victoire contient aussi la 
promesse de l'amalgame entre la France libre et la France combattante",^^
Like that of liberation and resistance, the memory of the Provence landings was 
all about redemption and above all unity. Yet unlike those of Liberation and Resistance, 
the heroic version has gone largely unchallenged: the regular army and the rebels of the 
interior were united in a decisive victory that proved once and for all that France was 
restored to its former glory. The subtext is almost spiritual: this was not merely a 
successful military operation, but a eucharistie rite leading up to a defining moment of 
national communion. There were, in the words of François Léotard, two victories: "celle 
de la libération, et celle de l'unité".
The reality was more fraught. From de Gaulle's point of view, the victory on the 
Provençal coast was intended to show fractious sections of the maquis just who was in 
charge, rather than to embrace them as equals. By the same token the intention was to 
underline this authority before the population as a whole, and to demonstrate at home 
and abroad that the French Empire was not dead and buried.
Another crucial aspect of these landings was the role played by France's overseas 
territories. In remembering the Provence landings the union française, which had had 
precious few occasions to celebrate its history in the anti-colonial climate of the 
previous forty years, could glory for once in a positive role. In fact the role it played 
was more than positive, it was absolutely crucial: according to the commemorative 
rhetoric, it not only enabled the French to commemorate a débarquement of their own, it 
also captured the essence of Frenchness in its most idealistic and laudable form; that is 
to say, as an ensemble of universal values that can mobilise anyone, regardless of 
origin, who is willing to fight to defend them. It is for this reason that, when Operation
Quoted in Le M onde  12 A ugust 1964.
Speech on 28 A ugust 1994, in A llocu tions de F rançois L éotard.
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Anvil is remembered, the aecent tends to be placed on the theme of unity in diversity, 
on the fact that the French genius was not confined to a specific territory, and that this 
very fact contributed to the eventual victory.
During the 1994 commemorations the Defense Minister François Léotard was 
keen to stress that united diversity. At Fréjus on 1 September he commemorated the 
"troupes noires" who had participated in the Provence campaign. On the 10 September, 
in Marseilles, he paid homage to "l'armée d'Afrique", those men who, "dans un brassage 
exceptiomiel d'origines et de religions, ont défendu le même id é a l" .A n  article devoted 
to the landings in Provence in Paris-Match was typical in that it again stressed the rich 
diversity of the invading force, made up of "plus de 200 000 hommes, métropolitains, 
pieds-noirs, marocains, algériens, malagaches, polynésiens et les étrangers de la 
légion".
Covering the fiftieth anniversary for Le Monde, Marc Ferro recalled the words of 
Gaston Monnerville, who was to become president of the Senate under the Fifth 
Republic: "sans son empire, la France ne serait qu'un pays libéré. Grâce à son empire, la 
France est un pays vainqueur.M onnerville had placed the Provence landings within a 
broad historical context, as yet another example of the empire coming to the aid of the 
fatherland: "Comme elle l'avait fait en 1870, puis en 1914, la France a mobilisé (. . .) ses 
soldats de l'o u t r e - m e r This was a particularly durable commemorative leitmotiv. Half 
a century after Monnerville, in 1994, François Léotard echoed his words, saying that "ce 
sont ces soldats de tous les continents qui ont permis, avec d'autres, que notre pays ne 
soit pas seulement libéré, mais vainqueur".Prim e minister Edouard Balladur took up
’° Speech on 28 A ugust 1994, in A lloca tion s de F rançois L éotard. 
A llocu tions de  F rançois L éotard.
25 A ugust 1994.
15 A ugust 1994.
Le M onde, 14-15 A ugust 1994.
Speech at Fréjus, 1 Septem ber 1994. A llocu tions de F rançois L éotard.
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exactly the same themes when he spoke at a ceremony on the beach at Dramont on 15 
August/^ This demonstrates how crucial the colonies, whose troops were known 
officially as "soldats de la Grande France", were to the face-saving operation in which 
the French were engaged. In colonial terms, only "la métropole" was occupied, although 
some of the African territories were collaborationist initially. But without Africa and the 
Free French, de Gaulle would have found it much more difficult to salvage some pride 
and prestige from the wreckage of World War Two. It is this above all that the French 
celebrate when they commemorate the landings in Provence.
The 1994 celebrations of this event centred mainly on president Mitterrand and 
the leaders of the former colonies in Africa. The grand naval review which took place 
on 14 August was watched by fifteen African heads of state alongside the French 
president. Yet the celebration of France's partnership with its former territories obscured 
one of the troubling consequences of the Provence landings: they helped to convince 
many of France's leaders that France's status as a great power was inextricably linked to 
its status as a colonial power. The tribulations brought on by the military collapse and 
subsequent occupation had seriously undermined their nation's claim to greatness. 
Resistance, along with the military campaigns led from Africa, allowed France's leaders 
to claim that the nation had regained its "ranlc". In these circumstances, undergoing a 
process of de-colonisation would, it was thought, have been grist to the mill of France's 
detractors. It would have negated the glory of resistance and liberation by forcing 
France into a minor role in world affairs.
As a result, the logic of de-colonisation, broadly accepted by Britain, gained less 
ground in France. The warning signs were there for all to see, however. As the war was 
ending in Europe, it was beginning for France in Africa. At Sétif, in Algeria, 29 
Europeans were murdered by Muslim insurgents in May 1945. The reprisals were
Le Monde, 17 August 1994.
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bloody: between six and eight thousand people died in the fighting that followed. Once 
again, behind the glorious feats of arms there lies a more sombre reality that is difficult 
to incorporate into the official commemorative discourse. Not surprisingly, it was 
invariably omitted.
Paradoxically, the Franco-African character of the Provence landings, which had 
always seduced French political leaders, can also explain why ordinary French people 
showed little appetite for commemorating it. In Normandy, in June, the heads of state 
and government of virtually all of what we now regard as the Western World were 
present, including, crucially, the United States. Its fiftieth anniversary commemorations 
had therefore mobilised opinion formers -  principally from politics and the media -  
from all over the world. Public opinion in France could not fail to take notice. In 
Provence, in August, the United States sent its ambassador, Britain sent Prince Andrew, 
and the world's media ignored the occasion. Timing had never helped the Provence 
commemoration. It fell in the middle of the August holiday period, and only ten days 
before the liberation of Paris. The net result, comparing the attitude of the political class 
to that of the general public, was an enthusiasm deficit: "En dépit des moyens mis en 
œuvre," said Rémy Desquesnes, "la commémoration de l'opération Dragoon (. . .) était 
loin d'avoir l'éclat des cérémonies en Manche".
The liberation o f Paris
Unlike the Provence landings, commemorations of the liberation of Paris have 
invariably been greeted with enthusiasm by the public. The memory of the few days 
preceding and following 25 August, the cult of the insurrection and its martyrs, have
77 R ém y D esquesnes in C on tem porary F rench C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995).
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been jealously guarded. This is only natural, for these few moments of history are 
priceless commodities: chapters of the Second World War to which the French 
contribution was both crucial and positive. True, the liberation of Paris could never be 
described as central to the military outcome of the war, but for France's pride in itself, 
these events, and their place in the national memory, are of the utmost importance.
The importance of the liberation of Paris, like that of resistance in general, may 
indeed have been mainly symbolic, but one cannot afford to be too dismissive, for 
history has shown that symbols often triumph over hard fact. "La vie, I'histoire des 
nations sont bâties (. . .) sur la mémoire et sur les symboles", said Edouard Balladur in 
1993, at another commemorative cerem ony.E ven more so when the hard fact leaves 
gaps and tlirows up contradictions, as it does for Paris's liberation.
De Gaulle, characteristically, understood the value of symbolism, and the freeing 
of the capital of the Republic was certainly symbolic. He also foresaw the future role 
that the liberation of Paris, alongside, notably, his own call to arms four years earlier, as 
well as the exploits of the Resistance and the Provence landings, would play in the 
collective healing process, even though he later admitted that the whole adventure was 
really just "a bluff that came off'.^^ There had to be the possibility of constructing a 
narrative that ended with the French uniting in resistance to the occupying force, thus 
sweeping away (or perhaps under the carpet) the divisions that existed during, and even 
before, the Occupation. Little wonder, then, that de Gaulle and Leclerc insisted so 
vehemently that the French 2nd Armoured Division be diverted in order to enter Paris 
first, in spite of the capital's relative insignificance from a strategic point of view. As Le 
Figaro aclaiowledged, "without de Gaulle, France would have been liberated by the
Speech at com m em orative cerem ony o f  16 July 1993 {Le M onde, 18-19 July 1993). 
Sunday Tim es, 7 January 1996.
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Allies anyway, [but] Paris would not have been liberated by its people and the 2nd 
Armoured Division.
In his Mémoires de Guerre de Gaulle wrote that "Parmi les points de la terre que 
le Destin a choisi pour y rendre ses arrêts, Paris fut en tout temps particulièrement 
sym bo lique".In France, almost every incident that counted in the nation's history had 
taken place in Paris. The point d'orgue marking the end of the humiliation of German 
Occupation was never going to be anywhere else. Hitler, in his own ruthless way, knew 
his history. He ordered Von Cholitz to leave the city in ruins if he left it at all, for "in 
history, the loss of Paris has always signified the loss of France.
One of the characteristics of commemorations is their deliberate lack of 
originality. They take up the forms, themes and discourses of previous 
commemorations, in order that the values celebrated may be presented as permanent, 
and in order that legitimacy for the present may be derived from the connection with the 
past. De Gaulle returned to the theme of Paris's status as role model for the nation in 
1964: "Paris (. . .) a, depuis tant de siècles, la charge capitale d’animer, d'illustrer, de 
signer ce que fait la F ra n c e " .In 1994 Jacques Chirac was able to represent his town's 
attributes as "eternal" and deep-rooted. Comparing Paris "today" with Paris in 1944, he 
claimed that "Paris ressemble encore à Paris de la Liberation, un Paris toujours 
frondeur, généreux et prêt à s'enflammer pour une cause qui lui paraît juste".
Because of its symbolic and emotive charge, the legend of the liberation had 
remained largely intact into the Mitterrand years. That legend had, after all, been 
formally inscribed on the walls of the Hôtel de Ville. De Gaulle's inscription tells of a
Quoted in F in ancia l Tim es press review , 11 June 1994.
Quoted by Jacques Chirac, writing in Le M onde, 25 August 1994.
M entioned in Le M onde, 25 A ugust 1994; special section, 'Paris libérée'.
Speech at com m em orative cerem ony o f  1964. Quoted in Le M onde, 27 A ugust 1964.
84 P aris-M atch , 1 Septem ber 1994.
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"capitale fidèle à elle-même et à la France", an "exemple pour la nation toute entière", 
which "s'est libérée par son propre effort, puis, unie à l’avant garde de l'armée française 
venue à son secours a, le 25 août, réduit l'Allemand dans ses derniers retranchements et 
l'a fait capituler.
And the enduring images of liberation maintained the epic tone. In December 
1983 a survey asked French people to select the image that best defined the liberation of 
Paris. 47% of those asked chose "le général de Gaulle descendant les Champs-Elysées". 
Far behind came "un soldat américain salué par la foule", with 16%, followed by "un 
resistant armé avec un brassard", on 15%. The negative aspects had manifestly been 
pushed to the back of their minds; the memory of "une femme tondue" was seleeted by 
only 8%/^
When it came to the fiftieth anniversary, Paris paid homage to one liberator: 
Paris itself. In the run-up to the commemorations, a section of the Gaullist right had 
complained that there had been too much deference to "the Anglo-Saxons" in 
Normandy in June. Gaullists would have more scope to influence the Paris anniversary 
than they had had in Normandy: the Mission du Cinquantenaire had delegated some of 
its powers to a Comité d ’honneur des célébrations du Cinquantième anniversaire de la 
libération de Paris, chaired by none other than Jacques Chirac, RPR mayor of Paris. 
The mairie allocated a budget of twenty million francs. And the grand open-air 
spectacle scheduled for 26 August was entrusted to the Charles de Gaulle Institute, 
whose priorities were not difficult to discern.
The commemoration in Paris, then, was sure to be different in tone from the one 
which had talcen place in Normandy in June: there were to be no telegenic U.S. veterans 
parading down the Champs-Elysées with their "Big Bands", and no medals were to be
Speech o f  24  March 1945. 
L 'H isto ire  n°67 (M ay 1984).
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awarded to them; no wreaths were to be laid at American monuments. The hundreds of 
plaques dedicated to loyal Parisians "tombés pour la patrie" during street battles with 
the occupying forces were cleaned up or restored one by one.^^ In the words of Rémy 
Desquesnes, "la commémoration consistait d'abord à organiser officiellement l'oubli de 
la participation des armées étrangères libératrices et à imposer une mémoire officielle, 
ici, la mémoire gaulliste".Desquesnes also suggested that objective history had come 
under systematic attack. He pointed out that the "precious" archives of the 
Oberbefehlshaber West, which ran the western occupied territories, had been moved 
from Paris to the U.S. National Archives in Washington. General Leclerc had allowed 
the American army to requisition these papers just after the liberation demonstrating, 
according to Desquesnes, "qui (. . .) s'estimait le maître de la situation".
Nevertheless, in August 1994 the organisers decided to put the emphasis on the 
Frenchness of the occasion, and they demanded that the media do lik ew ise .T h e  
mainstream, non-specialist press took up the baton willingly on this occasion. Its 
example was not followed by specialist historical publications, who generally saw it as 
their duty to provide an alternative narrative. For instance, V Histoire magazine brought 
out a special edition for the liberation which promised to "faire le récit le plus juste, sans 
légende et sans amnésie".^^
Paris-Match, on the other hand, was representative of ordinary, non-specialist 
opinion; there was no mandate to disturb consensus, no attempt to delve beneath the
So many com m em orative plaques had been erected after the war that the m inister o f  the Interior felt the 
need to set formal conditions. A s from the 12 April 1946 the owner o f  the land or building had to g ive  
formal consent, and the wording o f  the inscription had to be "noble et succinte". Subsequently, the decree 
o f  29 N ovem ber 1968 gave the prefect power to sanction or refuse any plaque or m em orial in his 
department. D ecentralisation brought further a further m odification in 1982: the mayor could now  make 
the decision. M ore details in Barcellini and W ieviorka, Passant, so tiv iens-to i.
Rém y D esquesnes in C ontem porary French C ivilisa tion , v o l.19, n°2 (1995 ), p .182.
Rém y D esquesnes in C on tem porary French C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995 ), p. 186.
R ém y D esquesnes in C on tem porary French C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995), p. 182.
N '^nft (July-A ugust 1994).
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surface. In the likes of Paris-Match some of the popular myth is usually left 
undisturbed. Its August edition featured a photograph taken during the battles in Paris. 
The caption ran, "Ces combattants sans uniforme ont pour rôle historique de restaurer, 
grâce à leur unification, scellée par la mission de Jean Moulin, la légitimité de la France 
incarnée par de Gaulle".
Even a brief caption like this one is revelatory of a nation's preoccupations. The 
favourite themes are taken up again: firstly there is the "rôle historique" of the resisters, 
which, crucially, is not primarily that of ensuring a military victory, but of "restoring the 
legitimacy" of a certain France, that personified by de Gaulle. The paradox here is a 
perplexing one. In aclcnowledging the restoration of this particular France, one is 
implicitly recognising the existence of another one. This "other" may well be 
illegitimate, unwelcome and treacherous, but it exists nonetheless, and its existence is 
inscribed in the very discourse that would efface it.
In order that the real France may be restored, there was a condition to be fulfilled: 
the combatants had to be unified. The retrospective interpretation always gave to 
believe that, once that unity had been achieved by Jean Moulin, victory was a foregone 
conclusion, and that the creation of the CNR and the liberation of Paris were part of the 
same glorious movement. In reality, the unification of Parisians against the occupier 
only took place after victory seemed assured, and not vice versa. The legend had 
reversed the order.
Rémy Desquesnes was not the only historian to question the "Franco-centric" bias 
of the 1990 commemorations (see above, p.55). Writing in Le Monde, André Kaspi 
acknowledged that "les mythes ont la vie dure", and attempted to dismantle some of 
them.^^ He explained, notably, why "Paris doit sa libération aux Américains autant
18 A ugust 1994; m y italics.
'La bataille et le mythe', 25 A ugust 1994.
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qu'aux Français": The Second Armoured Division depended on the Americans for 
equipment and provisions, and Leclerc was under the command of general Gerow of the 
Fifth U.S. Armed Corps. In addition, he recalled, it was the American general Barton's 
Fourth Division that fought the battle in Eastern Paris. Le Monde was consistently 
critical of officialdom's willingness to peddle flattering myths. Editorialist Thomas 
Ferenczi backed up Kaspi a few days later, denouncing the exclusion of the allies from 
Paris during the amiiversary period.^"^
Deference to the facts was, it seemed, a privilege reserved for outside observers. 
The organisers of the commemorative events reserved the right to be selective in what 
they celebrated, and the public did not appear to begrudge them that right. As Le Monde 
put it, "les Français sont persuadés, en partie grâce au général de Gaulle, qu'ils ont 
gagné la guerre par leurs propres moyens 'avec l'aide de leurs alliés'. La vérité historique 
est moins h é ro ïq u e .B u t then, the pure historical truth is always less heroic; that is 
why it is not always compatible with official, collective forms of remembrance, 
particularly when they constitute a crucial chapter in a national narrative.
As with the other war anniversaries, that of the liberation of Paris gave rise to a 
veritable mobilisation of communicators, responsible for the process of transmission of 
memory so vital to public commemoration. There was a massive poster campaign, to 
ensure that Parisians could not fail to notice that something was going on. The public 
television station France 3 co-operated with the municipal authorities of Paris to 
produce a film and an exhibition for the occasion. The exhibition, staged at the Hôtel de 
Ville, was entitled "Parisiens debout", and brought together photographs by the likes of 
Capa, Cartier-Bresson and Doisneau.^^ Since the start of June another exhibition had 
been running at the Hôtel national des invalides. It was entitled, "Ensemble ils ont




libéré la France", and dealt with the different stages of liberation of the national 
territory.
The day of 25 August started with a Mass at Notre Dame in the presence of Mgr 
Lehmann, president of the German "conférence épiscopale". (Charges of Franco-centric 
bias did not apply to the clergy, it seemed.) During the day there were ceremonies at 
Invalides, at the Leclerc monument at Porte d'Orléans, and at Montparnasse station, 
where the German general von Cholitz had surrendered. In the evening there was a 
projection on the façade of the Hôtel de Ville of all the names of the 1500 people who 
died liberating Paris, while an actress recited a Victor Hugo poem. This was followed 
by a son et lumière display recreating the atmosphere of August 1944. Finally, there was 
a huge balpopulaire at place de la Concorde, which was attended by 300 000 people.
The following day, the festival continued with a parade on the Champs-Elysées, 
the theme being "Libération, j'écris ton nom" (a quotation from a Paul Elouard poem). 
Featuring 6000 young "figurants", it was intended to re-enact de Gaulle's triumphant 
bain de foule fifty years before. Whereas the previous evening's celebrations were 
regarded as a success, this project did not appear to capture the imagination of the 
people. According to Rémy Desquesnes, the parade, which cost ten million francs, took 
place before "un public peu nombreux et circonspect".^^
As I have already suggested, the theme of national unity, and the danger of 
disunity, was ever present at the fiftieth anniversary of Paris's liberation. On 24 August, 
as part of the commemorative programme, the prime minister, Edouard Balladur, and 
the mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, attended the unveiling of a memorial to Marshall 
Leclerc, who led the first detachment of Allied troops into Paris. From Balladur and 
Chirac, members not of a political party but a Republican rassemblement, the RPR, one
96 R ém y D esquesnes in C on tem porary French C ivilisa tion , v o l.l9 , iF 2  (1995), p. 183.
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would expect nothing less than full commitment to the sacred virtue. And Bahadur's 
speech duly insisted on the need for national unity, which he described significantly as 
"plus nécessaire que jamais", and spoke of the danger of division. He quoted Marshall 
Leclerc on this subject: "Sachons tirer les leçons de l'histoire, notre pays ne peut pas se 
payer le luxe de divisions intestines".
On the evening of 25 August there was a high profile ceremony at the Hôtel de 
Ville, attended by the highest representatives of the Republic, including Mitterrand, 
Balladur and Chirac. François Mitterrand exhorted his audience, "Sachons préserver ce 
qui doit nous unir", while Jacques Chirac stressed the success attained by the "hommes 
unis et déterminés". The speeches consistently accentuated the fact that "la Résistance 
c’était la victoire du rassemblement, de l'unité, du courage et de l 'e sp o ir" .F o r  the 
ceremony at the Hôtel de Ville, Chirac had made a point of inviting personalities 
representing all the different strands of the Resistance as guests of honour. These guests, 
in the words of France 2's correspondent, symbolised "le consensus qu'a voulu Jacques 
C h irac" .T h is  united front also inspired the subtitle to the headline in Le Figaro of 26 
August. The same newspaper, summing up the "allocutions" of the two days of official 
commemorations, chose the words, "l'union dans le souvenir: union, rassemblement, 
reconnaissance" It is a phrase which goes to the very heart of what is at stake during 
collective memorial experiences such as this one.
The mystical, spiritual nature of the union sacrée was also evoked by the 
speakers. This constitutes another step away from the practicalities of partisan politics, 
and indeed from everyday reality, which is a characteristic of this type of national 
commemoration. In commemorative discourse, words that denote concrete objects or
R ém y D esquesnes in C ontem porary French C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995 ), p. 185. 
R ém y D esquesnes in C on tem pora iy  F rench C ivilisa tion , v o l.19, n°2, (1995), p .184. 
'II y a 50 ans, la Libération', 25 A ugust 1994.
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clear ideas tend to disappear, to be replaced by words which resonate wonderfully, but 
are difficult to pin down to a definition. Chirac, quoting de Gaulle, described the 
Liberation as "un des miracles de la conscience nationale (. . .) qui, parfois, au long des 
siècles, viennent illuminer notre h isto ire".M itterrand  talked of "cette mystérieuse et 
forte alliance qui nous a fait ce que nous sommes".
The anniversary had not been totally devoid of party political tensions, but these 
were, for the most part, put to one side for the key moments. Communists were 
encouraged to participate in the organisation of the ceremonies as well as in the 
ceremonies themselves. High profile figures such as Henri Rol-Tanguy (commander-in- 
chief of the Forces française de l'intérieur) and Maurice-Kriegel-Valrimont (a leading 
communist member of the Conseil national de Résistance) were allocated a place on the 
"comité d'honneur du cinquantenaire".*^^
Where there were tensions surrounding the fiftieth anniversary they were not 
between communists and Gaullists. They were generally of a more personal nature. 
Some Gaullists had been unhappy that Mitterrand's public pronouncements at previous 
commemorative ceremonies had not made much of de Gaulle's role. This had certainly 
been the case in Normandy and in the run-up to the commemoration in Paris. Alain 
Peyrefitte complained, in Le Figaro of 25 August, that this was an serious affront, since 
national liberation and General de Gaulle were indissociable; "Le souvenir de la 
Libération, c'est aussi, en effet, le souvenir du Libérateur, dont M. Mitterrand s'est 
efforcé, en cet anniversaire, de ne pas prononcer le nom".***^  In the keynote speech he 
gave that evening, the president did finally allude directly to de Gaulle. Jean Kahn, who 
helped to prepare that speech, has explained that this was a deliberate insertion. It was
F rance  2, 25 A ugust 1994.
F rance 2 , 2 5  A ugust 1994,
Reported in Le M onde, 23 A ugust 1994. 
Le F igaro , 25 A ugust 1994.
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felt that there would have been too much damaging criticism if the general had been 
omitted again from a presidential speech.***"* Unity, albeit begrudged and calculated, won 
the day on this occasion.
A dominant theme throughout French history has been the connection between 
external influence, best expressed by the French term rayonnement, and internal 
cohesion. As François Mitterrand said after his re-election in 1988, "c'est dans la 
cohesion sociale que réside la capacité de la France à faire rayonner (. . .) son génie".***^  
In September 1994 François Mitterrand was asked by what he would want people to 
remember about his presidency. He immediately alluded to that vital partnership 
between internal harmony and France's world role: "mes deux septennats furent la 
période de paix civique et sociale la plus marquée du siècle (. . .) enfin la France a, sous 
mon mandat, tenu son rang, celui d'une des premières nations du monde".***^
When such notions exist somewhere in the collective consciousness, they are 
exploited wherever possible for their galvanising potential, with the added bonus that 
each "exploitation" reinforces the very ideas that are mobilised in the first place. At a 
World War Two commemoration earlier that year, defence minister François Léotard 
had explained the partnership as "un rayonnement qui nous impose d'être forts si nous 
voulons être entendus".***  ^ The reasoning is that people tend to concentrate less on 
parochial disputes if their eyes are fixed on broader horizons; and also that they can be 
encouraged to unite in pride behind the gifts their collective genius has given, or can 
still give, to the world. A united nation is all the more able to make an impression on the 
world outside. The liberation of Paris was cherished because it enabled France, in the
Interview o f  10 March 1999.
Speech o f  8 M ay 1988, in François Mitterrand, D iscours: 1981-1995  (Paris: Europolis, 1995), p .267. 
L e F igaro , 8 Septem ber 1994
Speech at Saint M arcel (M orbihan), 18 June 1994. A llocu tions de F rançois L éotard .
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words of Jacques Chirac once more, to "retrouver son honneur et son rang dans le 
concert des n a t i o n s " O f  course, this sort of rhetoric echoes faithfully de Gaulle 
himself. He had declared lyrically after the liberation of Paris that "Derrière le nuage si 
lourd de notre sang et nos larmes, voici que reparaît le soleil de notre grandeur". Here 
one encounters the now-familiar bilateral system, whereby external assertiveness 
enhances interior harmony; and here again one must come to terms with a worldview 
that has been passed from generation to generation in France, and has been proclaimed 
loudly enough for all to hear by the historical heavyweights like de Gaulle, Napoléon 
and Louis XIV. It is a worldview that conceives of a hierarchical "chain of being" in 
which France occupies an exalted position, from which she is unhappily displaced from 
time to time. As in classical tragedy, chaos and destruction then hold sway, working 
towards an inevitable conclusion in which there will be a mass of bodies backstage, but 
in which everyone and everything is restored to its rightful rank.
After war and occupation these ideas became simultaneously more crucial and 
more difficult to sustain. More crucial because, in the wake of such unhealthy division 
anything that favoured unity was welcome; more difficult to sustain because during the 
previous four years there had been precious little in France worth radiating to the world. 
However, episodes like the Liberation provided the opportunity to rehabilitate France's 
messianic role. It was celebrated not only as the return of the "real" France from the 
wilderness, but as a psychological turning point in the world wide confrontation 
between the forces of good and evil. In times of commemoration, speeches habitually 
recalled the joy with which the news was received by the deportees in the Eastern 
concentration camps. The capital of the nation was presented as the symbolic capital of 
Civilisation: both Paris and Civilisation had been in darlaiess for a number of years, but, 
now that the former was free, the latter too would make a glorious return to dominance
France 2, 25 August 1994.
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on the world stage. The presenter of France 2's flagship programme, "II y a 50 ans, la 
Liberation", said by way of introduction that "on dit souvent que la Libération de Paris a 
été pour le monde entier le signal que quelque chose était en train de c h a n g e r" .O n e  is 
given the impression, listening to some accounts, that the Allied victory owed more to a 
collection of inspirational signs and symbols than to armed combat. Thus we were 
informed in the same television programme that, although not everyone participated in 
the insurrection, that hardly mattered because everyone heard the bells of victory ring 
out and thus the whole population was implicated in the victory! Jacques Chirac's 
speech on August 25 made reference to "l'émotion du monde entier, dont les yeux 
étaient rivés sur la France", when the news filtered through; François Mitterrand spoke 
of the "signification universelle" of the event.
The conception of Paris as a kind of grand metonym for the global conflict was to 
serve as a reminder that France ought never to let itself be engrossed in its own 
squabbles, since the rest of the world looked to her for guidance. In other words, the 





CH A PTER  THREE  
LA GUERRE FRANCO-FRANCAISE
"Les mains les plus impures de la guerre étrangère sont plus pures que les mains les plus 
pures de la guerre civile."
- Péguy
We saw in the previous chapter that one of the elementary functions of 
commemoration - to instill a sense of unity on a national scale- was still relevant to our 
period. However, in order that commemoration of the Second World War may perform 
that function, it had been necessary to be selective about what was remembered, about 
what was deemed fit for commemoration. But the facts could not be ignored forever; 
alongside the glory of the liberation of Paris or the heroic martyrdom of Jean Moulin, 
there was an immensely complex Franco-French conflict to be dealt with. And even 
within otherwise glorious episodes, the tensions could never quite be forgotten. To 
make matters more complicated, the problems did not always originate in the war 
period. As Marc Ferro has said, "history is one of the main areas of civil war" in 
France.^ Divergent modes of dealing with the past in collective memory and 
commemoration had the potential to provoke new tensions or accentuate pre-existing 
ones.
France is often said to have been continuously at war with itself. In 1985 the 
periodical Vingtième Siècle produced a special edition entirely devoted to "les guerres
The U se and  A buse o f  H istory, pp. 104, 105.
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franco-françaises".^ François Mitterrand has spoken of "la guerre eivile permanente 
entre Français",^ in which he included 1940-44. Henry Rousso has called the Vichy 
years "la faille la plus profonde qu'ait connue l'unité nationale".'^ According to Paul 
Thibaud, one of the reasons for the reluctance of the French to take up arms to defend 
themselves was that each Frenchman was afraid of his neighbour when he was armed. 
"Ils ne pouvaient guère envisager de prendre les armes, même de se mobiliser, sans que 
remontent les peurs réciproques".^
The fact is that, between 1940 and 1944, Frenchmen were engaged in violent 
struggle against fellow Frenchmen. Before 1943, perhaps, it was possible for both 
resisters and collaborators to delude themselves that, ultimately, they were both fighting 
for France. But in 1943, the year in which the milice was created, it became clear that 
there was indeed a kind of civil war going on. Over 2000 French people suspected of 
collaborating with the Germans were killed between 1943 and June 1944. Many more 
French men and women lost their lives, sometimes at the hands of their countrymen, for 
opposing that collaboration. Following the liberation, there was of course yet more 
Franco-French bloodshed, during the infamous period of épuration.^
But if the period is seen as another battle in the guerre franco-française, it is a 
battle which must be viewed in all its complexity. Without wishing to reduce other 
moments of conflict to mere binary opposition, it still made sense to be for or against 
the Revolution, for or against the Commune, for or against Dreyfus, for or against 
l'Algérie française, and so on. But it does not make full sense to ask if one was or is for 
or against collaboration with the Nazis. Very few people were wholeheartedly for
 ^ January-March 1985. The expression is attributed to Stanley H offm ann, one o f  the first historians to 
conceive o f  V ichy  as a Franco-French problem  as opposed to a Franco-German one.
 ^ Quoted by Nathan Bracher in 'Mitterrand and the lessons o f  histoiy', in C on tem porary  French  
C ivilisa tion , v o l .19, n°2 (1995).
'V ichy, le grand fo ssé’, in Vingtièm e sièc le , n°5 (January 1995).
 ^ 'La R épublique et ses héros', in E sprit, n'^198, (January-Apr il 1994).
 ^L a F rance des années noires, p .33.
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collaboration. They felt they had little choice. Responses to the situation that arose were 
multiple, and, to complicate the picture even further, there were many subsidiary issues 
to be confronted, which elicited any number of different responses. In occupied France, 
the internal fractures were not only ideological, but social, cultural, sometimes even 
accidental. In comparison, the great traumas of the Revolution, the Commune or the 
Dreyfus Affair appear blessedly straightforward. The fractures were serious, but clean. 
So, in spite of Gaullian and communist attempts to set up oppositions in accordance 
with their ideology ("the real France versus the traitors", and "the people versus a self- 
seeking bourgeois élite" respectively) it is impossible to view the Second World War in 
terms of a simple opposition.
Resistance
In many cases, internal divisions were only in evidence under the surface of the 
official commemorative discourse of a unified "national narrative". The myth of a 
valiant, consensual, unified resistance movement had not been left completely 
undisturbed before and during our period. For three or four decades after the Liberation 
the status of the Resistance had been guarded by an "establishment" of "anciens", which 
was able to promote its values and memory, and was thorough and energetic in 
countering perceived slurs on its actions during World War Two. An extraordinarily 
high proportion of résistants and deportees went into politics after the Liberation. Of the 
1 112 deputies elected under the Fourth Republic, 709 were in either of these two 
categories.^ This "establishment" still considered in 1981 that its influence and prestige 
justified a call to the French electorate to vote for the only candidate (François
 ^ Jean Chariot in R ésistan ce et M ém oire, ed. by Em ile Malet.
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Mitterrand, as it happens) whom they deemed "désireux de prolonger les grandes 
orientations du Conseil national de la Résistanee."^ During the 1981 election campaign 
the candidates had hotly disputed the right to claim to be the inheritor of the positive 
legacies of the war. Henry Rousso described the situation vividly; "Gauche et droite 
présidentielles bataillaient ferme à coups de francisques, de légions d'honneur ou de 
chars Leclerc. La campagne du second tour se terminait sur le rappel, tambour battant, 
des valeurs et du souvenir, apparemment vivaces, de la Résistance".^
But since that time, due to a combination of the natural ravages of time and a new­
found taste for slaying sacred cows, the stranglehold of the Resistance fraternity over 
the collective conscience has loosened considerably. By the 1980s it no longer seemed 
perfectly natural that the heroic exploits of the maquisards represent fully "the French 
experience" during the War. In 1982 Henry Rousso stated baldly (and perhaps 
prematurely) that "A I'image d'une France unanime dans la révolte contre l'occupant 
nazi a peu à peu succédé celle d'un pays tout aussi unanime dans la lâcheté et la 
dé la tio n " .F o r Rousso, the most prominent critic of contemporary attitudes, this was 
symptomatic of a creeping revisionism that sought to minimise the influence of the 
Resistance heritage, and replace it with a version of events that sat more comfortably 
alongside the nation's recent predilection for self-criticism. In 1993 Rousso observed 
that "hormis quelques célébrations isolées, le souvenir de la Résistance resurgit plus 
volontiers lors de polémiques". Eric Conan and Daniel Lindenberg concurred, writing 
in 1994 that "depuis déjà de nombreuses années les politiques n'honoraient plus 
qu'épisodiquement le culte sacré de l'héritage ré s is ta n t" .It is common for the French
® R ousso, L e Syndrom e de  Vichy, p. 196.
 ^Henry R ousso, 'La R ésistance entre la légende et l'oubli', in L'H istoire, n °4 l (January-June 1982). 
'° 'Où en est l'histoire de la Résistance?' in L'H istoire, n°41 (January-June 1982).
" L es C o llec tion s du N ouvel O bservateur, n°16 (M ay 1993).
'Pourquoi y a-t-il une affaire Jean M oulin?', in E sprit, January-April 1994.
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to be accused of over-emphasising the importance of the Resistance, but on the basis of 
official anniversaries this did not appear to be so. Although it was certainly honoured at 
other times and in other ways, the Resistance had no national commemoration to call its 
own. Over the years there were in fact a number of proposals for a "journée nationale de 
la Résistance". So far, however, none of these has come to fruition.
Revelation was taking precedence over veneration, and the Resistance legend in 
its traditional form was coming under implacable scrutiny. This induced a kind of panic 
from time to time in those who feared that their version of the truth might not survive 
intact when no one was left to bear witness to it. Against an increasingly assertive and 
sceptical "scientific" discourse, which sought to unearth the facts and lay them out for 
examination, most of those with first hand experience of resistance maintained a 
"commemorative" discourse, dedicated to keeping the memory alive. One of the 
recurring themes of France d'abord, the newspaper for former resisters, was the need to 
"defend the honour" of the movement against perceived slurs.
De Gaulle had nationalised the different strands of the armed struggle under the 
banner of "la France combattante", and his article of faith was that "les Français ne 
menaient qu'un seul combat pour une seule p a t r ie " .However, there had always been 
an intrinsic tension: for the disparate strands of the Resistance, participation in "le jeu 
du rassemblement" implied a loss of integrity. In the words of Robert Frank, unity also 
meant "de perdre leur âme, de masquer ce que fit la spécificité de leur combat, de 
gommer les déchirures nationales d’alors et de faire croire que la France entière avait été 
derrière eux pendant toute la période de l'Occupation".^^ While on one level, resistance
A s recently as N ovem ber 1998 le P a trio te  résistan t (FN D IR P) reported that certain associations hoped  
for a com m em oration on 27 M ay, anniversary o f  the creation o f  the CNR.
Quoted in Le M onde  12 A ugust 1964.
'La m ém oire em poisonnée', in L a F rance des années noires, p .489.
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was a patriotic act in defence of French sovereignty, like Verdun, on the other it was a 
political act in support of one ideology against another. The measures of each motive 
varied according to the branch of the Resistance one belonged to. There were as many 
permutations of patriotism, class war, allegiance to a trusted leader and personal rancour 
as there were réseaux. To simply equate the Resistance with "France" and its 
adversaries with "the enemy" was to lose sight of the multi-layered reality.
By the 1980s this national synthesis was widely seen as unwieldy and artificial. 
Resistance was reckoned by some to amount to nothing less than a Franco-French war, 
more significant in the final analysis than that between French and Germans. As Jean 
Moulin's biographer Daniel Cordier said, "la Resistance (. . .) ne fut jamais une cause 
n a tio n a le " .Thus during our period more attention was given to sub-groups or specific 
themes. This was true of specialist history, but there was an unprecedented overspill 
into other vectors of memory: associations of "anciens", the media, and eventually the 
state. The domination of the monolithic "France combattante" was giving way to the 
disparate movements and the tensions between them, the role of women in the 
Resistance, or the activities of Jewish and non-French volunteers (see chapter five). 
Regional identities had always been strong within the "France combattante". These were 
strengthened and often given expression in ceremonies, monuments and museums. The 
first local Resistance museum and documentation centre was opened in 1986, at 
Champigny-sur-Marne.^^ Many other towns followed suit.
To most socialists and social democrats, and to the post-1968 generation, the 
notion of armed defence of the patrie did not have quite the same hold on the 
imagination as it did for the Gaullist right and the older generations (and also the 
sovereignist left). In February 1989 general Fricaud-Chagnaud, chairman of the Comité
Interview in L e N ouvel O bservateur, 22-28  April 1999. 
L e M onde, 6 January 1986.
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du souvenir et des manifestations nationalesj^ wrote to the Elysée to request more 
financial and moral support for the bluets de France fund-raising collection. This annual 
event, the equivalent of the British poppy campaign, had been doing badly for a number 
of years. General Fricaud-Chagnaud put this down to competition from other causes that 
had a greater impact on the public conscience. Later in the same year French television 
companies upset ex-servicemen by failing to broadcast the 8 May commemorations. 
This led to complaints from the ex-serviceman's ministry, as did the lack of media 
interest in the Armistice Day ceremonies in November.
Like that of the Resistance fraternity, the influence of la France combattante as a 
whole had once been considerable. Up until the 1970s and 1980s ex-servicemen still 
constituted a large and powerful lobby. Jean Laurain has gone as far as to say that a 
significant number of ex-servicemen shifted their allegiance to François Mitterrand for 
the 1981 presidential election purely because he was committed to restoring the 8 May 
commemoration, and that their defection may well have tipped the balance in 
Mitterrand's fa v o u r.H is  analysis would be extremely difficult to test empirically, but 
if correct it would imply that a presidential election in 1981 was won partly because of a 
World War Two commemoration!
From liberation until the 1970s, communists and Gaullists had been the major 
political forces in France. They perpetuated the tension that had existed during the war 
between the Free French in exile and the interior resistance. The struggle for pre­
eminence between Gaullist and Communist versions of the Resistance narrative has
Letter to president Mitterrand, dated 27 February 1989; Jean Kahn's archives. The C SM N  w as a 
division  o f  the O ffice n a tional des A nciens C om battan ts et Victimes de G uerre.
Letter o f  31 October 1989 from the d irecteur de cabinet at the ex-servicem an's ministry, for the 
attention o f  Jean Kahn (Jean Kahn's archives).
D ebate at the conference 'Changer la vie; les années Mitterrand 1981-1984', organised by the F ondation  
nationale  des sc ien ces po litiqu es  and the Institu t F rançois M itterrand, Paris, 14-16 January 1999.
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been well documented. Commemorations and monuments were used as weapons in that 
struggle. Serge Barcellini has described the tug-of-war between the Mémorial de la 
France combattante, inaugurated by de Gaulle on 18 June 1960, and the clairière des 
fusillés, both at Mont Valérien.^^ The mémorial was favoured as a place of 
remembrance by the Free French, the clairière by the non-Gaullist, communist- 
dominated interior resistance. Until 1984, during Deportation Day ceremonies, more 
time was spent at the former than at the latter. However, in 1984 the itinerary was 
altered so that only half an hour was spent at the memorial, and nearly an hour at the 
dealing. These details are trivial but have a symbolic value for those concerned.
The 1980s and 1990s, while departing from the Gaullist/communist dichotomy, 
saw a number of controversies which undermined the "national narrative" of a unified 
resistance. Foremost among these were the "Manouchian affair" of June 1985, revealing 
attacks on communist and left-wing résistants by more right-wing factions, and the 
"Marenches affair" of September 1986, when Gestapo archives bearing evidence of 
treachery within the Resistance were brought to light; similarly, as a consequence of 
Klaus Barbie's posthumous testimony, resistance heroes Raymond and Lucie Aubrac 
were accused of complicity in the betrayal of Jean Moulin. Their children were moved 
to write to president Mitterrand in October 1991 asking him to "mettre fin au processus 
de diffamations" against their mother and fa th e r.T h e  controversy was to rumble on, 
however, for a number of years.
The race to reveal the "truth" about the Resistance was becoming rather frantic. 
France, or vocal elements within it, was apparently eager to destroy its icons. Few were 
more sacred than Jean Moulin. Daniel Cordier had taken it upon himself to defend Jean
Vingtièm e S iècle , n°45.
Letter o f  15 October 1991. Jean Kahn's archives.
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Moulin's memory in a biography of which the first volume appeared in 1989?^ His 
version of events comforted the "guerre franco-française" school of thought. Cordier 
was adamant that Moulin "n'est pas un héros d'union nationale, mais l'un des chefs du 
parti minoritaire qui a gagné".
Cordier had also revived the vendetta between Moulin and Henri Fresnay, by 
drawing attention to the latter's alleged antisemitic and xenophobic tendencies, and by 
answering some of the charges previously levelled at Moulin by Fresnay. In November 
1989 former members of Fresnay's Combat movement held a bellicose meeting at 
which Cordier was taken to task. Such was the tension that even the Elysée became 
alarmed. After speaking to one of the participants at the meeting, Elysée counsellor Jean 
Kalm warned a colleague that Fresnay’s comrades were "prêts à déten*er la hache de 
guerre pour faire son affaire à Cordier, et, à travers lui, à Jean Moulin"
The high water mark of this alternative form of revisionism was arguably reached 
in 1993, when Thierry Wolton wrote a book in which Jean Moulin was "revealed" to 
have been a Soviet spy!^^ Wolton styled himself a "journaliste d'investigation 
historique", and that job description typified the spirit of the age: the nation's recent past 
was seen as something that had to be exposed, the nation’s heroes had to be seen to have 
a dark side. Paul Thibaud claimed that Thierry Wolton's book was cynically timed to 
chime in with that mood. Wolton's hypothesis, wrote Thibaud,
Jean  M oulin. L'inconnu du P anthéon  (Paris: J-C Lattes, 1989).
Conan and Lindenberg in E sp rit n°198 (January-April 1994).
N ote  o f  1 D ecem ber 1989 for the attention o f  Christian Sautter. Jean Kahn's archives.
Le g ra n d  recrutem ent. In 1998 M oulin was the centre o f  attention once again. This time Jacques 
B aynac claim ed, in L es Secrets de I'ajfaire Jean M oulin, that M oulin had been ready to desert de Gaulle 
and align h im self with Giraud and the Americans.
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a eu de l'écho parce qu'elle flatte l'esprit du tem ps. Elle le flatte en général parce qu'il faut choquer.
E lle le flatte en particulier parce qu'elle est en conform ité avec la m anière devenue normale de 
traiter en France la période de la guerre (. . .) le public n'attend pas l'héroïsm e m ais la honte.^^
It was another sign of the times that Thibaud's article appeared in an issue of Esprit 
entitled "Que reste-t-il de la Résistance?"^^
Representatives of the state could do little else but attempt to placate the rival 
factions and shore up consensual aspects. François Mitterrand was understandably 
reluctant to talce sides in the quarrel between the pro-Fresnay and pro-Moulin factions. 
He paid homage to Fresnay, founder of the Combat movement, in a ceremony at the 
Invalides in September 1988. Then, on 17 June 1993, at the montagne Sainte-Geneviève 
in Paris, Mitterrand commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the first meeting of the 
Conseil national de la Résistance, set up by Moulin. Mitterrand's speech contained a 
warning which identified a threat to the memory of Resistance heroes like Moulin. Jean 
Kahn, who prepared the text of this speech for the president, confirmed that the 
following passage was inserted as a reaction to the controversy that had resurfaced in 
the form of Thierry Wolton's incendiary book:^^
Qui peut affirmer en des tem ps com m e les nôtres, que la crypte du Panthéon soit un abri sûr? Pour 
l'honneur de la France résistante et combattante, vous à qui je  m 'adresse et dont je  reconnais tant 
de visages qui s'illustrent dans les jours dangereux, restons vigilants.^®
The article w as entitled 'La République et ses héros’.
N °198  (January-April 1994).
M entioned during interview s o f  3 and 10 March 1999. There was to be m ore polem ical debate in 1998  
when Jacques B aynac accused Jean M oulin o f  being a Soviet agent.
Text o f  speech kindly provided by Jean Kahn at the Institu t F rançois M itterrand. Mitterrand's speeches 
over the com m em orative period w ere replete with this sort o f  exliortation. Another exam ple w ould  be the 
fiftieth anniversary o f  the "médaille de la Résistance", on 13 October 1993, w hen Mitterrand said: 
"Rappelez-vous que nous som m es chargés, vous et m oi, les uns et les autres d'une lourde responsabilité,
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In the same speech Mitterrand recognised that the pivotal moments of a people's 
history are always open to retrospective abuse: "II est facile, après coup, trop facile, 
d'isoler tel ou tel épisode pour l'amplifier ou le gommer, d'interpréter à contre-sens le 
comportement des uns et des autres. There is a discernible note of alarm in these 
words. This was a feature of the language of what we might call the Resistance 
"establishment" during the 1980s and 1990s. There was a feeling that the Resistance 
legacy was being contested unjustifiably, partly because it was the fashion to do so, 
partly because, as Daniel Cordier has suggested,French people had never been able to 
identify fully with a movement they had failed to support at the time. After all Pétain 
was, for most of the occupation period, more popular than the Resistance.^^
The theme was taken up again the following year, when another Moulin-related 
anniversary imposed itself on the commemorative agenda. Celebrating the fiftieth 
anniversary of the adoption of the CNR's manifesto, on 15 March 1994, François 
Mitterrand gave another warning against the dangers of the current fashion. He claimed 
that "ils sont trop oubliés, ce programme et cette institution", and called on survivors of 
the event to "transmettre intact" its ideals.
Revisions to the Resistance legend were often made in good faith. However, there 
was a real fear that they would be used to "over-relativise" the conflict, to give to 
believe that each side was as bad as the other. There was also a risk that, if the cynical, 
relativistic stance was taken to extremes, it would represent a defeat for the ideals 
defended by the Resistance, and by extension the Republic, and a denial of the "lesson 
learned" from World War Two: that democracy must be defended, if necessary by force.
celle  de transmettre à nos enfants, à nos petits enfants, à tous ceux qui viendront ensuite, un fi'agment 
essentiel de la m ém oire de la France". Text supplied by Jean Kahn.
A s above (Jean Kahn's archives).
Interview in L e N ou vel O bservateur, 22-28  April 1999.
A ffirm ed by "toutes les enquêtes", according to Paul Thibaud, 'La République et ses héros', in E sprit 
n° 198 (January-April 1994).
Le M onde, 17 March 1994.
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It was understandable, therefore, that people whose political ideals were founded on 
those that were regained in 1944, should have erected a monolithic Resistance myth as 
fortification against its nemesis - the guerre franco-française narrative, with its 
concomitant levelling of the moral high ground. And it is understandable that they 
should have been alarmed at the erosion of the myth, even when the agents of erosion 
were acting in good faith.
Henri Amouroux was well laiown for his extremely relativistic stance on Vichy 
and the Resistance. During the commemorative period of 1994 he declared in an 
interview with Le Quotidien de Paris that "les atrocités sont à porter au débit de la 
Résistance comme à celui de la collaboration".^^ He also wrote in Le Figaro-Magazine 
of the torture and sadistic cruelty inflicted by each side on its prisoners.^^ This was 
precisely the strategy employed by Jacques Trémolet de Villiers, Paul Touvier's defence 
lawyer, during Touvier’s trial. He portrayed the period as a civil war in which the 
overwhelming preoccupation of each side was to take control: ethical and political 
decisions were incidental, and both sides were willing to harm innocent people to 
achieve their objectives. During the Touvier trial, then, de Villiers made great play of 
Resistance atrocities, such as the murder of the Jourdaii family, in Voiron. Some of the 
Jourdan males belonged to the militia; in consequence every family member, from the 
baby of two years to the eighty two-year-old grandmother, was killed by the 
R esis tan ce .W as this a step towards the whole truth, or an insidious attempt to 
apportion blame indiscriminately?
Interview o f  2 June 1994. 
^"29 July 1994.




In the previous chapter we saw that the fiftieth anniversary of de Gaulle's BBC 
broadcast was commemorated in relative harmony, and how this was due in part to the 
relative moderation of French politics at the time. That said, consensus is rarely 
absolute, and even for the 18 June anniversary, chinks in the armour of national 
unanimity were apparent if one was prepared to look closely enough. Behind the scenes 
the partisan jostling for position started long before the commemorations themselves. 
Pierre Lefranc, in the same article that celebrated the nation's rallying to de Gaulle, went 
on to complain that state funding for the commemorative projects had been insufficient, 
especially when compared to "d'autres anniversaires" (by which he meant the 
bicentennial of the Revolution).Lefranc did later admit that "on a eu tout ce qu'on a 
demandé" in terms of financial backing from the government, although he pointed out 
that the demand for funding had been deliberately modest.
Further behind the scenes, some former Français libres wanted to have a special 
batch of decorations created for the occasion. They suggested that the awards of Légion 
d'Honneur and Ordre national du Mérite be upgraded, but exclusively for members of 
the resistance who had been so honoured before 1980."^  ^ The date was significant, 
because there was a feeling among non-Gaullist resisters that they had been neglected 
by the honours system prior to Mitterrand's victory in 1981. Indeed, a large number of 
former left-wing resistance fighters were only decorated after 1981. Had the idea put 
forward by the Gaullists been retained, these people would have been excluded from the 
new round of honours. In the event the plan did not come to fruition, but the anecdote
L e M onde, 1 February 1990. 
Interview o f  11 M ay 1999.
N ° 256  o f  the R evue de  la  F rance libre, m entioned by Jean-Mathieu B oris in a letter to Jean-Louis 
B ianco (o f  E lysée staff) on 30 January 1989. Jean Kahn's archives.
76
7 7
illustrates the type of maneouvring that occurred, as the different groups attempted to 
make their presence felt.
Of the same ilk was the pressure applied by the Paris municipality, headed by 
Jacques Chirac, in order that that year's prix national de la Résistance be presented in 
June, thereby happily coinciding with the anniversary of de Gaulle's BBC broadcast. 
Here the objective was obvious: to render "resistance" and "de Gaulle" indissociable in 
the public consciousness. However, this, too, was not to be, since it was decided that 
responsibility for the timing of the prizegiving lay with the prefect of each French 
department."^* Also, the actions of the Gaullist mayor of Plessis-Robinson (Hauts-de- 
Seine) upset communists. He was accused of indulging in a "miserable opération 
politicienne" when he approved the changing of a street name, from rue Jacques 
Duclos, in honour of the former PCF presidential candidate, to rue Charles de Gaulle. 
On a more rudimentary note, in Seine-Saint-Denis a monument dedicated to the general 
was vandalised on the 18 June.
The Allied landings in France
In the Normandy region, with its historic beaches, its war cemeteries, and its 
countless monuments, there was (and is) a sense of proprietorship of the D-day heritage, 
and with it a sense of responsibility for its memory. Yet at the same time these events 
have national and international significance, since what happened in June 1944 affected 
most of the world. It is not surprising that this could cause tension between the different 
interested parties, whose aims and methods did not necessarily coincide. During the 
Mitterrand years France's regions became more assertive than they had been before, and
A lluded to in a note o f  9 April 1940 from Cliristian Sautter, for the attention o f  Jean Kahn and Christian 
N ique. Jean Kahn's archives.
77
78
this was recognised by the process of decentralisation begun in 1984. The change in the 
balance of power was not a particularly smooth one, and this was discernible in the 
anniversary years of 1984 and 1994.
Fortieth anniversaries do not have the same appeal as fiftieth anniversaries, but in 
the case of the Normandy landings the 1984 anniversaries were the biggest to date. 
Raymond Triboulet, chairman of the Comité du débarquement since its inception in 
1945, promised that "les célébrations du 40  ^ anniversaire seront les plus grandes et les 
plus belles jamais faites"."*  ^ Given the lack of enthusiasm of previous French 
governments for the Anglo-Saxon flavour of the Normandy landings, this was not mere 
empty rhetoric on Triboulet's part.
Initially a division was made between the national commemorations, overseen by 
the government, and those organised by the Comité du débarquement. Ceremonies 
organised unilaterally by Allied nations were added to the programme, as were events 
organised by local authorities. The lines of demarcation between the different groups 
corresponded here to a "bataille de mémoire" in which differences of approach, tone, 
interpretation and sometimes factual information came to a head. In the eyes of Serge 
Barcellini, the anniversary can be seen as a "tool", employed for a different purpose by 
each "agent". For the Comité, then, the memorial tool was used to promote "une 
pédagogie gaullienne de l'honneur national"; for the govermnent it served to advance 
"une politique mitterandienne"; while the local authorities had in mind "une politique 
économico-touristique régionale"."*^
Quoted by Serge B arcellini, 'D iplom atie et com m ém oration. Les com m ém orations du 6 juin 1984: une 
bataille de mém oire' in G uerres m ondiales et conflits contem porains n°186 (1997).
The aim s o f  the different actors do o f  course overlap at tim es. The statutes o f  the C om ité  state that one 
o f  its objectives is the "développem ent du tourisme dans les zones du débarquement"; another is the 
"entretien des relations fi'anco-alliées". H ow ever, the aims as given  in the founding statutes and the real 
priorities are not necessarily coincident.
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The co-existence of several acteurs de mémoire, each with a distinct set of 
priorities, begs some important questions: where is the French collective memory in all 
of this? Is one group the legitimate representative of that idea, to the exclusion of the 
other two? Do we find it by drawing a line between the three and taking the point of 
intersection? Can the parts form an integral whole? Is collective memory represented at 
all at official commemorations?
A closer look at the "bataille de mémoire" of 1984 provides some answers. One of 
the interesting features of the fortieth anniversary was that, for only the second time 
since 1945, the national government decided to impose its own commemorative 
programme, rather than accept that proposed by Triboulet's committee. Although 
Mitterrand granted considerable autonomy to the regions, he also expanded the state's 
department of war commemoration, which at the time went under the title of Direction 
des statuts et de l'information historique. It was this department that was asked to 
"conduire une réflexion", and come up with a programme."*"*
The programme was formed around three guiding principles. Firstly, that the main 
ceremony should be international in flavour, and should take place on Utah Beach, 
where the first landing had been made by US troops. Secondly, it was decided that there 
should also be an exclusively French ceremony at Ouistreham, where the only French 
commando unit had landed. This, according to Serge Barcellini, was intended to 
compensate for the non-French nature of the other events, and at the same time to 
reverse "une hiérarchie gaullienne" which had systematically privileged the memory of 
French SAS troops over that of Kieffer's commandoes. Thirdly, in order to avoid open 
conflict with Triboulet, which would have damaged France's image, it was agreed that 
part of the programme plaimed by the Comité du débarquement should be incorporated
B arcellin i, 'D iplom atie et comm émoration', p. 126.
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into the national programme. Thus its ceremonies at Bayeux, Colleville, Bény-sur-Mer 
and Sainte-Mère-Eglise were included.
When Jean Laurain, minister for ex-servicemen, informed Raymond Triboulet of 
the arrangements, the latter was not satisfied. In January he wrote to Laurain, lamenting 
the fact that, "pour la première fois depuis 1945, le rôle et la position juridique du 
Comité du débarquement semblent faire problème dans certains milieux administratifs". 
But he did not consider that the "excellent" Jean Laurain was to blame. Rather, he found 
fault with "certains jeunes fonctionnaires", who did not recognise 'Tesprit de la loi et la 
valeur de la tradition établie"."*^
So in the end conflict was not avoided. The government decided to separate the 
ceremonies organised by the Comité from those organised by the s ta te .T h e  Comité 
was thus allowed to go ahead with its own programme, as long as it did not interfere 
with the national commemoration."*^ Its response was to issue a motion of protest, voted 
unanimously by its members (including all 65 mayors of the coastal municipalities). 
Included in the motion was a call for the government to "rétablir l'unité de la 
commémoration" which had traditionally been respected. However, this was to no avail, 
and the state continued with its preparations regardless."*^
'D iplom atie et com m ém oration', p. 127, The reference to the "position juridique" stem s from the fact 
that the decision  to override Triboulet's C om ité  w as justified with reference to the law  o f  1947 which  
gave the governm ent the right to organise com m em orations o f  6 June, and w hich  m ade no m ention o f  the 
C om ité. H ow ever, as Triboulet pointed out, the C om ité  had been considered "par tons les gouvernem ents 
successifs com m e l'organe d'exécution de cette loi".
In 1969 there had been a previous dispute betw een Triboulet and the national governm ent, w hich  led to 
a "partition", and to Triboulet boycotting one o f  the cerem onies. In 'D iplom atie et comm émoration',
p .128.
'D iplom atie et com m ém oration', p. 128.
'D iplom atie et com m ém oration', p. 129.
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For the 1994 commemorations there were no less than five different groups 
involved, complementing and contradicting one another to varying degrees."*  ^ By a 
decree of 10 September 1992, the government set up a temporary Mission du 
cinquantenaire. It was a large scale operation, supported by the ministries of defence, 
culture and ex-servicemen. Philippe Mestre, the ex-servicemen's minister, presided over 
the Mission. Several departmental and municipal authorities also lent their support, as 
did Radio-France and France-Télévision. Its remit was one of "coordination" and 
"animation". The Mission was also responsible for the official commemorations of the 
Provence landings, the liberation of Paris, and the end of the war in Europe,
In order to officialise those events and ceremonies that were deemed appropriate, 
a system of labelisation was put in place. A committee consisting of historians and 
delegates from the ministries of defence and ex-servicemen decided which projects 
were to receive official approval. The favoured projects then had the right to carry the 
official logo of the Mission, tluee faces seen in profile, with a flag bearing the words 
"Resistances", "débarquements" and "libération". With the endorsement of the state, 
these projects would consequently be more attractive to the public and to potential 
sponsors. The Mission du cinquantenaire was given an international dimension, 
reflecting the global character of the original events: an International Commission, with 
around sixty representatives of the belligerent nations as well as the relevant French 
regions and localities, complemented the Mission itself.
The region of Basse-Normandie set up an Association Débarquement et Bataille 
de Normandie 1944, known by the acronym ADBN 44. It brought together at a regional 
level representatives from different strata of government, and from other interested 
parties: the French State, the tliree conseils généraux of Basse-Normandie, the
I am indebted to R ém y D esquesnes and his article, '1994: échos des com m ém orations en France', in 
C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995) for many o f  the details o f  the cerem onies in
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municipalities, the Comité du débarquement, the Comité régional du Tourisme, the 
museums, hotels, restaurant owners, bus companies, and other interested parties were all 
represented.
In order to pay homage to the Allied soldiers who had fought on its beaches, the 
region decided to strike a special commemorative medal, to be awarded to all those who 
took part, should they so desire. The president of the regional assembly, René Garrec, 
made a number of trips to the Allied nations to award medals to those who were too 
infirm to make the trip to France. The medals, and the award ceremonies, were 
generally appreciated as a solemn and moving tribute.
As I have pointed out before, the collective consciousness does not sustain itself 
by magic; it can be acted upon by those who have the means to do so. Commemoration 
is first and foremost a golden opportunity to make a lasting impression on that 
consciousness. ADBN 44 expended much time, energy and imagination promoting its 
activities: it paid for advertisements in newspapers all over the world; it bought space at 
the World Travel Market in London, at which it reconstructed a Norman beach. Local 
newspapers were mobilised in order to inform the people of Normandy of what was 
happening and why. In particular, they stressed the importance of welcoming and, if 
necessary, tolerating, the upheaval caused by the influx of Anglo-Saxons. As the poster 
campaign put it, "En juin 1944, on leur a dit Thank you, en juin 1994 on leur dit 
Welcome". Since, in France, it is always desirable to keep the Parisians "on side", 
ADBN 44 also ran a poster campaign in the metro, which invited the inhabitants of the 
capital to associate themselves with the D-day commemorations.
The conseils généraux of the region's three departments got together in 1992 to 
form an organisation called Espace historique de la Bataille de Normandie, whose
Normandy in June 1994.
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mission was to valorize the sites relevant to the landings and subsequent battles.^** In 
total the three conseils contributed seventy million francs to this project. They hoped 
that, in time, this would prove to be an investment rather than a donation; in other 
words, they hoped that the influx of "memorial tourists", in 1994 and afterwards, would 
eventually generate a profit.
Subsequently the department of the Manche decided that it needed its own 
committee, and in January 1993 it set up Liberté 44 in order to co-ordinate local 
activities. There was only one D-Day site -  Utah beach -  on the departmental territory; 
according to Rémy Desquesnes, this induced a sort of paranoia among members of the 
conseil général that they would be treated as "second class citizens" in the 
commemorative community.^* Even more than other commemorators, Liberté 44 saw 
its priority as passing on the requisite memory and lessons to children. Its first public 
activity, in June 1993 on Utah beach, was to organise a vast gathering of children, who 
scraped the word "liberty" in the sand. A year later, in 1994, it organised one of the 
most impressive ceremonies: 4410 children, some of them from North America, Great 
Britain and Germany, came together at Saint James’ American cemetery. Dressed in 
white, each child laid a flower on one of the 4410 graves of the soldiers of Patton's 
army.
Already in existence, of course, was Raymond Triboulet's Comité du 
débarquement, which had looked after commemorative ceremonies since 1945. It was 
based in Bayeux, and its remit was to maintain the historic sites and organise the annual 
ceremonies. Over the years the Comité had erected and maintained numerous plaques 
and monuments on the various sites, including the successful museum at Arromanches 
(inaugurated in 1952) and that situated at Pegasus Bridge. For the fiftieth anniversary.
Four beaches (Sw ord, Juno, G old and Omaha) are in Calvados, and one (U tah) in M anche. In the Orne 
there are no beaches, but several battle sites.
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then, the Comité had a particularly prominent role in the organisation of the ceremonies 
of 5 June.
Finally, to complicate an already complicated picture, the municipal councils of 
the larger towns, such as Cherbourg, Caen, and Saint-Lô, put in place their own 
structures for commemoration of their own liberations.
In principle, these disparate associations were to complement one another, since, 
broadly speaking, they were all working towards the same goal. Yet the different 
organisations, inevitably, had differing interpretations and priorities. Also, each was 
keen to guard, and if possible extend, its sphere of action and influence. The comité du 
débarquement, for instance, felt that its experience and fidelity over fifty years 
conferred a legitimacy that was not shared by ADBN 44, created in 1993. Libération of 
31 May 1994 spoke of a "war" between these two vectors of memory, and told of the 
difficult relationship between the respective chairmen, Raymond Triboulet and Paul 
Queney. May 1994 saw a squabble between the two organisations over the medals 
(mentioned above, p. 82) struck by ADBN 44 to mark the fiftieth anniversary. The 
comité du débarquement complained that these medals were illegal, since a regional 
assembly did not have the authority to make or distribute war medals. The comité, of 
course, had its own medals, and considered these to be the only legitimate ones.^^
There was also tension between Triboulet's committee and the Elysée. Jean Kahn, 
who advised the president on commemorative matters at this time, found that the task of 
planning the presidential programme was rendered more difficult by some of the actions 
of the comité du débarquement. In October 1993 he informed the president that
In C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , v o l.19, n°2 (1995), p .154. 
L ibéra tion , 2 June 1994.
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"l'agitation de M. Triboulet" had been complicating matters, although this had calmed 
down "recently
François Mitterrand did not share the Gaullist conviction that resistance, the 
Normandy landings and liberation formed a single "trinity". In contrast with his Gaullist 
minister for ex-servicemen who still believed that "rien n'est separable", Mitterrand was 
quite prepared to leave homage to the Resistance aside and celebrate the landings for 
what they were: an Allied operation on French soil. His keynote speech at Ohama 
Beach on 6  June 1994 was fulsome in its praise of the Allies, and made only one 
reference to the French Resistance. In truth, there was little ambivalence in the attitude 
of the French commemorators, commentators and public: it was one of gratitude 
towards the Allied troops, portrayed as accomplished and courageous liberators. As 
Rémy Desquesnes concluded
11 n’y a eu en B asse-N orm andie, lors du cinquantenaire, ni ambiguité, ni confusion  dans l'esprit des 
habitants (. . .) ce sont des soldats anglais, canadiens et américains qui ont surgi de la mer sous le 
feu de l'eim emi et qui ont donné leur v ie  pour notre liberté.^"*
This can be seen as an attempt to compensate for years of relative reticence 
towards the Allies, inspired by de Gaulle. Under de Gaulle particularly, commemoration 
of an episode that cast the Americans in the role of heroes was seen as extremely 
problematic. On the one hand, the landings launched the military operation that would 
free the country from German occupation, and in that sense had positive associations. 
On the other hand, the débarquement could not seriously be held up as an example of
"Note à l'attention du président de la République" dated 19 October 1993. From Jean Kahn's archives. 
D esquesnes in C on tem porary F rench C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995).
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French heroism, when only a few thousand French troops participated. Celebrations 
were low-key, and the Resistance was honoured as much as the Allies.
There were to be more affronts to de Gaulle. Gaullists were particularly upset that 
Mitterrand did not once mention de Gaulle by name during the various speeches he gave 
over the 1994 commemorative period. As well as that straightforward snub, there were 
more surreptitious moves afoot: since 1984 the centre of gravity of the June 
commemorations had been shifting from Bayeux to Caen, and other places in 
Normandy less closely associated with the general. Bayeux was where the triumphant 
de Gaulle had established popular legitimacy with his historic first address to the nation 
on French soil and his proclamation of the Fourth Republic, on the 14 June 1944. De 
Gaulle had also inaugurated monuments here in 1946 and 1952. The town also boasts a 
"place du général de Gaulle", a commemorative plaque on the sub-prefecture building, 
and a Charles de Gaulle museum. In his speech on the latter occasion de Gaulle had 
described the débarquement as a "grand événement national", since it had enabled 
France to re-establish its legitimacy. In the Gaullist credo, 14 June was held to be as 
significant as 6  June. The restoration of national dignity went hand-in-hand with the 
Allied landings. As Serge Barcellini remarked, "dans la pédagogie de l'honneur 
national, Bayeux donne un véritable sens à Utah Beach".
Bayeux had been described in le Monde of 6  June 1964 as "le quartier général des 
cérémonies commémoratives". Although the whole occasion was much more low-key in 
1964 - neither de Gaulle nor his prime minister were present - the only "antenne 
d'accueil franco-allié" that was set up was based in Bayeux. In a direct role reversal, 
Bayeux featured in only one of the six commemorative ceremonies which took place on 
the 5 June 1994, and even then it was a small scale event, the opening of the 
"Eisenliower roundabout". The main dignitaries were not in attendance. The following
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day, Bayeux was the venue for one national and one international event, but, 
considering there were fourteen official ceremonies that day, this was no great honour.
Bayeux was also the site of the headquarters of the Comité du débarquement. This 
body, which had organised the commemorations since 1945 in a Gaullian, Franco- 
centric spirit, was sidelined (in the committee's own estimation) in 1984 and again in 
1994. This contributed to the movement from Bayeux to Caen as the nerve-centre of D- 
day commemoration.
Under François Mitterrand there was little prospect that, as in 1964, Caen would 
be left on the periphery as a rather melancoly "ville martyre". On 7 June 1964 the 
minster for ex-servicemen Jean Sainteny had presided over a ceremony during which 
one of the 322 victims of the Allied bombardments was buried, and during which the 
mayor of the town talked of "un jour de recueillement douloureux dans le souvenir d'un 
bilan a t r o c e " .Twenty years later, French attitudes were no longer tinged with rancour, 
and it was not deemed appropriate to dwell on the damage done by the Anglo-Saxons in 
liberating France. Accordingly, a new symbolic role was being invented for Caen.
On 5 June 1984, the first stone had been laid for the "musée mémorial de la 
bataille de Normandie". There was no reference in any of the speeches to the martyrdom 
that had hitherto been the town's abiding memory of the war, although the fractured 
entrance to the memorial-museum complex would, when completed, symbolise the 
destruction of the town and others like it. The museum would become the pivot of a 
burgeoning ''memorial-tourism'' industry which, although taking its cue from the 
Second World War, endeavoured to make a positive, educative contribution to human 
rights, world peace, freedom and democracy. The crowning moment came on 6  June 
1988, when president Mitterrand came in person to open the newly built museum,
55 Serge B arcellin i, 'D iplom atie et com m ém oration', p. 137.
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rechristened "Musée pour la paix".^ *^  Increased self-confidence and dynamism had been 
garnered from the process of decentralisation instigated by the socialist government: 
Caen was now the capital of a powerful regional authority, with newly acquired 
resources and the capacity to dispose of them as it saw fit.
There was no doubt that, by 1994, Caen had supplanted de Gaulle's Bayeux as the 
"natural" focus for commemorative activity (although France-Télévision did base its 
operations in Bayeux in June 1994). Gaullists were not slow to spot what was 
happening, and were quick to exploit any suspected cases of lèse-majesté by taking 
every opportunity to make commemorations of the Second World War 
commemorations of de Gaulle and his ideas. In an address on 6  June, Edouard Balladur 
underlined the role of the general in the outcome of the war: "si la France n'a pas été 
dans le camp des vaincus, c'est au général de Gaulle et à son courage que nous le 
devons"; and drew from this the classic Gaullian lesson: "il faut que notre pays ait les 
moyens de se d é fe n d re " .In a commemorative speech the same day he deemed it 
necessary that "la France soit forte, rassemblée et qu’elle fasse entendre sa voix".^^ He 
then appeared on television to say that the role of French people, such as the London 
Free French and the maquisards, must not be underestimated. He also pointed out that 
the first Allied soldier to be killed during the Normandy landings was a Frenchman. 
At Puteaux on June 8  Charles Pasqua regretted that Mitterrand "n'ait pas trouvé 
l'occasion de rendre un hommage particulier au chef de la France libre". Another 
favourite Gaullist method of counter-attack was to mention Bayeux whenever possible. 
During his TFl appearance on 5 June Balladur told viewers what he would be doing on
The main initiator o f  the m em orial project was Jean-Marie Girault, senator and mayor. 
Interview ed on T F l, 5 June 1994.
58 Le M onde, 1 June 1994.
Evening new s on F rance 2, 6 June 1994.
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14 June: he would be at Bayeux for the anniversary of de Gaulle's speech.^^ Come the 
day, the Gaullist "family" were out in force, and Chirac and Balladur spoke of the need 
to "rassembler" and "défendre les intérêts supérieurs de la nation".
The landings in Provence in August 1944 form part of the "national narrative" of 
wartime, but here too there was a hint of the "guerre franco-française". In this case the 
adversaries were the anciens of two divisions of the French army. In the words of Jean 
Kahn, these and other ex-servicemen’s federations (of which there were twenty two in 
1 9 9 1 ) , 6 2  "n'arrêtaient pas de se tirer dans les pattes".
The 1st Army of France, commonly known as the "armée d’Afrique", had fought 
hard in Italy before landing in Provence and defeating the Germans there. The 2nd 
Armoured Division had taken part in the liberations of Paris and Strasbourg, which, 
from a military point of view, were rather meaningless victories. However the symbolic 
force of the liberation of Paris in particular meant that Leclerc and his men instantly 
became part of national folklore, to a much greater extent than the 1 st Army, The fact 
that the former had been seen as "Gaullist" while the latter had been seen as 
"Giraudiste" exacerbated these tensions.
Not surprisingly when it came to commemorate each division had its priorities. 
For Leclerc’s veterans these were obviously the liberations of Paris and Strasbourg and 
to some extent the Normandy landings, while for the former soldiers of the 1st Army the 
Provence landings were preferred. However these had never really captured the 
imagination of the French people. Moreover, for the all-important fiftieth anniversary
Interview ed on TFl, 5 June 1994. 
Le M onde, 16 June 1994.
62 A ccording to a 1991 study o f  associations o f  "anciens combattants et victim es de guerre" 
com m issioned by the ministry for ex-servicem en. Jean Kahn's archives.
“  Interviews o f  March and April 1999.
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the ex-serviceman's minister, Louis Mexandeaux, was preoccupied with events in 
Normandy, his home territory. Provence was "relégué au second plan". "^  ^ Despite 
attempts by staff at the Elysée to provide a better balance, the "relegation" was never 
properly redressed. So behind the rhetoric of national unity which is invariably de 
rigueur on such occasions, one begins to discern a reality where each group is fighting 
to defend the memory of its own particular experience.
The liberation o f Paris
As explained in the previous chapter, the liberation of Paris is one of the most 
powerful symbols of the rediscovered unity of the French people. It was, in the words of 
Jacques Chirac, "la victoire de la France sur ses propres déchirements, sur ses divisions, 
ses luttes intestines, ses trah isons".A s these words suggest, for unity to be so precious 
there must have been prior disunity, both within the nation as a whole and the 
Resistance as a movement. The theme of disunity does not feature prominently in 
commemorative discourse, but it is implicit in every evocation of unity.
The rhetoric of national communion also obscures the fact that the liberation of 
Paris, or at least de Gaulle's triumphant arrival in the liberated capital, had little to do 
with the fight against Hitler or Pétain. The Germans would have been defeated 
eventually in any case, and Vichy's representatives had fled in the first few days of the 
insurrection. In fact de Gaulle needed to organise a triumphant entry in order to assert 
his authority over those who fought on his side. For many of the communist and left- 
wing resistance fighters were ready to proceed to what they saw as the next stage of the 
struggle - a fight for political control within France. The risk of a new kind of civil war
N ote from Jean Kahn to Hubert Védrine on 28 June 1994. Jean Kahn's archives. 
W riting in Le M onde, 25  A ugust 1994.
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was a real one. That it didn't happen was largely due to de Gaulle's presence, but also 
his wisdom in refusing to take support for granted, and in taking seriously the threat of 
communist-inspired insurrection. Wherever possible, then, he strove to reinforce his 
own legitimacy. His declaration at Bayeux, the diversion of French troops to liberate 
Paris, his parade down the Champs-Elysée, his speech at the Hôtel de Ville, the 
Provence landings, his tour round France: they all served to underline, to France and to 
the world, that he was in control of a political entity - the French Republic - that was 
viable once more.
Commemorations of the liberation of Paris are among the most festive of French 
war anniversaries. Yet the air of celebration does not completely block out a more 
pessimistic reading, which has it that the Liberation marked the defeat of one faction in 
the latest instalment of an ongoing civil war. Otherwise why the bloody reprisals of the 
épuration, started as soon as liberation had been gained, during which as many as 
10,000 Frenchmen and women were killed by their countrymen? It has been said many 
times since, that the épuration had nothing to do with just punishment and everything to 
do with the victors taking their revenge on the vanquished, and with settling personal 
scores. No doubt this is largely true, and not unusual in itself; except that it supports the 
interpretation of the liberation of Paris, and of France as a whole, as a decisive civil war 
victory rather than a glorious and united rising against an external enemy.
France Soir of 25 August 1994 carried an eloquent photograph of a sign displayed 
by some Parisian cafe owners just after liberation. It said, in imperfect English: "During 
occupation by German army, the owner of this café has refused to deal with the 
Germans. Any bar in which you don't see this poster has collaborated or made some 
profits with the Jerries". The pieture is left to speak for itself in the newspaper, but it 
invites comment, since it speaks volumes about the ambiguities of the conflict, both at
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the time and fifty years on. First of all it is wiitten in English to appeal to soldiers of an 
Allied army that found itself in a city freed, according to de Gaulle, "par son propre 
effort". There is an obvious eontradiction here. Then there is the reference to the 
Franco-French conflict, with the non-collaborationists exacting commercial revenge on 
those who made money from the Germans. One is left with the ironical impression, 
however, that collaborationists and self-proclaimed non-collaborationists were 
ultimately united in a spirit of opportunism that led both to maximise the chances that 
came their way.
However, the problem of disunity was generally overcome by an "ail right on the 
night" argument, that also owed much to Christian notions of reconciliation and 
redemption: the sins and divisions of the previous four years were healed by the act of 
mass uprising, consecrated by the sacrifice in the streets of Paris of a respectable quota 
of the combatants. The Cliristian framework is also useful in that it allows for eleventh 
hour confessions or conversions (provided that these are sincere). François Mitterrand 
himself endorsed this idea by using it to defend his own political odyssey. He said that it 
was better to start off badly and finish well than vice versa, and described himself as a 
"jeune homme de droite qui a bien tourné".
In August 1994, then, the account of events in Paris-Match did not consider that 
the lateness of so many of the conversions was important:
M êm e si parmi les résistants, qui sem blent alors surgir de partout, certains sont des ralliés de la 
onzièm e heure, les 20  000  fusillés et les 65 000 déportés, dont 35 000  ne sont jam ais revenus, 




The sins of the sinners are washed away by the blood of their brethren; the collective 
soul is cleansed, and faith renewed.
But it is one thing to concede that there were "some" eleventh hour conversions; it 
is quite another to enter into the detail of exactly how many. It comes as something of a 
surprise, then, to hear an FFI volunteer recount on French television that at the start of 
the uprising on 19 August the insurrectionists numbered around thirty volunteers 
(although the police prefecture had been taken on the 15 Augus t ) . I t  is unlikely that the 
official and popular versions have ever overtly denied this; but the emphasis has 
certainly been placed elsewhere, on the triumphant final phase and on the fifteen 
hundred French martyrs. The net result is that when the details are insisted upon they 
seem rather harsh, and come as a shock to the system.
One of the key aspects of the insurrection in Paris was the leading role of the 
police. Since 1944, the insurrection had been balm to the uneasy conscience of the 
Parisian police, which had hardly covered itself in glory in the previous four years. Not 
surprisingly, then, it had grown to the stature of a defining myth over the years. To this 
day each police officer in Paris has the right to wear the "fourragère" badge on his 
uniform in memory of the great event.
However, the state's representatives did not allocate much of their time to 
commemoration of the start of the police revolt. On 19 August Mitterrand, Chirac, 
interior minister Charles Pasqua and ex-servicemen's minister Philippe Mestre attended 
a ceremony at the prefecture, but they only stayed for half an hour. Mitterrand unveiled 
a commemorative sculpture, but gave no address. Prime minister Edouard Balladur did 
not attend.
'Paris est à nous', F rance 3, 23 August 1994. 
Reported in Le M onde, 21-22  August 1994.
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The sanitised version came under attack from some quarters, though not, of 
course, at official ceremonies. The special edition of VHistoire^^ was relentless in its 
destruction of comfort mythology. It evoked the "guerre civile" that was "loin d'etre 
achevée" at the liberation of Paiis; it also featured an article on the Parisian police's 
artful change of allegiance, with the rather blunt heading "la police parisienne change de 
camp".^^ This article, by Jean-Marc Berlière, offered some interesting examples of 
history being edited as it was being made: towards the end of the German occupation 
the "battle for memory" was as bitter as any physical battle, and arguably more 
important. The 150 policemen who had been killed were to became symbols of the 
force's heroic sacrifice, by dint of the plaques that were erected after the victory. Jean- 
Marc Berlière described this in terms of military tactics, as "un investissement 
systématique et précoce du territoire de la mémoire". These plaques were of course 
renovated for the fiftieth anniversary in 1994.
Berlière also revealed that, on 26 August 1944, a notice appeared in Paris, signed 
by the prefect Luizot, to the effect that "la police de Paris, qui s'est fièrement battue, 
n'oubliera jamais le concours aussi efficace que valoureux que les FFI lui ont apporté du 
19 au 25 août pour la défense de la préfecture de police". The day after the Liberation, 
then, the roles were already reversed according to this version of events. Instead of the 
police finally joining with the Free French, it is the latter who are thanked patronisingly 
for their "help" in the final battle, as if the police had been fighting alone for years!
Yet even the police themselves had begun to feel uncomfortable at the distortion 
of the truth, and in May 1992 a remarkable project was initiated to teach police men and 
women about the war years in a more equitable manner. Organised by the Centre 
national d'études et de formation de la police nationale, the courses promoted fact at the




expense of myth: the stagiaires would have been surprised to learn, for example, that, 
out of 22 000 officers, the three police Resistance groups - Front national police et 
gendarmerie. Police et Patrie and Honneur de la Police - boasted, at most, 800 
members.
Deportation
In 1995, with the fiftieth anniversaries of the liberation of the Nazi concentration 
camps imminent, a dossier was provided for the Elysée by Robert Sheppard, a former 
Français libre and deportee. It included a description of the organisational framework 
of former deportees' associations. Sheppard started his dossier by alluding to the 
fragmented nature of this framework: "Des Associations, Fédérations, Amicales, tant en 
Franee qu'en Europe, ont un peu scindé, partagé, parfois - hélas - politisé, la structure 
générale du système concentrationnaire nazi qui ne formait qu'un tout, pour tous les 
déportés". Sheppard added that "notre idée est que c'est la France par son président (. . 
.) qui commémore et rend h o m m a g e . In theory, there was only one commemorator, la 
France. In practice, of course, things had never been so straightforward. That said, 
disunity was less problematic in the 1990s than it had been in previous decades. This 
was due in no small part to the "threat" posed by a more assertive Jewish memory of 
deportation.
Hopes for a completely united front among deportees had been dashed as early as 
1945, when the anti-communist part of the movement refused to cooperate with the 
FNDIRP {Fédération nationale des déportés, internés, résistants et patriotes), which, it 
was claimed, had an extreme-left bias. The dissidents called themselves the Fédération
Jean Kahn's archives; m y italics.
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nationale des déportés et internés de la Résistance, dropping the patriote tag favoured 
by the communists/^
In the early 1980s there was a quarrel in which the FNDIRP and the FNDIR were 
once more on opposite sides. Among the FNDIRP's membership were a number of 
communists who had been interned in France by Daladier after the Germano-Soviet 
pact, and then deported to Buchenwald. Just before the camp was liberated there had 
been an insurrection by the prisoners, which was more or less significant according to 
the version of events one choses to believe. After the war, however, the former 
Buchenwald internees had been considered as non-combatants, and thus were deemed 
ineligible for the prized title of "combattant volontaire de la Résistance", Official 
designations were extremely important, both for status and pension rights. However 
with the victory of the left in 1981 some of them felt that the time had come to revise 
their status, and started manoeuvring for position. This brought protests from the right- 
wing FNDIR, who considered themselves "genuine" resistance combatants. The 
government stalled on the issue and it still had not been resolved in 1990, when it 
surfaced again. And by the end of the Mitterrand era the status of the Buchenwald 
"brigades" had not been upgraded.
The extreme right
On the whole, the leadership and supporters of the Front National were placed in 
a difficult situation during commemorations of second world war victories. On one hand 
the national military glory and sacrifice that they prized were to the fore, as was the 
defeat of an old enemy and the reoccupation of the national territory. On the other hand,
The F N D IR  is affiliated w ith the U N A D IF  and the ADIR.
N otes taken from Jean Kahn's archives, dating from 1982 to 1990.
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this was also the eventual demise of a régime - that of Vichy - whose ideology inspired 
the Lepenist movement. That defeat was also the triumph of the bêtes mires of the 
extreme right, namely de Gaulle and the communists. The result was generally an 
awkward silence during times of war commemoration. Critics were marginalised to the 
extent that, in so far as they were noticed at all, they were regarded as embittered 
fanatics.
In the right-wing newspaper Présent^  misgivings were more freely expressed. In 
May 1994 Jean Madiran, in his "considérations différentes sur le débarquement", 
referred to the "terrorisme" of the liberating forces, which, he alleged, killed civilians 
unnecessarily.^"^ Benoît Lorrain drew attention to the irony he perceived in the release of 
balloons into the sky above Caen, "ce ciel d'où, cinquante ans plus tôt, sont tombées des 
tonnes de bombes alliées, détruisant une grande partie de la ville et faisant des centaines 
de blessés parmi la population civile".
While only a tiny minority would come close to concurring with Jean Madiran 
and company, the debate was less innocuous than Rémy Desquesnes implied in his 
account of the anniversary per iod .According  to Desquesnes, only "quelques 
survivants âgés passionnément attachés à leur vieille ville" were interested in reviving 
the controversy. In fact it extended beyond a few disgruntled Norman pensioners. Three 
thousand protest posters appeared in the towns of Normandy. These posters, showing 
part of a town destroyed by bombs, bore the bitter caption: "Lâches, la France n'oubliera 
pas".^^ This is a reminder that, in France, it was not always easy to decide who the 
enemy was, and that as a result the potential for division was always there behind a 
united front. This potential haunted France's political landscape, and solicited all the
8 June 1994.73
P résen t, 5 M ay 1994.
D esquesnes in C on tem porary French C ivilisa tion , v o l.19, n°2 (1995), p .160. 
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appeals for unity, solidarity and rassemblement that were heard so often during 
commemorations. For Desquesnes, then, the most blameworthy aspect of the 
bombardment controversy was precisely that the critics were reopening the divisions of 
the past. Consciously or unconsciously, they were reprising one of the favourite themes 
of Vichy and German propaganda: the alleged scorn of the Allied and Free French 
forces for the well-being of French civilians.
98
99
CHAPTER FOUR  
THE SEARCH FOR "LA VRAIE FRANCE"
"Mon sentiment d'appartenir à un grand peuple (grand par l'idée qu'il se faisait du 
monde et de lui, et de lui dans le monde, selon un code de valeurs qui ne reposait ni sur 
le nombre, ni sur la force, ni sur l’argent) avait subi quelques entailles. J'ai vécu 1940: 
inutile d'en dire plus"
- François Mitterrand, L'Abeille et l'Architecte^
Did Vichy represent France?
D. Nicolaidis has observed that, in the course of history, "il arrive que surviennent 
des événements déviants qui engagent la Nation en tant que telle dans une voie 
incompatible avec l'image qu'elle a d'elle-même".^ France has often known the kind of 
incompatibility Nicolaidis spoke of. In itself, this is not so remarkable. The problem 
with the Second World War was that the French initially tried to compensate for that 
incompatibility between self-image and actual behaviour by settling on a retrospective 
interpretation of the facts that fell into line with the self-image. Thus the "national 
narrative" mode of commemorative discourse alluded to in chapter two was, 
understandably, more prevalent than that which highlighted negative aspects.
Historically the French Republic has talcen great pride in its role as, on the one 
hand, a strong nation-state capable of defending its interests, and on the other, the 
proclaimer and upholder of universal human rights. So the disastrous rout of 1940, and
’ Quoted by Robert Fraiilc, 'la m ém oire em poisonnée', in La F rance des années noires, II, p .504. 
^A utrem ent, n°144 (April 1994).
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the crimes entailed by the policy of collaboration, represented the antithesis of all 
France purported to stand for, and could not easily be incorporated into the national 
narrative. It is not simply that the defeat was humiliating and that some of the acts 
committed were abhorrent - most peoples have had their moments of humiliation and 
cruelty - but that the discrepancy between the real and the ideal seemed too glaring to 
be assumed with equanimity. Between 1940 and 1944 French people were confused, 
weak and somewhat venal, rather than evil, with some exceptions at either end of the 
scale. It is not a terribly damning judgement. However, for a nation that had been 
encouraged to think of itself as great, the less sparkling truth was often unacceptable. 
But before and during our period of study, as the myths and taboos were pushed back, 
the French were forced to revise their opinion of themselves. Since this revision had to 
ineorporate a number of harsh facts, it was in some respects a painful experience.
After liberation there was an understandable temptation to fudge the issues. Any 
stubborn facts that refused to fit the mould were dealt with by a simple procedure: they 
were simply excluded from "the real France". De Gaulle set the parameters of this 
selective view of "la France" in his speech after the liberation of Paris, in which he paid 
homage to "la France qui se bat, c'est-à-dire la seule France, la vraie France, la France 
éternelle". The reasoning is peculiar: in the interests of national unity, the nation is 
identified not with its people as they exist in reality, but with a lofty ideal which only a 
few of those people actually upheld. In this formulation the word "real" has the 
peculiarity of signifying not "real" but "ideal". The "real France", in the context of the 
Second World War, refers not to a geo-political entity and the people that inhabited it, 
but a set of ideals acted upon by a minority.
The "necessary myth" implanted following liberation could not have taken root so 
easily without this pre-existing conceptual framework, which readily took on board the
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idea that collaborationists were not properly French, since they had clearly lost touch 
with the nation's soul, the quintessential French values. It is a philosophy that borrows 
heavily from the discourse and philosophy of religion. Renan was quoted as describing 
a nation as a "spiritual entity" (as well as a "plébiscite de tous les jours"), with an 
immortal soul. The soul of the nation, which is composed of the values, attitudes and 
memories that are held in common, was ultimately regarded as more important than any 
avatar present in the here-and-now.
Vichy was merely physical form, an "autorité de fa if '^  the essential France that it 
betrayed could never be lost, and was kept alive in London and in the maquis. In 
essence, then, "la France" never ceased to exist; it simply went into clandestinity for a 
few years. Did not de Gaulle say in June 1940 that "j’ai conscience de parler au nom de 
la France"? Did he not state explicitly on the 9 August 1944 that "la République (. . .) 
n’a jamais cessé d'exister"? Clearly, since it had ceased to exist for a time in reality, he 
could only have meant that its spirit had been kept alive in exile. Ultimately this way of 
thinldng was another attempt at closing the wounds opened by the internecine aspect of 
the war years, the "guerre franco-française". In portraying the enemy as "illegitimate", 
in declaring that the Republic had existed throughout, one effectively demotes the 
conflict to the status of a putsch followed by the inevitable restoration of legitimate 
authority.
Amiiversaries serve to focus attention on the event in question, and also on some 
of the peripheral issues. Often the attention is perfunctory, but at times it can give rise to 
real and impassioned debate. Thus the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the "rafle 
du Vél’ d’hiv"’ provoked animated discussion about the responsibility of the French
 ^ A ccording to the wording o f  the 1993 decree establishing the new  day o f  com m em oration. See  
below , p. 125 ff.
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State for the rqfle and other crimes committed in these years/ The starting point of what 
Mitterrand's supporters^ saw as a "coup monté" was a petition asking that the president 
accept responsibility on behalf of the French state, for Vichy's misdeeds. Behind this 
petition lurked searching questions about the legitimacy or otherwise of Vichy, and at a 
deeper level about the very nature of France and Frenchness, and also about the 
workings of collective memory and identity.
The petition appeared in Le Monde of 17 June 1992. Its signatories included 
prominent intellectuals such as Jean Lacouture, Régis Debray, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, 
Pierre Boulez, and Jacques Derrida. Collectively they styled themselves the "Vél d’hiv’ 
'42 Committee", and demanded specifically that the president make a formal declaration 
admitting that the Etat Français of Vichy was culpable in the deportation of Jews to 
concentration camps. In the words of the petition, they urged the president to 
"reconnaître officiellement que l'Etat français de Vichy est responsable de persécutions 
et de crimes contre les juifs de France".
The resulting squabble ranged, on one side, those who argued that Pétain and the 
Etat français were voted into office legally, to popular acclaim, and that France 
therefore had a duty to acknowledge its responsibility. On the other side were those who 
argued that the Vichy régime was merely an illegitimate parenthesis interrupting 
fundamental republican continuity; that Vichy was, in the words of François Mitterrand,
On 16 and 17 July 1942 over 13 000 Jewish men, w om en and children w ere arrested by the French 
police, on the orders o f  the Germans, and taken to the winter velodrom e in the fifteenth  
arrondissement. From there m ost w ere deported to the Eastern concentration cam ps, v ia  French transit 
camps.
 ^ Including Serge Barcellini, former E lysée counsellor Jean Kahn, and socia list deputy (now  senator) 
M ichel Charasse, the latter o f  w hom  worked on the presidential decree o f  February 1993. (Interview s o f  6 
M ay 1999, M arch-April 1999, and 10 June 1999.) Serge Barcellini saw  a direct relationship betw een the 
controversy o f  1992, Chirac's declaration o f  1995, and the M atteoli com m ission  w hich is still w orking out 
how  m uch the French state ow es despoiled Jewish fam ilies.
On 10 June 1994 Jean Kahn sent a note to the president in which he said that he had "aucune sym pathie 
pour les groupes qui ont m onté l'affaire du Vél' d'hiv' il y a deux ans". (Jean Kahn's archives.)
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"nouveau, différent, occasionnel"/ His argument was no different from that employed 
by his predecessors: the Etat français which had sanctioned these crimes was an 
aberrant régime, and the Republic itself had no "comptes à rendre".
La R épublique n'a rien à voir avec cela, et j'estim e, m oi, que la France non plus n’est pas 
responsable; que ce sont des minorités activistes, qui ont saisi l'occasion pour s'emparer du 
pouvoir, qui sont capables de ces crim es-là. Pas la République, pas la France ! ^
He reiterated in November 1992 that "la nation française n'a pas été engagée dans la 
triste aventure" of Vichy.^
With these words Mitterrand gave his seal of approval to one of the articles of 
faith of de Gaulle and the Resistance: Vichy had nothing to do with la vraie France, la 
France éternelle, and therefore it simply did not count in the great scheme of things. 
The proclamation of the Provisional Government of 9 August 1944 had simply declared 
Vichy nul and void. Article One of this text states that "La forme du gouvernement 
français est et demeure la République. En droit, celle-ci n’a pas cessé d’exister". Article 
Two continues, "Sont, en conséquence, nuls et de nul effet tous les actes 
constitutiomiels, législatifs ou réglementaires, ainsi que les arrêtés pris pour leur 
exécution, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, promulgués sur le territoire 
continental postérieurement au 16 juin 1940".^
For de Gaulle, the crucial issue was freedom of action: Pétain may have had 
overwhelming popular support initially, but this in itself did not confer legitimacy, since 
the populace had very little real choice in the matter after the military defeat. On 19
® On R adio  J, N ovem ber 1992 (recounted in L e M onde, 5 February 1993).
 ^T elev ision  interview  o f  13 Septem ber 1994. Quoted by Nathan Bracher, 'Mitterrand and the lessons o f  
history', in C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , v o l.19 n°2 (1995).
® On R adio  J, N ovem ber 1992 (recounted in L e M onde, 5 February 1993).
 ^Eric Conan and Fleniy R ousso, Vichy: un p a s s é  qu i ne p a sse  p a s  (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p .70.
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June 1940, de Gaulle declared that Retain's government had forfeited the right to speak 
and act in the name of the French people because it had fallen under "la servitude 
ennemie". Aided by René Cassin, he developed his conviction into a coherent formula, 
which soon emerged as the orthodoxy. It borrowed from that time-honoured, 
quintessentially French and Republican tradition, articulated by the likes of Renan and 
Fustel: the nation was not the blood, or the volk, but "le génie plus le contrat". A 
"certain idea", in other words, plus the institutions required to make that idea a reality. 
De Gaulle maintained that Vichy had made a mockery of the French génie, which was 
kept alive by the Free French; and the contrat could not be said properly to exist 
because of the conditions under which it emerged. This is a conception that lives on in 
the likes of René Rémond. This distinguished historian has said that Vichy did not 
express "les sentiments profonds" of the French people since the régime was "imposed" 
on them.^^
Some constitutional experts have shored up the Gaullian position by identifying a 
number of procedural flaws by which the Vichy régime may be deemed illegitimate.^^ 
However, analysis of the constitutional permutations have the demerit of diverting 
attention from the central problems which, one feels, lie elsewhere. After François 
Mitterrand's refusal to accept responsibility Laurent Lemine criticised him for 
responding "en juriste à un problème politique et moral"; Georges Broussine called him 
a "juriste g l ac é" . Th e  criticisms may be extended to cover all those who lost sight of 
the real issues in dissecting the constitution, whether or not they agreed with 
Mitterrand's position. The bare reality remained that Pétain and the régime he installed
Le M onde, 2 October 1994.
" For exam ple André Frossard in Le F igaro  17 July 1992. One o f  the m ore com m on ly  invoked  
arguments is that the N ational A ssem bly did not in fact have the constitutional right to accord Pétain "le 
pouvoir constituant".
L a C roix, 18 July 1992; L ettre  de la  N ation , 23 July 1992.
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were accepted by the French people and their representatives for long enough for it to 
commit some heinous acts.
That said, the work that has been done on the constitutional question can be 
valuable if kept in perspective. Le Monde des Débats of November 1992 used it as an 
im'oad into the vexed question of Vichy's place in national history: "peut-on mettre entre 
parenthèses quatre ans d'histoire française?" For, from de Gaulle's pronouncement - that 
in spite of Vichy the Republic had never ceased to exist - until Jacques Chirac's counter­
pronouncement fifty one years later, this was precisely what France's political 
representatives had done. In this respect the constitutional negation was important, 
because it permitted the more profound moral and political negation: how could a nation 
assume a part of its history that did not "properly" belong to it, and for which it was not 
"teclinically" responsible?
Some people accepted that Vichy had technical legitimacy, but maintained that 
the essence of the argument lay elsewhere. Raymond Aubrac's view was that the Vichy 
government
était légal, m ais on l'a très vite considéré com m e illégitim e: il ne répondait pas aux aspirations, aux 
fondem ents de ce qu'est la République française. A  partir du m om ent où un gouvernem ent, m êm e  
établi légalem ent, essaie d'effacer la R épublique, il ne correspond plus à la culture, à la civilisation  
de notre pays.'^
Again, it is a question of values, not of constitutional procedure.
The most unconditional dismissals of the petitionists' claims came from the far 
right, which decried what it saw as a systematic campaign to make French people 
ashamed of their common history. Paradoxically, the extreme right's basic position on
Em ile M alet, éd., p .90.
105
106
the legitimacy of the Vichy régime was similar to that of the signatories of the petition, 
although, needless to say, the conclusions drawn were radically different in each case. 
According to the former, Pétain was given the power to constitute a government by a 
democratic process. The French people could therefore be said to have given their 
backing to Pétain, and therefore to Vichy. For the right, it followed that those who 
obeyed the orders of this government did nothing wrong. As Maurice Papon is reported 
to have said, "There is no crisis of conscience when one is obeying o r d e r s " . I n  July 
1992 the Lepenist newspaper Présent, dismissing calls for more "justice" and 
"mémoire" with regard to Vichy, recalled that "De 1944 à 1951, deux millions de 
Français ont été poursuivis pour avoir obéi à un gouvernement imposé par leurs députés 
en majorité socialistes".'^
Indeed those on the opposite side, who, like de Gaulle and Mitterrand, saw Vichy 
merely as a product of exceptional circumstances, had a number of problems to 
overcome. Not least of these was the massive vote in favour of according Pétain the 
authority he asked for. The deputies of the Third Republic’s National Assembly voted 
by a margin of 569 to 80 (with 17 abstentions) to adopt the following text, which is 
remarkably unambiguous:
L 'A ssem blé nationale donne tous pouvoirs au gouvernem ent de la R épublique, sous l'autorité et la 
signature du maréchal Pétain, à l'effet de promulguer, par un ou plusieurs actes, une nouvelle  
C onstitution de l'Etat français. Cette Constitution devra garantir les droits du travail, de la fam ille  
et de la Patrie. E lle sera ratifiée par la N ation et appliquée par les A ssem blés qu'elle aura créées.'^
Andrew  Roberts, Sunday Times, 12 October 1997. 
Edition o f  23-29  July.
N ation a l H ebdo, 23 -29  July 1992.
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Reading this text, it is difficult to see how Pétain and his colleagues can be dismissed 
blithely as a bunch of adventurers who somehow managed to grab power and humiliate 
the nation when the "real France" wasn't paying attention. Not only was Pétain accorded 
the pleins pouvoirs by an overwhelming majority of representatives, but the ultra­
conservative philosophy of the Vichy régime, based on work, family and fatherland (the 
travail, famille, patrie slogan is already present in the text) were approved at the same 
time. In the eyes of Pétain and his supporters, it was the Republic, and particularly the 
Front populaire, which was the imposter. They saw themselves as the upholders of real 
French values, and considered that these ideals had been betrayed by previous 
custodians. Their task, as they saw it, was to restore the unity and legitimacy of the 
nation. In a speech prepared by Pétain in 1943, which was in fact banned by the 
Germans, Pétain wrote that, "C'est le respect de la légitimité qui conditionne la stabilité 
d'un pays (. . .) Je ne veux pas que ma disparition ouvre une ère de désordre qui mettrait 
l'unité de la France en péril."'
Another stumbling block was the high degree of continuity between the Third 
Republic, the Etat français of Vichy and the Fourth Republic. Below the political 
leadership, French people remained French people. In particular, the administrative 
personnel of the three régimes remained largely unchanged. The Vichy police force, for 
instance, was the same as that which served under the Third and Fourth Republics. The 
force which occupied the prefecture in August 1944 was the same as that which had 
arrested tens of thousands of Jews so efficiently in previous years. Most of the deputies 
who had voted for "les pleins pouvoirs" were re-elected after the Liberation. And, in 
spite of de Gaulle's declaration that Vichy was "nul and void", some of its policies 
remained. National identity cards, family allowance. Mothers Day, the work of the
Jean-Paiil and M ichèle Cointet, 'L'hypothèque de V ichy dans l'été de 1944 ou la querelle de légitimité', 
in H istoriens e t géograph es, M ay-June 1995.
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Youth and Sports department, the Ordre des médecins all lived on to testify to the 
existence of the régime that introduced them. In 1992 the "Véf d'hiv' '42 committee" 
drew attention to this continuity to reinforce its demand for official acknowledgement. 
The Vichy administration "était servi par des administrateurs français, des magistrats 
français, des policiers français, qui ont accepté en masse de prêter serment à Petain, 
d'exécuter des ordres inhumains". The only reasonable course of action, according to the 
"Véf d'hiv' '42 committee", was to accept that "de tout ce qui s'est fait au nom de la 
France, l'Etat français est aujourd'hui coupable".'^
Richard Wertenschlag, chief rabbi of Lyon, aligned himself with the committee 
when he declared that every government, whether it likes it or not, is "l'héritier d'une 
histoire commune qu'il convient d'assumer, dans ses grandeurs comme dans ses 
démissions morales."'^ However, if taken to its logical conclusion, this attitude is a 
potential thorn in the side of heads of state. Indeed, one of the reasons for Mitterrand's 
reticence on the "Véf d'hiv'" issue was that it would establish a precedent for other 
groups who felt they had been wronged by the French state at one time or another. Was 
Mitterrand also to be held accountable for the Terror of the 1790s, the bloody 
suppression of the Paris commune, or the Dreyfus affair, all of which were perpetrated 
"in the name of France"?
Yet in defending the traditional stance, one risked endorsing the à la carte 
approach to the past that had stored up so much trouble for Mitterrand, and for France 
more generally. Examples of that approach are legion. In the Opera House at Vichy, 
there is a commemorative plaque that pays tribute to those who voted against Pétain's 
being granted the pleins pouvoirs: "Dans cette salle, le 10 juillet 1940, quatre-vingts 
parlementaires ont par leur vote affirmé leur attachement à la République, leur amour de
Le M onde, 16 July 1992. 
^M 'H um anité, 16 July 1992.
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la liberté et leur foi dans la victoire. Ainsi s'acheva la Troisième République." There is 
no mention of the 569 representatives who voted otherwise. It was also the municipal 
authority of Vichy which erected signs after the Liberation proclaiming that "Vichy 
n'est pas le siège du gouvernement traitre à la patrie mais la REINE DES VILLES 
D’EAUX".“
In a similar vein is the plaque at the gare de VEsi whieh honours the memory of 
the French railway workers who brought deportees back to France. The inscription 
reads, "En hommage aux cheminots de France qui par leur ardeur au travail et leur 
dévouement rendirent possible le retour rapide dans leur patrie de centaines de milliers 
de Français". There is no answer to the question which immediately springs to mind: if 
the French railwaymen brought the deportees home, who took them there in the first 
place? Admittedly the above examples date from before our period, but they provide a 
valuable insight into the workings of a selective group memory, and into the standards 
against which the deeds and words of our period can be judged.
So in spite of the reasoned arguments for and against Vichy's legitimacy, what 
mattered in the end was blind faith in "la France" as an ideal. In August 1942, Mgr. 
Saliege, the bishop of Toulouse, wrote a pastoral letter in which he denounced the series 
of mass arrests of Jews that took place that summer. His letter was both courageous and 
effective. Yet Mgr. Sallège absolved France of all blame; indeed, he praised her all the 
more. France, far from being guilty, was one of the victims: "France, Patrie bien-aimée, 
France qui porte dans toutes les consciences de tous les enfants la tradition du respect de 
la personne humaine, France chevaleresque et généreuse, je n'en doute pas, tu n'es pas 
responsable de ces erreurs".^'
C N R S, éd., p.55; upper case in original.
D enis Peschanski, Vichy 1940-1944: C on trô le  et exclusion  (Paris: Editions C om plexe, 1997), p. 185.
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Michel Winock explained the phenomenon in these terms; "II ne faut jamais 
confondre la France, qui est d'ordre ontologique, et les Français, qui n'en sont qu'une 
détermination particulière et souvent décevante"/^ The dichotomy between real and 
ideal remains. Pierre Bérégovoy explained this position to the audience at a CRIF dinner 
in 1992.^  ^ He admitted that "des crimes furent commis par des Français", but then 
continued in a familiar vein: "ces Français qui doivent rendre des comptes à la justice 
n'étaient pas la France. La France, ma France, la vôtre (. . .) ne s'appelait pas Henriot, 
Déat, Darquier ou Darland. Elle avait pour nom de Gaulle, Christian Pineau ou Daniel 
Mayer, Henri Frenay ou Jean Moulin." He was willing to concede that certain 
individuals, of French nationality, were guilty, but maintained that the Etat français was 
"illégal et illégitime", and that "la France" was not implicated.^"'
At this stage it was clear that representatives of the Republic were not prepared to 
cross the Rubicon by aclmowledging, be it implicitly, the responsibility of the collective 
entity known as "France". Until Jacques Chirac broke the mould there was no clear-cut 
divergence between right and left on the matter. Vichy was to be denounced in the 
strongest terms, but Vichy was not to be confused with France or the French Republic. 
Bérégovoy's successor as prime minister, Edouard Balladur, found himself engaged in a 
familiar balancing act the following year. Delivering a speech at the first official 
national commemoration of the Vél' d'hiv' rqfle, on the 16 July 1993, he roundly 
condemned Vichy's "affreuse complicité", but then went on to assure his audience that 
"la France demeurera aux yeux du monde la patrie des droits de l 'h o m m e " .Ironically 
it was France's status as a "terre d'asile" that had attracted so many Eastern Jews before
M ichel W inock, P arlez-m o i de la  F rance  (Paris: Plon, 1995), p.25. 
C on seil rep ré sen ta tif  des institu tions ju iv e s  de F rance.
Reported in L e F igaro , 30 N ovem ber 1992.
25 Conan and R ousso, p .9I.
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the war. Their confidence in French principles was cruelly abused during the 
occupation.
The communists, too, liked to separate Vichy from their conception of France. 
L ’Humanité of 16 July 1992 castigated Vichy severely for being far more zealous in 
rounding up Jews than the Nazis themselves expected. It then expressed gratitude to the 
"numerous others" who intervened to save Jewish lives. The "real" France is chosen 
from a number of working examples: "II est heureux que d'autres, nombreux, aient 
montré le visage de la France, terre de tolérance et d'humanité, en faisant souvent le 
sacrifice de leur liberté et quelque fois de leur vie" to save potential victims.
On the fiftieth anniversary of the rafle, the UDF deputy Léonce Deprez published 
an article in La Croix^^ which inadvertently bore witness to the gap between the ideal 
and the real, and the struggle between intention and action. The article was entitled "La 
France, lumière d'espérence", and took for its subject France's exemplary role in world 
affairs. Deprez insisted that "II est nécessaire que la France reste une force motrice 
imposant sa présence et son rayonnement dans le monde en perturbation. Il est 
nécessaire qu'elle le fasse avec son panache, son poids et sa foi". Immediately next to 
this was an article on the Vél' d'hiv' commemoration entitled "1942, la honte".
Le peuple français
Just as sacred as the notion of "la vraie France" was that of "le peuple français". 
The latter term has the same resonance as the former. It, too, tends to be employed 
prescriptively and qualitatively, rather than descriptively and quantatively. "Le peuple 
français" does not designate real French men and woman, but an idealised image and a
16 July 1992 .
16 July 1992 .
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set of unique attributes. The mindset is deeply rooted in democratic tradition. In any 
democracy, "the people" is sovereign (the word democracy derives from the Greek for 
the strength o f the people). Right at the core of the democratic ideal, especially its 
French republican strain, is a belief that "le peuple" has a mystical, unquestionable 
status. When the monarchy gave up its claim to devolved divinity, it was supplanted by 
the people. So, in the words of Jacques Julliard, "le peuple est bien le deus ex machina 
de la politique moderne, à la fois agent historique et principe spirituel de la 
d é m o c r a t i e In a French post-war context this was overlayed with the influence of the 
PCF, whose Occupation narrative was based largely on a class model in which the 
workers were betrayed by a treacherous ruling class, and had to fight heroically for their 
freedom. This version was largely obsolete by the 1980s, but was once an orthodoxy, 
and necessarily left its mark on the collective conscience. Thus to condemn "le peuple" 
is to condemn one of the principles on which the nation was founded in 1789 and re­
founded in 1944, and so to condemn France itself. Even when the majority of 
individuals are in the wrong, "le peuple" cannot be, since it is an ideal as opposed to an 
objective reality.
It is also an electoral maxim that "public opinion" is beyond reproach. Politically 
there would be nothing to gain and much to lose from a general attack on the conduct of 
ordinary French people during the Occupation. What is true for politics is true in a 
wider sense: telling people they are or were wicked does not make you popular. The 
people did not make the wrong choice; they were let down by their representatives, or 
the elites. De Gaulle said that "tous les gens biens étaient pour V i c h y " he would never 
have said the same of "le peuple".
'Le peuple', in L es Lieux de M ém oire, III, part 1, p. 186. 
L'H um anité, 16 July 1992.
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So while vehement criticism of the French authorities under occupation was 
commonplace by the Mitterrand era, it was still rare to hear these critical voices turned 
towards the ordinary French men and women who allowed these authorites to act. One 
of the effects of the Vél' d'hiv' fiftieth anniversary was to direct some inquisitive minds 
in this direction. The Antenne 2 news programme of 16 July broadcast footage of a 
demonstration at the home of René Bousquet, chief of police of the Gironde under 
Vichy. Bousquet's case was unexceptional in that it could be accomodated within the 
traditional doctrine of "a few high-profile traitors betraying the people". But Resistance 
heroine Lucie Aubrac gave an interview outside Bousquet's house in which she 
denounced not the former police chief, but the ordinary French men and women who 
made the rafles of Jews possible. She made specific reference to the policemen, the men 
who drove the buses and trains, the various minor officials and administrators, as well 
as those who saw what was happening and did nothing.
Noël Copin, writing in La Croix^^ also went further than most in that he, too, 
insisted that French society as a whole, and Christians in particluar, had to accept some 
responsibility for allowing a culture of antisemitism to take root: "I'Etat français n'aurait 
pas pu répondre aussi facilement aux exigences de l'occupant s'il n'avait existé dans la 
société française un antisémitisme latent dans lequel des chrétiens avaient une lourde 
responsabilité". Most unsparing of all was France 3, which, in its coverage of the 1993 
Vél' d'hiv' amiiversary insisted on the fact that Jews were rounded up by "des Français, 
et seulement des Français''
This sort of discourse still had the capacity to shock, not because the facts had 
been freshly discovered or because they were especially contentious, but simply because 
it was rare to hear them evoked frankly. In 1989 L ’Express had noted that people still
14 July 1992.
Late even ing new s, 16 July 1993.
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reacted with surprise when they learned that French policemen had organised the arrests 
that preceded deportations.^^ There is a certain validity to the argument that ordinary 
people would not necessarily have seen the effects or understood the implications of, 
say, the measures taken in 1940 and 1941 which excluded Jews from public life. A 
reduction in the number of Jewish judges or professors was unlikely to touch the daily 
lives of many people. However, in the case of rafles, internment camps and 
deportations, policemen, railway employees, bus drivers and others clearly knew that 
their actions were sure to harm the people they were dealing with, but this knowledge 
did not prevent them from continuing. It is known that only one policeman resigned in 
protest after the Vél' d'hiv' operation.
That said, most historians claimed that ordinary French people began to turn 
against the Vichy government in the summer of 1942, when the treatment of the Jews 
took a more blatantly cruel turn. Interviewed in Le Nouvel Observateur at the time of 
the fiftieth anniversary, André Kaspi spoke approvingly of "la thèse dominante (. . .) 
qu'il y a eu un tournant dans l’opinion en 1942", and maintained that "les Français 
ordinaires, sans-grade, obscurs (. . .) très souvent ont eu un comportement admirable". 
Bruno Frappat made the familiar distinction between the authorities and the rest when 
he said that "la France, du moins en sa représentation officielle d'alors, fut un agent de 
la barbarie. Cela ne vaut pas accusation pour l'ensemble de la nation, ni pour le peuple, 
où il se trouva assez de gens pour sauver l'honneur du pays". "^^
According to Denis Peschanski, "tous les historiens s'accordent à souligner le 
choc qu'ont provoqué dans l'opinion les rafles ou le récit de c e lle s -c i" .However, any 
proof of active popular opposition is generally vague or anecdotal; there is no evidence
14 July 1989.
”  16-22 July 1992.
Le M onde, 17 July 1992; m y italics, 
p .77; my italics.
114
115
of group protests of any description/^ The most solid piece of documentary evidence is 
a police report telling of increased hostility to anti-Jewish measures. However, the 
Office français d ’information deemed it necessary to suppress facts regarding arrests of 
Jews, in the face of public disquiet. On 26 August 1942 it decided to "interdire jusqu'à 
nouvel ordre toutes les informations sur les arrestations de Juifs en zone sud". Yet 
Peschanski went on to note that the historians he referred to also agreed that the 
population's shock was not generally translated into verbal or physical protest.^^ There 
was a "discreet" protest -  never made public -  from the Roman Catholic archbishops/^ 
led by Mgr. Suhard, archbishop of Paris, and the Pastor Boegner had already written a 
letter of solidarity to the chief rabbi in 1941, but these can hardly be termed "popular". 
Neither do the testimonies of victims provide much solace. Annette Krajcer, who was 
12 years old when taken off to the velodrome, recalled that "Nous portions tous nos 
étoiles jaunes, mais les Parisiens ne voulaient pas nous voir"."^  ^ In a television 
documentary broadcast in 1994, one eyewitness told of what he saw from a cafe facing 
the internment camp at Drancy, where deportees from the Vél' d'hiv’ were held 
temporarily before being transferred to the East."^  ^ He spoke of French gendarmes 
striking Jewish children with their truncheons in order to make them get onto buses. 
These buses were of course driven by French employees, as were the trains which left 
from the nearby Drancy-Le Bourget station. There are even accounts that tell of 
Parisians applauding as the convoys of buses past, and of concierges betraying Jewish
36 Peschanski, 1997, p .173.
”  p.77.
A ssem bled  in Paris on 22 July 1942.
The intevention o f  Mgr. Chappalie in 1943 was effective, how ever. The episcopal delegate to the 
governm ent m anaged to prevent the application o f  a plan to denaturalise all Jew s w ho had becom e French 
after 1927.
One must be not be too harsh in criticising the discretion o f  the Cliristian Churches. The Consistory, too, 
w as generally discrete. It sent an officia l letter o f  protest to the governm ent in February 1942, but it, too, 
decided not to make the protest public.
Le F igaro , 15 July 1992, p.9.
E nvoyé spécia l: 'Drancy, la Honte', F rance 2, 6 October 1994.
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families living in "their" building. However, it is difficult to separate myth from fact, 
and there are also stories which give the oppposite impression. Reactions varied from 
place to place, and memories are often far from reliable. Little wonder that a settled 
version of events was proving elusive.
There was a similar contrast between received opinion and eyewitness views 
regarding the conduct of the police. While the police authorities' conduct was 
unpardonable, ordinary policemen had largely been given the benefit of the doubt. It 
was suggested that the police were extremely reluctant to carry out their task, and gave 
Jewish familes time to escape whenever they could. After such a claim had been made 
by Henri Amouroux on French radio in 1982,"^  ^ an eye-witness wrote to l'Humanité to 
give a quite different account. He had been living opposite a hostel for immigrant 
workers at the time of the round-ups and witnessed an "opération coup de poing" in 
which no one was forewarned, and everyone t a k e n . O n e  damning fact that must also 
be considered is that the policemen involved in the operation had the power of decision 
over each potential detainee. Though there were, of course, instructions, the French 
police on the ground had the final say in whether to make the arrest or not. The fact that 
so many women and so many children, even those born in France, were arrested has led 
Asher Coher to conclude in 1993 that most of them carried out their task "'loyalement' 
et même avec dureté".
In the RPR's newsletter of July 1992 Georges Broussine criticised François 
Mitterrand for his "icy" attitude in refusing to implicate France, but maintained that 
"notre peuple" was, "activement ou passivement (. . .) dans le camp de la j u s t i c e " . He
F rance Inter, 13 July 1982. 
L'H um anité, 17 July 1982.
A sher Cohen, P ersécu tion s et sau vetages: Juifs e t F rançais sous l'O ccupation  e t sous Vichy (Paris: les 
Editions du Cerf, 1993), p .273.
45 Lettre de la Nation, 23 July 1992.
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does not explain what it means to be "passively" on the side of justice, nor how it is 
possible to verify this category, and this is probably the whole point: in constructing a 
collective memory, it is natural, perhaps even desirable, to err on the side of self- 
delusion. This is what gives collective memory a purpose and distinguishes it from 
history. Where there is any doubt, "le peuple" and "la France" are likely to be given the 
benefit of it.
This cast of mind is exemplified by the Vél' d'hiv' affair, but it also applies more 
generally. In 1993, a plaque was unveiled at the Hôtel du Parc in Vichy, where Pétain's 
government was based. The plaque gave details of the rafles that were conducted in the 
"zone fibre" from August 1942 onwards. It is a gesture that would seem to be 
representative of a new climate of candour with regard to these episodes, yet the 
inscription qualifies this by exonerating "la population". It reads, "Dans leur ensemble 
la population française et les clergés protestants et catholiques se sont immédiatement 
opposés à ces mesures qui violaient les traditions et l'honneur de la France".
Even those voices that one might have expected to be critical could be indulgent. 
Serge Klarsfeld, implacable pursuer of former collaborators, has praised the French 
people for protecting the greater part of the Jewish population. In Vichy, on Deportation 
Day in 1993 the mayor unveiled a plaque which commemorated the anti-Jewish rafles 
and laid the blame squarely on the Etat français. Yet the inscription paid homage to 
French people who opposed those measures. The plaque was sponsored by Klarsfeld's 
Fils et Filles des Déportés Juifs de France. This homage to ordinaiy French people is 
repeated on the numerous other plaques initiated by the FFDJF since its inception.^^
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .466. 
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .466.
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Claude Lanzmaiin, director of the monumental film Shoah, said that, "si des 
Français ont livré des juifs, d'autres, infiniment plus nombreux qu'on ne le dit 
maintenant (. . .) les ont sauvés"/^ In fact the survival of two thirds of France's Jewish 
population was the result of a number of factors acting together, notably the division of 
France into free and occupied zones, the fact that many Jews were fully-integrated 
French citizens, and the activities of resistance groups. Personal acts of solidarity, 
commendable though they are, constitute only one unquantifiable factor among many.
Similar observations can be made regarding the French internment camps, a 
subject which fired the imagination of the media during the early 1990s. These years 
saw a number of investigations revealing details about former "camps". For the most 
part they presented themselves as taboo-breakers, denouncing the scandal of an official 
cover-up. L'Evénement du jeudi entitled one such article, which appeared in May 1992, 
"Les archives interdites des camps français" (my italics), and this was typical of the 
tone adopted. Here the populism was two-fold: ordinary people living at the time were 
presented, albeit vaguely, as victims because "the authorities" committed wrongful acts 
in their name; and they were presented as victims of an official "cover-up" in the years 
that followed, thus frustrating a supposed popular thirst for the truth. However, such 
research presented something of a contradiction, since it tended to blame official 
archives policy for hindering research, and thus keeping the public in a state of 
ignorance, while demonstrating that the people who live or lived in the vicinity of the 
former camps showed little interest in what went on.
For example, in June 1993 France 3 devoted its La Marche du siècle programme 
to the French internment c a m p s . I t  featured the former transit camp at Rivesaltes, near 
Poitiers, which was in the "zone libre" controlled by the Vichy authority during the war.
Le M onde, 17 July 1992.
La M arche du siècle, 30  June 1993.
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Approximately 11 000 people, half of them Jewish, were sent there before being moved 
on to other camps, where most of them were exterminated. Yet when the film was shot 
the buildings were in ruins, and the local people seemed unsure of their former use, and 
those interviewed seemed completely indifferent in any case. Similarly, the internment 
camp at Drancy was situated in the centre of a town of 35 000 inhabitants, and 
surrounded by flats with a view into the camp, but no one talked openly about what 
went on, and no one spoke out. This was a camp in which the conditions became so bad 
that in November 1941 the Germans felt obliged to take control and release the most 
vulnerable inmates.
The error was a common one with regard to the issues thrown up by war and 
occupation. At the time, the failure to speak out or act was not always due to repression. 
And those who decried the amnesiac instinct that took hold in the post-war decades 
often forgot that it was not autocratically imposed by the "powers that be" or by former 
collaborators, but was desired by the majority of ordinary French people, for whom the 
"devoir de mémoire", so compelling during our period, was by no means a priority. 
These French people were not, on the whole, filled with righteous anger or crusading 
zeal. The war had been too bewildering and exhausting for that. Scores were settled, 
certainly, during the épuration, but that had little to do with discovering the truth and 
implanting an authentic memory.
It would therefore be wrong to blame "the authorities" systematically for 
deficiencies of collective memory, and to depict a public always desperate to Icnow the 
objective truth about its past, let down by an administration thinking only of 
dissimulation. Marc Ferro observed astutely that
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l'Etat et la politique ne sont pas les seuls à mettre l'histoire sous surveillance. La société s'en m êle  
aussi qui, pour sa part, censure et autocensure toute analyse qui révélerait ses interdits, ses lapsus, 
qui comprom ettrait l'im age qu'une société entend donner d’elle-m êm e.
So although during our period it became almost obligatory to support any initiative that 
professes to serve the interests of the "memory" of the war, and to express a willingness 
to uncover the past in its entirety, that had not always been the case. And although 
public opinion had started to race ahead of official opinion, this had not always been the 
case either.
Collective responsibility
Clearly, the concept of collective responsibility is a troublesome one; and it 
becomes even more troublesome when it is passed down the generations. Is the group 
morally obliged to accept the blame for crimes committed in its name? Should the next 
generation of this group be expected to do the same? Former German president Richard 
von Weizsacker said, on the subject of his nation's Nazi past, that "la faute collective 
n'est pas quantifiable. Les coupables, ce sont les auteurs du génocide. Mais nous avons 
hérité de la responsabilité".^^ There is a parting of the ways here between legal and and 
moral responsibility. The law tries individuals, but, plainly, the majority of individuals 
living in France from 1940 until 1944 were guilty of no serious crime. However, the 
process of identifying with a group has always implied sharing in its glories and being 
ashamed at its failings, whether or not one is personally involved. It is that sense of 
implication that von Weizsacker was thinlcing of; it can be heriditary, unlike culpability
Marc Ferro, L 'H isto ire sous su rveillan ce  (Paris: Calm ann-Lévy, 1985). 
Quoted in L e F igaro , 9 April 1994.
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in the strict legal sense. In fact the Germans were prepared to accept both types of 
responsibility after the war: the German Federal Republic proclaimed itself the 
constitutional inheritor of the German State, thereby assuming legal responsibility for 
crimes committed under previous régimes, including Hitler's Third Reich. And a 
whole national identity was founded on the acceptance of moral guilt by association.
In 1993 an issue of Esprit^^ was given over to a discussion of history and memory, 
and the writer of the introduction seemed at times quite bewildered by the complexity of 
this problem, wondering how one could deal with all its facets at once. Is it possible, he 
asked, to instill "un souvenir collectif de l'errance collective, rendre hommage à 
l'héroïsme et au martyre vrais, blâmer la passivité ordinaire, tout en assumant la 
continuité d'une histoire et un héritage que nous n'avons pas voulu tel"?
It is hardly surprising, then, that in evoking Vichy, there had always been a 
temptation to try to side step collective responsibility. Not only was there a tendency to 
separate Vichy from "la vraie France", as we saw in the first part of this chapter; there 
was also a tendency to ascribe the more flagrant acts of anti Semitic persecution to the 
Germans alone. This phenomenon was most noticeable in the inscriptions on plaques 
and other monuments erected since the Liberation. Yet many of these were renewed or 
updated as part of the fiftieth anniversary commemorations that fell during our period. 
In some cases new plaques or monuments were put up where there had been nothing. 
The changes that were made suggest that collective forms of remembrance were 
beginning to admit the notion of French responsibility for some of the misdeeds of the 
Occupation. And the more candid inscriptions on plaques and monuments prefigured 
the defining moment that came in 1995 when Jacques Chirac declared that "la France" 
had to accept its share of the responsibility for what had happened. The mindset which




saw "la France" as an untouchable ideal was being challenged by new forms of 
remembrance.
On the occasion of the Vél' d’hiv' fiftieth anniversary, some Jewish groups staged 
a mock trial of the Vichy régime in front of the Palais de Justice. One witness recalled 
that on the gravestone of a two-year-old Jewish child who died in a transit camp there 
were inscribed the words; "victime du régime hitlérien"; the witness refused to leave 
this uncontested, saying that "c'est faux, c'est une victime du gouvernement de Vichy". 
Similarly, the petition published in Le Monde of 17 June 1992 noted that
dans les discours et sur les rares plaques com m ém oratives, les ju ifs  de France déportés et 
assassinés dans les cam ps nazis apparaissent le plus souvent com m e les v ictim es de la seule  
barbarie de l'occupant allemand, m êm e lorsqu'ils ont été poursuivis, raflés et livrés par l'Etat 
français parce que Juifs.
The signatories ought to have realised that this had started to change, albeit 
unevenly. The original memorial plaque on the former site of the Vél d'hiv', unveiled in 
1951, recorded that the victims "furent parqués en ce lieu sur l ’ordre de l'occupant 
nazi", and gave to believe that the raids were "l'œuvre de la barbarie hitlérienne".^^ 
When the plaque was renewed in 1986, the text underwent a significant modification, 
which no longer gave Vichy the benefit of any doubt. The Jews were rounded up par la 
police du gouvernement de Vichy, sur ordre des occupants n a z i s " . It was also in 1986 
that the "Place des Martyrs Juifs du Velodrome d'hiver" was so baptised, by municipal 
decree. The second monument at the Vél' d'hiv', erected in accordance with the decree
F ran ce-S oir, 17 July 1992. 
Conan and R ousso, p .50.
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of 1 9 9 3 /^ was fairly specific in its apportioning of blame: it paid homage to "les 
victimes des persécutions racistes et antisémites et des crimes contre l'humanité commis 
sous l'autorité de fait dite 'gouvernement de l’Etat français'"/^
The original plaque at the Japy gymnasium in the eleventh arrondissement of 
Paris, where thousands of Jews were interned after the raids of 1941 and 1942, was put 
up in 1964. It did not mention the fact that the victims were Jewish, was vague about 
numbers ("des milliers"), and failed to name the perpetrators. It was replaced in 1994 by 
an inscription which recorded that the victims were chosen "par le seul fait d'etre juifs", 
gives the precise number of victims (3 710), and accuses "la police de Vichy et 
l'occupant nazi".^^ Curiously, though, the "histoire de Paris" information post a few 
yards away persevered with the vague approach. It said that the Jews were "victimes des 
persécutions nazies", failing to mention any French involvement.
At the lycée Jean-Zay at Orléans, the original commemorative plaque described 
Zay as "victime de la barbarie nazie". On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of his 
murder, in 1994, another was added in a ceremony presided by François Mitterrand. It 
bore the words "assassiné par la Milice du gouvernement de Vichy". Similarly, the 
inscription on the memorial to Victor Basch was modified to include the phrase 
"victime de la haine raciale", on the insistance of the CRIF and the LICRA.^^
Also, in the showpiece "mémorial pour la paix" in Caen, opened in 1988, there are 
seven different espaces, each divided into several themes. In espace 2 of the museum, 
devoted to "La France des années noires", the visitor is taken tlrrough a sombre 
underground chamber, and retraces the stages that led to deportation and genocide. 
There is no attempt to disimulate the harsh reality of collaboration, particularly with
O fficia lly  unveiled  in July 1994. 
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .485. 
Barcellini and W ieviorka, p.477. 
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .26.
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regard to antisemitism. The guidebook that visitors are given states clearly that "En 
France, les mesures antisémites se succèdent, certaines sur ordre de l'occupant mais 
d'autres aussi à l'initiative du gouvernement de Vichy."
Needless to say, the picture was more complex than one is sometimes led to 
believe. Not all new inscriptions departed from the traditional formulae. Shelomo 
Selinger's monument at Drancy, which dates from 1986, maintained that the Jews 
interned there were "victimes de la barbarie nazie", despite the fact that many of them 
would have been taken there by the French authorities. Similarly, the extent to which 
the identity of the perpetrators was obfuscated in older inscriptions has sometimes been 
exaggerated. We are dealing with general trends; there was never a hard and fast rule 
against alluding directly to French malefactors. In the Ain department, there are fifteen 
plaques which designate the Milice, most of which have been in place since 
immediately after the war.^^ The one dedicated to the memory of Victor Basch and his 
wife, erected in 1945, records that the couple were "sauvagement assassinés par la 
Milice".“
Yet the fact remains that, whenever memorial inscriptions were updated, they 
tended to become less indulgent, above all when the victims were Jewish and the 
malefactors French. There is certainly no evidence of a change in the opposite sense. 
And the Vichy government, and not just the extremists of the Milice, was more often 
called to account. While the centrepiece sculpture at Drancy did not make direct 
reference to Vichy, the presidential decree of 1993 provided for a plaque that did. It was 
positioned in front of the "wagon-témoin" which also served as a mini-museum. In 
contrast, the inscription on the original plaque that was put up at the site of the 
internment camp at Drancy after the repatriation of the deportees was, to use Henry
Barcellini and W ieviorka, p .24.
B arcellin i and W ieviorka, pp .347, 348. V ictor B asch was president o f  the ligue des d ro its  de l'homme.
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Bulawko's expression, "anodyne" in character, and this at the insistance of the 
management of the HLM estate that owned the land/"^ The inscription, on the wall of 
the HLM building, records that the victims "ont été intérnés par l'occupant hitlérien".
A new day o f commemoration
The Vél’ d'hiv' commemoration stood out as a focal point for tension between 
differing conceptions of France and the Republic, and for differing notions of collective 
responsibility. It could not but be implicated in the move towards a more self-critical 
collective memory, one which admitted the possibility that "la France" had been in the 
wrong. The indulgent view of France as an inspiring ideal rather than a patchy reality 
was once acceptable to a nation in need of a sustaining myth, but there was now 
dissatisfaction with this position and its implications. That dissatisfaction was 
articulated most strongly by the left-leaning media and by Jewish groups, but the fact 
that it eventually produced a presidential decree suggests that public opinion was on 
board.
It was the Vél' d'hiv' affair that brought things to a head. Jean Dujardin, a Catholic 
priest, criticised the obdurate tendency to disassociate Vichy and France, and to judge 
and condemn Vichy "comme la faute d’un autre". Dujardin gave expression to what was 
becoming the new orthodoxy when he claimed that no society could live in true peace 
with itself "sur un passé refoulé et mensonger", and that reconciliation was only 
possible through "un rapport de vérité avec notre h i s to i r e" .A cartoon in Le Monde of 
the following day returned to the theme to ridicule the attitude of Mitterrand and his
Henry B uiaw ko was, am ong other things, vice-president o f  the A m ica le  des A n ciens D ép o rtés  Juifs de 
F rance). H e w as made a comm ander o f  the L egion o f  Honour in 1998 in recognition o f  his work in 
defence o f  the m em ory o f  antisem itic persecution. Interview o f  19 April 1999.
Le M onde, 17 July 1992.
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supporters/^ It showed a group of caricatural French figures saying to a forlorn-looking 
Jew, "Puisqu'on vous dit qu'on n'était pas de service ce jour-là! ! "
Hervé de Charette, then UDF deputy and subsequently foreign minister, was one 
of the few mainstream, high-profile politicians to believe that the French state ought to 
be incriminated. His view was that, "pour être en règle avec notre passé, il eût (. . .) fallu 
(. . .) reconnaître (. . .) que les Etats, aussi, sont pêcheurs.
In 1994 Jacques Attali, a former conseiller d’état to François Mitterrand, said on 
the subject of Vichy that "c'est la République qui est coupable et, au-delà, la France". 
He also declared that "de Gaulle a fait croire aux Français qu'ils étaient résistants alors 
qu'ils étaient collabos. The outraged response to his remarks illustrated the delicacy 
of Mitterrand's position in 1992: Mitterrand's reticence drew criticism, but it might have 
been even more dangerous to tell his critics what they wanted to hear. Jacques Baumel, 
a compagnon de la Libération, described Attali's remarks as "odious", and an insult both 
to history and to those who had fought and died. He maintained the Gaullian position 
that although France had "baissé la tête" in 1940, "dans ses profondeurs elle ne s'est pas 
vautrée dans la collaboration". This notion of France's "depths", like those which evoke 
the "real" or "essential" France, takes us into the realms of faith and belief, out of the 
reach of objective enquiry.
The CRIF had been organising an annual ceremony at the site of the former winter 
velodrome in Paris since after the war. But in the 1980s the state began to pay official 
attention to the Jewish community's commemoration. A representative of the 
government, ex-servicemen's minister Jean Laurain, attended for the first time in 1982.
18 July 1992.
Le F igaro  17 July 1992.
On a J  programme about the Touvier trial, 20 March 1994.
Le F igar0 -M agazine  16 April 1994.
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Prior to this, official assistance and participation had always been refused by the 
organisers. The fact that a president of the Republic was present for the first time in 
1992 was a further aclaiowledgment from both "sides", the Jewish groups and the State, 
that the nation as a whole ought to be formally, and symbolically, involved. It was also 
an official expression of a collective desire to recognise that the nation's past was an 
extremely patchy affair, made up of darkness and of light. Essentially these were the 
same motives that had led to inscriptions on plaques being updated.
However, there was a problem in that France's official bodies were not prepared to 
move as quickly as some would have liked. This led to misunderstandings and tensions, 
some of which expanded into minor crises. As we have seen, in June 1992, Jewish 
associations, human rights groups and assorted public figures came together to form the 
"comité 'vél' d'hiv’ ’42". Their petition put François Mitterrand under pressure to make a 
public apology on behalf of France, which he refused to do. As a consequence of that 
refusal Mitterrand was jeered and heckled as he took his place among the audience. 
There were even some shouts of "Mitterrand à Vichy" from a section of the gathering. 
Militant Zionist youth movements were blamed for the disturbance. Eventually the jeers 
were drowned out by applause, and it was the applause that was prominent when 
Mitterrand left the ceremony. In between times, there was a notable contribution from 
Robert Badinter, then president of the Conseil constitutionnel. Visibly angered, he 
expressed disgust and outrage at the hecklers' actions before going on with his speech.
In order to clear up the apparent misunderstanding of his attitude towards Vichy, 
Mitterrand decided to decree a new national day of commemoration which would 
coincide with the 'Vél' d'hiv' anniversary. The decree was made public in February 
1993. This was the first time in the history of the Republic that a national
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commemoration had been established by presidential decree/^ The official title of the 
new commemoration was "journée nationale commémorative des persécutions racistes 
et antisémites commises sous l'autorité de fait dite 'gouvernement de l’Etat français'". It 
followed the recently established pattern in that it recognised that certain categories of 
people were singled out for persecution, and it referred directly to the Vichy 
govermnent. Roger Jouet, head of the Délégation à la mémoire et à l ’information 
historique, confirmed this when he said that the significance of the new commemoration 
lay precisely in the fact that it recognised "la culpabilité de I'Etat français" in the 
persecutions.^*
Also, for the first time ever a systematic policy of memorial inscription was 
ordered and financed by the state, to cover the whole of the national territory. 
Henceforth each department was to have at least one inscription bearing a reference to 
the racist and antisemitic persecutions carried out by the Vichy government. The 
monument for Paris, at the former site of the Vél' d'hiv, was inaugurated at the 1994 
ceremony. It was attended by the three most prominent political figures in France, 
François Mitterrand, Edouard Balladur and Jacques Chirac.
That said, the semantics of the official title provided an interesting nuance. 
According to the second petition organised by the "Vél' d'hiv' '42 committee", which 
appeared on 19 July 1992, the objective had been to obtain a commemoration of the 
crimes and persecutions perpetrated "par I'Etat français de Vichy". Jean Le Garrec, the 
deputy who sponsored the initial legislation, had retained the preposition "par"P 
However, the actual wording of the decree, "commises sous I'Etat français de Vichy" 
leaves a measure of indulgent ambiguity. The crimes have still been committed, and
™ Rendered possib le by the presidential powers granted by the constitution o f  the Fifth R epublic, 
In the foreword to L es Chem ins de la m ém oire  n °3 1, July-Septem ber 1993.
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Vichy is still implicated, but the link between the two becomes more tenuous. Did the 
Vichy government actively contribute to the persecutions, or was it merely "in charge" 
at the time?
Similarly, the term "autorité de fait" takes us right back into the classic argument 
about Vichy's legitimacy, and about what was the "real France". The choice of 
vocabulary implies that Vichy, while it may have had "authority" for a while, was in no 
sense a legitimate government. Mitterrand had no intention of changing his stance on 
the relationship between the Vichy government and the Republic. Fte was keen to 
demonstrate that he was not indifferent to the persecutions suffered by Jews and others 
under Vichy, but in doing so he remained consistent in drawing a distinction between 
the Republic which paid homage and the "autorité de fait" which was complicit in the 
persecutions. According to Michel Charasse, who helped prepare the 1993 decree, the 
president had been "furious" that his refusal to implicate the Republic in any official 
apology had been used against him, as "proof that he harboured Vichyist sympathies.^^
Roger Jouet, while he approved the recognition of Vichy's culpability (see above, 
p. 127), was quick to point out that "les crimes commis par certains Français pendant 
l'occupation n'impliquent nullement une quelconque responsabilité collective". The 
Gaullian philosophical distinction remained a shadowy presence: legitimacy was not 
conferred by power, even when accorded by an elected parliament, but by fidelity to 
certain fundamental "national" values. Even amongst the supporters of this innovative 
venture, the old mindset had a place. Clearly, changes in collective mentality take the 
form of evolution rather than revolution.
73 Interv iew  w ith  M ic h e l  Charasse,  10 June 1999.
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Temporarily at least, Mitterrand's decree appeared to placate those who had 
previously been critical. A statement from the CRIF said that "la décision prise par le 
président de la République a la valeur d'une condamnation des crimes de Vichy, ce que 
nous attendions depuis longtemps". Its president, Jean Kahn, said on television that 
"pour la première fois on a voulu institutionnaliser la mémoire, c'est un progrès 
considérable. (. . .) La mémoire doit servir à préserver notre pays d'un retour à des 
idéologies qui avait prévalu à l'époque (. . .) la vigilance doit être très grande."^"* The 
French communist party echoed the anti-racist, anti-exclusion discourse: "La mémoire 
de l'holocauste perpétué voilà cinquante ans permet d'agir maintenant ( .. .) La chasse au 
racisme, à la xénophobie est devenue indissociable de la lutte contre les inégalités, les 
injustices, de la nécéssité de changer de politique.
As ever with commemorations, the future was at stake as much as the past. The 
"Vél' d'hiv' committee" "rejoiced" at the decision, which "engage pour l'avenir toute la 
communauté nationale"/^ Louis Mexandeau, secretary of state for war veterans, took up 
a familiar theme - that of the transmission of memory from the living witnesses to the 
next generations: "Alors que les derniers témoins disparaissent, les persécutions racistes 
et antisémites se trouvent ancrées à jamais dans la mémoire de la France." Christian 
PieiTet, campaign director for the parti socialiste, also stressed the educational value of 
the decision: "il est nécessaire pour les jeunes générations que l'on procède de manière 
pédagogique pour bien montrer ce que sont l'antisémitisme et le racisme qui sont loin 
d'avoir disparu aujourd’hui."^^ At the first decreed ceremony in 1993 (which the 
president did not attend), Edouard Balladur underlined once again the link between past, 
present and future that lends significance and sometimes poignancy to the act of
N ot to be confused with former E lysée counsellor Jean Kahn. 
L'H um anité, 5 February 1993.
Le M onde, 9 February 1993.
Barcellini in Vingtièm e S iècle  n°45.
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commemoration. "La mémoire de ces événements doit inspirer le regard que nous 
portons sur le monde actuel. La transmettre aux générations futures est notre devoir".
There was some criticism from those who thought that Mitterrand had gone too 
far, and from those who thought he had not gone far enough. The Green Party 
considered that the initiative had come too late and was not unequivocal enough in its 
condemnation of Vichy. And while Jacques Chirac approved, the RPR's spokesman on 
human rights suspected that there was more than a hint of pre-electoral opportunism in 
the announcement.^^ His suspicions were later vindicated by Elysée counsellor Jean 
Kahn, who confirmed that the general elections of 1993 were indeed a factor in the 
timing and the form of the decree.
Chirac's declaration
It was Jacques Chirac who shifted the official position most radically, during the 
ceremony marking the fifty third anniversary of the rafle du Vél' d'hiv', on 16 July 1995. 
It will be observed that, strictly speaking, I am going beyond the Mitterrand years in 
mentioning this event. However, this liberty is justified by the fact that the new 
president's gesture was intended to be the final curtain call of the Vél' d'hiv’ saga, and at 
the same time a fresh beginning to a new era in which France could be held to account 
for the actions of the Vichy government.^* Thematically it belongs to this study, and is 
in fact a more appropriate cut-off point than, say, Mitterrand's last day in office. For
Speech at cerem ony o f  16 July 1993 (Le M onde, 18-19 July 1993).
Barcellini in Vingtièm e S iècle  n°45.
Persona] correspondance from Jean Kahn, 14 M ay 1999: "des politiciens (. . .) ont cru habile de 
préparer (the decree) à la hâte en prévision des élections de 1993." H ow ever, M ichel Charasse explained  
that, with general elections imminent, there w ould not have been tim e to put a law  through parliament in 
the normal way. N orm al parliamentary business was suspended in any case after the announcem ent o f  the 
elections.
Chirac's declaration provided the context required for the M atteoli com m ission , w hich  is currently 
w orking out how  m uch the French state ow es to French Jews despoiled  during the O ccupation.
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Chirac was consciously drawing a line under the record of perceived equivocation and 
ambiguity that he inherited. In his speech he assumed unequivocally, on behalf of 
France, collective responsibility for the crimes of Vichy. To make the avowal of 
responsibility was a significant step, because of the implicit recognition that the Etat 
français of Vichy was a government that was accepted, if only for a while, by the 
French people, and that there was in this respect a certain continuity with the republic 
which took its place.
Perhaps more tellingly, he recognised that it was "la France" which "a commis 
l'irréparable", which "livrait ses protégés à leurs bourreaux".And he was unambiguous 
when he said that "la folie criminelle de l'occupant a été secondée par des Français, 
secondée par l'Etat français". With these words he put paid to the idea that Vichy was 
some aberrant un-French entity which somehow managed to oust the "real" France for a 
time, and he officially banished the Gaullian dogma in which France, at least the "real" 
France, was more or less united in its resistance to foreign occupation despite the 
treachery of the bureaucratic élite.
Not only did Chirac incriminate the French nation, and "des Français", he pointed 
the finger at the ordinary people who physically carried out the rafle, by alluding to "les 
bus parisiens et les fourgons de la préfecture de p o l i c e " . In doing so he flirted with 
transgession of the unwritten rule which states that politicians must not criticise 
"ordinary people" (see above, p . I l l  ff). That said, it will be noted that only the vehicles 
are referred to directly. Even in breaking with tradition so resolutely, it would have been 
inappropriate to spell out that "French bus drivers took Jewish families away". Still, the 
pill was certainly bitter enough to require the familiar sweetener of allusion to the
Conan and R ousso.
Le M onde, 18 July 1995.
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imminent insurrection: "cet été sera, pour beaucoup de nos concitoyens (. . .) le point de 
départ d'un vaste mouvement de résistance."
Jacques Chirac's speech was in part a reaction to the shift in the public mood 
which followed the Mitterrand-Vél' d'hiv' controversy, and his judgement was 
vindicated by an IFOP poll published on 27 July 1995.^ "* 72% of those questioned 
agreed with the president's position. However, the difficulty of making generalisations 
about public opinion (and the crucial importance of the wording of the prompt) is 
illustrated by a poll conducted in 1994, which found that 57% of opinion disagreed with 
the statement that "cinquante ans après, la France d'aujourd'hui doit se sentir coupable 
de ce que le régime de Vichy a fait entre 1940 et 1944". Only 25% agreed.
The immediate impact of Chirac's declaration was symbolic: the French nation 
had accepted that it could not deny all responsibility for what occured under the German 
occupation, in particular with regard to the Jews. But the declaration also had practical 
implications. French Jewish families who had been despoiled at this time now had a 
reasonable case for demanding some form of material compensation from the French 
state.
in L 'E vénem ent du jeu d i.
In Le F igaro  M agazine, 17 D ecem ber 1994.
86 In February 1997 A lain Juppé com m issioned a report w hose aim s w ould be to establish the nature o f  
the despoilm ent o f  Jews liv ing in France during the Occupation and to m ake recom m endations regarding 
any dam ages to be awarded. The "mission" was headed by Jean M attéoli, a former R esistance deportee. 
His interim report o f  8 January 1998 gave notice o f  the extent to w hich responsib ilities had been o ffic ia lly  
recognised. M attéoli w rote that his aim was to "étudier les conditions dans lesquelles les biens 
appartenant aux personnes considérées com m e ju ives par l'occupant et les autorités de V ichy ont été 
confisqués, ou d'une manière générale, acquis par fraude, v io lence ou vo l dans le cadre de la p o litiq u e  
antisém ite  qu i a  sév i en F rance  entre 1940 et 1944" (m y italics).®*'
Here w e find that the French governm ent o f  V ichy is clearly designated as a guilty party, and also that the 
antisem itical nature o f  the crim es is not obscured. N evertheless, the report m akes it plain that the term  
" Ju if is only being used for convenience's sake. Under French law there w as no basis for categorising  
any person or persons in such a w ay. The discriminatory legal definition em ployed by V ichy had been  
abolished at the Liberation. The report explains that "En toute rigueur, la M ission  étudie les conditions de 
la spoliation non des Juifs de France, mais des personnes qui ont été considérées com m e ju ives par 
l'occupant ou les autorités de Vichy". This brings us back to the them e o f  com m unities w ithin the 
R epublic. W hile the French authorities w ere now  w illing  to be more sp ecific  than ever in identifying the 
real victim s and m alefactors o f  the Occupation, and to assum e the financial consequences, they had to 




Given the state of mainstream opinion in July 1995, criticism of Chirac's speech 
was generally muted. Perhaps the RPR bulletin Lettre de la Nation was most eloquent, 
if not in the way it intended. It praised Chirac for his "langage clair", which compared 
favourably with the Mitterrand's "finasseries", but then proceeded to neglect the 
incriminating part of the speech and concentrate on its more positive - but obviously 
less significant - aspects, such as the public indignation aroused by the arrests of 1942.
Although in the ministerial ranks of the RPR few voices were raised against him 
at the time, it was understood that some were upset by this implicit repudiation of the 
traditional Gaullian line.^^ It was indeed ironic that the first Gaullist president for two 
decades should be the first unequivocally to repudiate the myth on which much of the 
Gaullist edifice had been built. The extreme-right publication Minute, comparing the 
respective attitudes of Mitterrand and Chirac, remarked that the Socialist was much 
more Gaullist than the Gaullist in this respect .Two of Chirac's former advisers, Marie- 
France Garaud and Pierre Juillet, regretted that, in accepting that Vichy acted in the 
name of France, he was "outlawing" de Gaulle and "legitimising" his condemnation for 
treason. However, whether by accident or design, Garaud and Juillefs argument failed 
to make the distinction between recognising the facts and condoning them. Implicitly, 
Chirac was acknowledging that de Gaulle was indeed an outlaw at first; the government 
that deemed him so had been voted in by the people's representatives, and there were no 
protests in support of the rebel general at the time. What indeed was to prevent Vichy 
claiming to speak and act "in the name of France"?^^
Philippe Séguin, having kept his counsel for two years, went public with his 
dismay during the Maurice Papon trial of 1997. He was concerned that, in seeking to
In private, prominent Gaullists such as Jean-Jacques de Bresson and Pierre Lefranc have also criticised  
Chirac's declaration.
19 July 1995.
M arie-France Garaud and P ien e  Juillet in Le M onde, 22  July 1995.
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blame the Republic for the crimes commited by Vichy, certain groups were attacking 
the memory of Charles de Gaulle, indulging a perverse taste for "l'autoflagéllation", and 
playing into the hands of the Front national by promoting the "abaissement" of France. 
Like Garaud and Juillet, and many others before them, Séguin managed to confuse 
Nation and Republic, seeing an acceptance of blame on behalf of the former as calumny 
towards the latter. Yet outside of the extreme right no one seriously suggested that the 
Republic was to blame for the crimes of Vichy, even if the Third Republic did dissolve 
itself too meekly. In asking incredulously "comment peut-on prétendre que I'Etat de 
Vichy incarnait la République?" Garaud and Juillet were probably being disingenuous. 
They sought to reshape Chirac's declaration into a more vulnerable form, and then 
attack it.^^
The parliamentary left - if socialist education minister Lionel Jospin and 
communist leader Robert Hue can be deemed representative of it - approved the 
declaration. (Also, after he became prime minister Lionel Jospin endorsed Chirac's 
declaration at the 'Vél' d'hiv' commemoration of 1997). Jean-Noël Jeanneney was one of 
the few centre-left intellectuals to voice criticism at the time. Like the Gaullists 
mentioned above, Jeanneney took exception to Chirac's presuming to accuse "la 
France".^* Associations of former resisters, soldiers, prisoners of war and deportees^^ 
were also unhappy at the initiative, as they thought it might detract from established 
commemorations. However, critics had to be circumspect to avoid playing into the 
hands of the Front national. For over on the extreme right, Jean-Marie Le Pen was 
voicing his opinions bullishly. The FN leader was indignant that the new president had 
dared "salir la nation et sa mémoire" in such a way, and put it down to an "electoral
Le M onde, 22 July 1995.
Le M onde, 20 July 1995. He reiterated his criticism s to me in an interview  o f  12 March 1999.




debt" payable to the Jewish community/^ Chirac had upset the extreme right by 
attacking its ideologies in his declaration:
Quand à nos portes, certains groupuscules, certaines publications, certains enseignem ents, certains 
partis politiques se révèlent porteurs d'une idéologie xénophobe, raciste, antisém ite, alors cet esprit 
de vigilance qui vous anim e, qui nous anim e, doit se manifester avec la plus grande force.
There were concerns, too, that the National Front would seek to instill, and then 
exploit, a feeling that the Jewish community were attempting to maximise French 
collective guilt, partly in a spirit of vengeance,part ly in order to achieve political or 
financial goals.^^ According to the extreme right's argument, French Jews were able to 
obtain favourable treatment from politicians and state authorities because of France's 
guilt about Vichy, and a willingness to compensate for past misdeeds. It pointed to the 
behaviour of the state of Israel towards Palestinians, and the indulgent attitude of the 
United States, amongst others. The danger in a French context was that the appeal of 
this discourse may increase as a result of a perceived "hi-jacking" of history and 
memory by the Jewish community at the expense of the nation as a whole. In a survey 
conducted in 1993, 23%, a significant minority, of French people, expressed a fear that 
a culture based on the memory of the Holocaust could provoke a rebirth of 
antisemitism.^^
Le M onde, 20 July 1995. Others, such as Jean Kahn, have said the sam e o f f  the record. Jean-M arie Le 
Pen's pet theory w as that Chirac w as "controlled" by influential Jewish groups. H e is quoted in L e M onde  
o f  2-3 M arch 1997 as saying that Chirac "respecte la prom esse faite au Bnai Brith et à toutes les autres 
organisations juives: ne pas remettre en cause le partage du gâteau instauré à la Libération."
Henry B ulaw ko admitted as m uch in the interview o f  19 April 1999.
The financial goal o f  restoration o f  w ealth stolen by the N azis and their accom plices w as brought 
closer by the M atteoli com m ission, set up by A lain Juppé in February 1997.




However, while the danger of overkill remained real, the little evidence that exists 
suggests that, on the whole, people were likely to be more sympathetic towards Jews 
when the topic of Vichy was loiown and discussed. Louis-Harris asked the following 
question in 1966, 1978 and 1987: "D'une manière générale, quand on vous apprend 
qu’une personne que vous coimaissez est juive, est-ce que cela suscite en vous plutôt de 
la sympathie, plutôt de l’antipathie ou est-ce que cela ne vous fait aucun effet 
particulier?" In 1966, when the words "Jewish" and "Vichy" were rarely placed side by 
side, only 4% of those polled expressed sympathy. In 1978, the figure was 10%, and in 
1987, during the period of "obsession" with Vichy's crimes, it had risen to 15%. The 
corresponding figures for "antipathie" were 10%, 4% and 1% (on each occasion the vast 
majority went for "aucun effet particulier").^^ Obviously this evidence is only 
circumstantial, but there is a steady and coherent progression which suggests that there 
is a linic between antisemitism and ignorance about the persecution that occured during 
the Occupation. There was certainly no real evidence to suggest that the more candid 
approach to Vichy's antisemitism provoked feelings of resentment towards French Jews 
amongst the French public.
houï^-W^rnsïov l'Evénement du jeudi, 15-21 October 1987.
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CHAPTER FIVE  
LES MEMOIRES DIFFICILES
As we moved into our period the idea of the nation as an indivisible entity was 
becoming less sacred in France. It was no longer the uncontested reference point for 
collective identity. European integration, the rise of a human rights-based ideology, and 
the affirmation of regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences within French 
society, contributed to the relative fragmentation of the national framework for memory. 
A society in which, in theory, only the state and the citizens occupied the public sphere, 
was giving way to a society in which different "communities" claimed a right to affirm 
their identity. Memories of experiences unique to each group were mobilised in order to 
legitimise these claims. When people talk of this "logique communautaire" with 
reference to war and occupation it is generally a veiled reference to French Jews, who, 
as has already become apparent, were by far the most dynamic formation in the 
"batailles de mémoire" of the 1980s and 1990s.
However, in order to fully understand recent developments, it is necessary to take 
a step back. The German occupation had meant one thing for all Jews living in France, 
whether or not they were deported: first and foremost it had meant exclusion from the 
nation. The woes that followed were a result of that exclusion. Instinctively, those who 
survived sought to reintegrate themselves within the national community as fully as 
possible. Under such circumstances, it would have been inappropriate to assert a 
specifically Jewish memory, which would only have accentuated a negative sense of 
common identity as a minority apparently fated to be singled out for persecution. 
Reintegration was achieved through discretion.
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That said, the discretion was not always deliberate. After the war priorities were 
different. Even if people appreciated the importance of keeping memory alive, they 
simply did not have the time or the resources to do it justice. At first, the travail social 
took precedence over the travail de mémoire. There were returning deportees, as well as 
widows and orphans, to look after. Many of them spoke little or no French, which made 
the task more complicated, especially when dealing with the French administration. 
Many of the families had had their goods stolen or their houses taken from them.
Aside from the practical concerns, it was understandable that some of those who 
had undergone such trauma should seek some peace of mind in silence. The politician 
Simone Veil has recalled that some members of her family could not bear to talk or 
even hear talk of the concentration camps. Veil's mother-in-law, for instance, refused to 
watch television whenever the subject was dealt with. ^ Others wanted to speak out, but 
found themselves tongue-tied. What, in truth, could one say about something so 
unspeakably humiliating? As the Nouvel Observateur reported in 1992, "ils étaient 
écrasés par le chagrin, ils ne voulaient plus être des victimes, ils voulaient se fondre 
dans la masse des Français sans histoires".^ Until becoming involved as a partie civile in 
the trial of Maurice Papon in October 1997, Eliane Alisvaks-Dommange had been 
incapable of revealing to her children that her own parents had been deported to 
Auschwitz and gassed, and that she, along with her two brothers, had only managed to 
avoid a similar fate by escaping from the transit camp at Drancy. For most of her life 
she had been at a loss as to how to approach the subject. As she told I’Express , "ce n'est 
pas: on prend une tasse de café, on s'assoit et on discute".^
'Une d iffic ile  réflexion', in P a rd ès  n°16 (1992). 
 ^ 16-22 July.
 ^ 2 -8  October 1997.
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This gave rise to a state of affairs where it was almost taboo to utter the word 
"Juif in public; and all the more so when evoking the Second World War. In Resnais 
and Cayrol's film Nuit et Brouillard, made in 1955, the word is not uttered one single 
time."  ^This conferred a certain shock-value on one of the more infamous slogans of May 
1968: "Nous sommes tous des Juifs allemands". It was the first time that the Holocaust 
had been referred to so specifically and so publicly since the Liberation. The protesters, 
as was their wont, considered that in shouting the word "Juif they were breaking 
another taboo. Even at that, Vichy's role in Jewish persecution was not an issue, since 
the slogan only mentioned German Jews.
Revival o f Jewish memory
The relative discretion of the Jewish community had required the suppression of 
justifiable feelings of indignation and sorrow, and the renouncement of the equally 
justifiable urge to tell the story "like it was". While Jewish families waited at the Hôtel 
Lutétia for the 3% who survived , plaques were being put up all over Paris in memory of 
every person who had fallen at the Liberation (including members of the police force 
that had helped to deport Jews).^ Plainly, a national memory that was detailed in some 
respects, and vague in others could not hope to satisfy everyone. When the specifically 
Jewish experience was eventually rehabilitated this would be seen as a sort of poetic 
justice, a bloodless revenge against those who tried to downgrade the Jews in the 
hierarchy of remembrance.^
‘^ L ibération , 10 July 1997.
 ^Le M onde, 14 July 1982. A m em orial plaque w as unveiled at the Lutétia in 1985. It referred to 
"I'angoisse et la peine des fam ilies des m illiers de disparus qui attendirent vainem ent les leurs en ce lieu." 
(Barcellini and W ieviorka, p .406 .)
 ^ Hem'y B ulaw ko expressed these sentim ents in an interview o f  19 April 1999.
140
141
From the 1970s on, Jewish deportees and their representatives were increasingly 
unimpressed by calls for a national synthesis in commemorative matters. Activist Henry 
Bulawko even expressed disappointment that the presidential decree of 1993 (see 
p.l25ff) made the Vél' d'hiv' anniversary a national affair. While on one hand he 
welcomed the increased exposure, Bulawko, amongst others, would have preferred it to 
remain a more intimate, Jewish commemoration.^
Jewish activists began to see the preoccupation with national unity as a 
smokescreen, either for jealousy of the Jewish community's success in arousing popular 
interest in its experience, or for a latent anti-semitism.^ For them, persecution and 
genocide did not constitute a national experience. On the contrary, genocide scorned 
national frontiers. Rita Thalmann, a secular Jew who created the commission for 
"mémoire historique et droits de l'homme" within the LICRA, has argued that the war 
ought never to have been "nationalised" in the first place, since phenomena like 
resistance and deportation were far from being uniquely French experiences. Thalmann 
was critical of the French obsession with "indivisibility", and claimed that this 
obsession had been counter-productive with regard to memory of the war years. It had 
nourished a number of myths, such as a united and inclusive "France résistante" and the 
umbrella category "tous des victimes du nazisme", which were destined, sooner or later, 
to be painfully deconstructed. The old, post-revolution motto of the Paris Consistory, 
patrie et religion, seemed hopelessly out of step with the spirit of an age in which the 
nation sometimes appeared as an obsolete staging post between one's community and 
"the world". In 1992 the indefatigable memorial activist Serge Klarsfeld gave a lecture 
which summed up these developments. His paper was entitles "mémoire sans
 ^ Interview o f  19 April 1999. 
 ^ Interview o f  19 April 1999.
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frontières".^ The recovery and promotion of a distinctly Jewish memory of the 
Holocaust was a truly international movement.
It was inevitable that, when the climate was favourable, a Jewish memory of war 
and occupation would begin to assert itself. In the 1970s a new generation of Jewish 
intellectuals was emerging, fired by a sense of injustice untempered by the fatalism of 
the generation that had lived tlirough the horrors of the Shoah. For this generation, 
remembering the Holocaust was a crucial aspect of a wider quest for collective identity. 
Being Jewish was no longer about suffering in silence, but about breaking it. The new 
generation was not too traumatised to speak out, or wary about proclaiming its 
Jewislmess. On the contrary, the new breed of Jewish intellectuals were determined to 
be noticed as Jewish intellectuals, and to make an indelible impression on Jewish and 
then French consciousness.
While national equivalents had existed since the Liberation, it was not until 1979 
that a specifically Jewish association for the memory of deportees was created. The time 
lapse since the events themselves dictated a shift in focus from the deportees themselves 
to their descendants. Consequently the new movement, in which Beate and Serge 
Klarsfeld featured prominently, was called Les Fils et Filles des déportés juifs de 
France. Whereas the deportees' associations that were created after the war, though they 
did not exclude Jewish victims, emphasised resistance and political opposition to Vichy, 
the ethos of the FFDJF was quite different. It aimed to support the Klarsfelds and others 
in their mission to track down and bring to trial those alleged war criminals who 
remained at large, and sought, in general, to establish and broadcast what it considered 
to be the truth about antisemitic persecution.
M alet,  éd.,  1993.
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These Jewish memorial activists realised that collective memory was not a given, 
unchanging entity, but could be acted upon by motivated individuals and groups. It was 
no use waiting for the tide to turn magically: in the words of Rita Thalmann, French 
Jews "ont dû imposer leur mémoire". They also appreciated the unstable nature of that 
collective memory, and sought to reinforce it wherever possible by leaving durable 
marks in the form of plaques, monuments and other "lieux de mémoire". But it was only 
gradually that the Jewish community became fully conscious of the importance of 
safeguarding the memory of what had happened, and had begun to give it a formal 
structure. As Henry Bulawko explained, in the beginning there was little theory and 
little coherence behind the work that was done in the field of memory and 
commemoration. People were gathering together and putting up plaques here and there, 
but these were instinctive gestures of mourning and respect for those who had died: the 
"dette envers les morts". As Bulawko put it, "on essaimait nos petits cailloux de la 
mémoire: un monument ici, un musée là pour que le souvenir reste p e rm an en t" .This 
was to become the basis for a more systematic travail de mémoire.
One of Serge Klarsfeld's key achievements was to compile the Mémorial de la 
Déportation des Juifs de France, a document which simply lists the names, dates of 
birth and occupations of every one of the 75,721 Jewish people deported from France, 
convoy by convoy. There is no attempt to comment or interpret: the facts are simply set 
down in black and white, and a victory is won in the "battle for memory". Klarsfeld 
expressed his proactive, voluntarist philosophy when he said that "le travail d'un seul, 
parfois, peut éveiller ou réveiller la mémoire de tous".^^ It was this principle that
Interview o f  3 June 1999. Thalmann regretted that the im position had been necessary.
" In L e Jou rn a l du dim anche, 17 July 1994.
12 Le Monde, 9 February 1997 .
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governed his work in the field of collective memory, and he proved it to be largely 
correct.
Klarsfeld was representative of a number of his fellow Jews who dedicated 
themselves to preserving the memory of genocide. Their work, as Klarsfeld's Mémorial 
suggests, was usually systematic, and precise, as well as being specific to Jews. Another 
example was Gérard Gobitz, a former deportee, who undertook a statistical study of 
Jewish deportation from the Southern zone. He started drawing up lists bearing the 
names of every Jewish deportee, and, after "finishing" an administrative department, 
transferred the names to physical memorials such as plaques and monuments.The 
monument for the department of the Haute-Garonne was inaugurated in January 1991 in 
the presence of Lionel Jospin and André Méric, ministers for education and ex- 
servicemen respectively. Thanks to Gobitz's research, the figure of 910 Jewish 
deportees, including forty two children, was set in stone. The fact that the Vichy 
government was involved was also recorded for posterity.
At the same time it was recognised that a purely partisan Jewish memory would 
lack historical credibility. So in parallel with the developments outlined above there 
were attempts to put new research on a truly scientific footing. In 1979, the year of the 
creation of the Fils et filles des déportés juifs de France, the Centre de documentation 
juive contemporaine organised a conference in Paris on the theme of the Jewish 
experience of war and occupation. The scale and prestige of the event lent welcome 
respectability to Jewish history of the period. Since then, French historiography of the 
Holocaust has been extremely healthy. The prix de la Shoah, awarded each year in 
recognition of historical excellence, is regarded as one of the most prestigious awards 
available to war historians.
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p.470.




One of the consequences of this affirmation of a specifically Jewish memory was 
a change in the sense attributed to the emotive word "deportation". Where once 
deportation had been strongly associated with active opposition to the Etat français, the 
word was being increasingly used interchangeably with Jewishness. The account in Le 
Monde of the 1994 Deportation Day ceremony illustrates this semantic slide. The article 
contained a description of the deportation memorial on the lie de la Cité, on which 
"flottaient des oriflammes rayés de bleu et blanc commes les uniformes des déportés, 
portant les noms des camps de la solution finale"}^ But by no means all the deportees 
were victims of Hitler's final solution, which was only applied to the Jews. For the 
correspondent, deportation was associated with its Jewish victims, to the exclusion of 
the other categories of deportee.
Just as the different forms of remembrance had been reluctant to identify the 
perpetrators precisely, they had been less than accommodating, too, of the precise 
identity of the victims. Yet after the war Jewish deportees had been subsumed within 
the totality of deportees and other "victimes du nazisme". Officially, Jewish deportees 
had no separate status, and no separate commemorative practice, despite accounting for 
more than half of all French deportees. The departmental deportation monument for 
the Yonne, officially opened in 1949, exemplified the prevalent attitude in that it 
airbrushed out antisemitic deportation. In fact, the Yonne memorial left out everything 
other than the Resistance. Its inscription paid homage to the deportees as part of "le 
monde combattant''. ^  ^
L e M onde, 26 April 1994; my italics.
The figures, as established by the secretary o f  state for ex-servicem en and the com ité  d 'h isto ire de  la  
S econde gu erre  m ondiale, were: 63 085 non-Je w ish deportees, o f  w hom  59%  returned, 75 721 Jewish  
deportees; o f  w hom  3% returned.
A s detailed by B arcellini and W ieviorka.
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In retrospect this tends to be explained rather cynically: France was ashamed of 
the way the Jews had been treated, and was anxious to obfuscate the specific nature of 
their persecution - the fact that they were deported, with the complicity of the French 
authorities, simply because of their race. The cynical interpretation is justified to some 
extent, but it is not the full story. Many deportees and other "rentrants", Jewish and non- 
Jewish, had a very republican conception of collective identity. For them it was 
genuinely a matter of principle that all the victims of Nazism be honoured and 
remembered in the same way, regardless of whether their victimhood was a 
consequence of their politics, their race, their acts of resistance, or simply having been 
in the wrong place at the wrong time. A poster of 1945 depicted a prisoner of war, a 
deportee and an STO worker supporting each other, under the slogan, "Ils sont unis: ne 
les divisez pas!" The poster suggests that the calls for unity were not simply an excuse 
to avoid dealing with antisemitic persecution. In any case, the Jewish deportees who had 
survived and returned to France were shocked to find that the Vichyite methods of 
categorisation were still being applied. The authorities had decided to divide deportees 
into three categories: déporté résistant, déporté politique and, for the Jews, déporté 
racial, Jewish deportees had to struggle in order to have the third category annulled.
During the tense post-war period it was feared that the important issues might be 
compromised if each "community" of deportees started to affirm its own unique history, 
and if there were a struggle for pre-eminence among the deportees. This fear was 
nourished by the division, in 1945, of the former deportees into rival federations, of 
which two were dominant. The Fédération nationale des déportés et internés, résistants 
et patriotes was dominated by communists (some of whom were Jewish). The
One o f  the leading players at the tim e was Henry Bulaw ko, w ho explained som e o f  these points in the 
interview  o f  19 April 1999.
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Fédération nationale des déportés et internés résistants was more Gaullist in 
character.T hese organisations were often at loggerheads in the years that followed.
So in the beginning there was little enthusiasm for any initiative that sought to 
make Jewish deportees a category apart. In February 1949 the French president Vincent 
Auriol unveiled a plaque on the synagogue at rue de la Victoire in Paris. The plaque 
bore the following inscription: "A la mémoire de nos frères combattants de la guerre et 
de la Libération, martyrs de la Résistance et de la Déportation, ainsi qu’à toutes les 
victimes de la barbarie n a z i e " Jewish deportees were not remembered as a specific 
group, even on the wall of a synagogue!A t the unveiling ceremony the head of the 
Paris Consistory, the rabbi Georges Wormser, said that "nous entendons honorer 
aujourd’hui, sans distinction de confession ou d'appartenance, tous ceux qui sont tombés 
pour elle (la p a t r i e ) Significantly, this lieu de mémoire was later largely disregarded 
in favour of less discrete places of remembrance such as the Holocaust memorial in the 
Marais or the memorial at the site of the Vél’ d'hiv’.
When it was opened in 1957, the memorial to the unknown Jewish martyr was 
one of the only physical memorials to make specific reference to French Jews. It placed 
the "Juifs de France" within a global Jewish memory of the Holocaust rather than within 
a narrative of French deportation. When the project was announced in 1952 it aroused 
the suspicion of the FNDIR, which questioned the wisdom of "differentiation": "le 
secrétaire général croit que la différenciation qui sera ainsi faite parmi toutes les
A ffiliated  to the F N D IR  w ere the U N A D IF  (U nion nationale des assoc ia tion s de  déportés e t d 'in tern és  
et fa m ille  and the A D IR  (A ssocia tion  des déportées in ternées de la  R ésistan ce). A lso  in existence w ere 
the FIAP (F édéra tion  in ternationale des anciens prison n iers po litiq u es)  and the A N FR O M  (A ssocia tion  
nationale  des fam illes  de résistan ts et o tages m orts p o u r  la F rance).
M y italics.
B arcellin i in Vingtièm e S iècle, n°45.
Annette W ieviorka, 1992, p .403. M y italics.
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victimes de la barbarie nazie ne desserve plus qu'elle ne serve, la mémoire de ceux qui 
tombèrent dans des conditions si atroces".
The first national "Deportation Day" commemoration was held on 24 April 1954, 
but there was no reference made to the Jews as a distinct category. And the evolution of 
the Deportation Day ceremony since its inception speaks volumes about the way in 
which the issue has been represented in France.^"  ^The official bodies were involved in 
an ongoing damage limitation exercise, by which they came to recognise that collective 
memory was a complex and fragmented phenomenon, and tried to expand the notion of 
"national memory" in order to cope with that fragmentation.
Until 1984 the official ceremony had always been held at the "Mémorial de la 
France combattante" at Mont Valérien. Mont Valérien was the principal execution site 
for the Parisian region, and many a feat of Resistance martyrdom had been 
accomplished th e r e .I t  was at this location, in November 1945, that one of the first acts 
of deportation commemoration had talcen place. Fifteen corpses were solemnly interred 
in a crypt built for the occasion. These remains were intended to symbolise "la France 
combattante". Two deportees were laid to rest there, hut they had both been members of 
the Resistance. While there was a space at Mont Valérien for the text of de Gaulle's 
appel du 18 juin, there was no room for those who had been deported because of their 
race, religion or political background.
For the deportation day ceremonies a symbolic urn was carried to Mont Valérien 
via the UNADIF^^ headquarters, the "chapelle des déportés" at St. Roch's Roman 
Catholic church, the Ministry for ex-servicemen, and the tomb of the unknown soldier.
F N D IR  bulletin o f  N ovem ber 1952, cited by Serge Barcellini in Vingtièm e sièc le , n°45. The mem orial 
w as renovated and extended in 1993, in order to heighten its pedagogical impact; it now  includes a 
library, archives, and exposition and conference rooms.
There had been a cerem ony on this day since 1952; it w as made official in 1954.
M ost notably perhaps, M issak M anouchian and 22 comrades were shot there in 1944.
Union nationale  des associa tions de déportés, internés et fa m ille s  de d isparus.
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As from 1957, the memorial to the martyr ju if  inconnu was also included in the pre- 
itinerary.^^
In 1985, as a more explicit acknowledgement of the fact that deportation was a 
multifaceted experience, the Deportation Day ceremonies were broadened. At the 
request of Jewish former d e p o rte e s ,a  specifically Jewish memorial was included in 
the main itinerary. It was also decided that, on the Saturday before the alloted Sunday, 
each of the six groups that were recognised could hold a ceremony in a lieu de mémoire 
of its choice. So Jewish deportees were commemorated at Drancy, Christians at Saint 
Roch's Church, those belonging to the Gypsy community at Montreuil Bellay, and so 
forth. There was even a separate ceremony at Fréjus for prisoners held in Japanese 
camps. Six torches, one from each of the ceremonies, were then brought together at the 
Mémorial du martyr ju i f  inconnu for a common ceremony, before crossing the Seine to 
the Mémorial des martyrs de la déportation. The third phase was held at the tomb of the 
unlcnown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe. The ceremonies were presided over by the 
minister for ex-servicemen.
The intention was to do justice to the two conflicting interpretations of 
deportation: the general and the specific. The deportation memorial on the He de la Cité 
deliberately ignored the background of the deportees. In contrast, the whole point of the 
memorial to the unknown Jewish martyr was to recall that the Jews were singled out 
precisely because they were Jews, Just as the unlcnown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe is 
anonymous except for his Frenchness, the unlcnown Jewish martyr is anonymous except 
for his Jewishness. This was underlined by Serge Barcellini, who headed the
D etails o f  this paragraph in Serge Barcellini's article 'sur deux journées nationales com m ém orant la 
déportation et les persécutions des "années noires'", in Vingtième S ièc le  n°45 (1995).
Interview  o f  19 April 1994.
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commemorative arm of the ex-servicemen's ministry during this period.^^ He explained 
that "le jumelage des deux mémoriaux permet à la fois de souligner le fait historique 
global que représente la déportation et la tragique spécificité de la Shoah à l’intérieur de 
ce fait historique".
By the middle of the decade, then, the antisemitic aspect of deportation was 
officially taking its place within (or alongside) the national memory. This marked the 
beginning of the end of what Rita Thalmann has called "le mythe de l’unicité de la 
déportation".^^ Those who refused to recognise the new order were swiftly castigated by 
groups dedicated to preventing any backsliding. So it was that in 1986 the official 
communiqué issued by the FNDIRP^^ for Deportation Day was criticised by the 
"Agence télégraphique juive" for "banalisation" of the Shoah and for failing to allude 
directly to Jewish deportation. "Ce texte", said the counter-communiqué, "en ne 
mentionnant pas une seule fois le mot 'juif, occulte (. . .) la spécificité du martyr juif en 
oubliant de rappeler que les victimes juives ont été déportés non en tant qu’opposants 
politiques ou résistants, mais en tant que Juifs".
While their origins still determined the political orientations of the FNDIRP and 
the FNDIR, the intensity of that rivalry was weakening. This was partly a consequence 
of the downturn in the fortunes of the communist party and to a lesser extent the 
Gaullists. But it was also a reaction to the "threat" posed by the exclusively Jewish 
memory of deportation, which was fast becoming the dominant one. The rival 
federations realised that unity was now imperative. In the 1980s they started producing
The name o f  the service changed several tim es, but the m ost durable has been D éléga tion  à la  m ém oire  
et à l'inform ation h istorique.
In Vingtièm e S iècle , n°45.
Interview o f  3 June 1999. 'Le m ythe de l’unicité de la déportation' w as the title o f  an article that 
Thalmann wrote for Le M onde, but which was not published.
F édération  n ationale des déportés e t internés de la  R ésistance.
B arcellini in Vingtièm e S iècle , n°45.
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a common sta tem en t,and  laying a common wreath, for the annual Deportation Day. 
The "message commun" was intended to unify, but it was not signed by Jewish groups. 
These latter resented the fact that the communiqués made little or no reference to anti­
semitic deportation and genocide. The signatories, for their part, were determined to 
uphold the principle by which the deportees were "tous des victimes du nazisme", and 
were unwilling to give the Jews a special separate status.
The non-Je wish associations also cooperated in the creation of the Fondation pour 
la mémoire de la Déportation, established in 1990 to prolong the memory of 
deportation beyond the lifespans of the anciens. Jewish groups were not interested in the 
Fondation pour la mémoire de la Déportation, because they were looking towards their 
own Fondation de la Shoah, also set up in 1990. It appeared that the long-standing 
division between Gaullists and communists had been dealt with, only to be replaced 
with another, between Jewish and non-Jewish deportees.
Commemorating Vichy's crimes
So there is not much evidence that these modifications to the forms of 
remembrance were effective in safeguarding a unified approach. By the 1990s there was 
little cooperation between the Jewish associations and the others. Increasingly, the Jews 
saw themselves not as French victims but as victims of France. While the former 
participated in the Deportation Day ceremonies, they considered that it was not really 
"their" commemoration.^^ The establishment of the official commemorative day in July
That o f  1999 w as signed by: the A ssocia tion  des D éportés e t In ternés de la  Résistance', the F édéra tion  
N ation a le  des D ép o rtés  e t In ternés de la  Résistance', the F édéra tion  N a tion a le  des D ép o rtés  e t Internés, 
R ésistan ts et Patriotes', the Union N ationale des A ssocia tions de D éportés, In ternés e t F am illes de 
disparus', and the Union N ationale des D éportés, Internés et Victim es de G uerre.
Interview w ith Henry Bulaw ko, 19 April 1999. Bulaw ko regarded the F N D IR  as "antisemitic". He had 
more respect for the FND IR P, but said nonetheless that "je ne travaille plus avec eux". Rita Thalmann,
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1993 reinforced these orientations. Although no one says such things directly, in talking 
to those involved one realises that non-Jewish associations suspected that the Jews 
wanted to make deportation and Judaism synonymous, in the hope of winning sympathy 
and influence; while the Jewish groups believed that the others - particularly the 
Resistance fraternity - were bitter because they no longer enjoyed the power and the 
hold over the public imagination they once had. All this was magnified by the media, so 
that when one particular memory was "on top" the others felt that they were being 
ignored completely. This created animosity between the "rival" groups, and increased 
the determination to have "our own" memory prevail over those rivals. Jewish memorial 
activist Henry Bulawko bore witness to the existence of this phenomenon when talking 
about the strength of the memory of the Jewish experience and the relative weakness of 
the "France combattante" narrative. He had no compunction about referring to 
"revenge" for the lack of consideration given to the specifically Jewish experience in 
earlier times.
These misgivings were increased by the new day of commemoration established 
in 1993. After all, the petitionists of 1992 had called for "une journée nationale de 
commémoration des persécutions et des crimes perpétrés contre les Juifs". This 
exclusive reference did not appear in the decree, but it was obvious that the Jews were 
foremost in everyone's mind. To counter the risk of monopolisation, Jean Daniel 
proposed that the 16 July be "universalised", to become a day on which all minorities 
present in France "qui peuvent être un jour victimes de bourreaux" could come 
together.^^
Jew ish academ ic, LICRA activist and specialist on the m em ory o f  the war, did not leave the FNDIRP, but 
said that "j'ai dû avaler beaucoup de couleuvres" in remaining a member. (Interview  o f  3 June 1999.) 
Interview o f  19 April 1999.
N ou vel O bserva teu r  8 July 1993, quoted by Barcellini.
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The mainstream associations of deportees regarded the new commemoration as 
superfluous. The FNDIR regretted the innovation because "elle fait double emploi avec 
la Journée de la déportation"; the FNDIRP, for its part, reaffirmed that "la journée du 
dernier dimanche d'avril restera (. . .) le grand moment de la mémoire en hommage à 
toutes les victimes de la déportation".^^ In private, representatives of these groups were 
more vehement in their criticisms. Talking on a one-to-one basis, M. Voutey of the 
FNDIRP was much more forthright in his opposition to the new commemoration than 
the federation's official statements would suggest.^^ He also regretted that the "logique 
communautaire" seemed to be going from strength to strength. Publicly, however, they 
had to be moderate in order to avoid the trap of playing into the hands of the extreme 
right, which would stand to gain from any major confrontation. The Lepenist newpaper 
Présent had tried to stir things up by describing the decision to establish another 
commemoration as "un acte de guerre civ ile",w hile  Jean-Marie Le Pen opined that "il 
n'est pas utile de rouvrir les plaies"."^*
So Serge Klarsfeld was not entirely correct in his prediction that Mitterrand's 
decree would encourage national reconciliation, that it would "mettre fin à un 
malentendu entre la communauté juive et la communauté n a tio n a le K la rs fe ld 's  
conception of two communities, a "Jewish" one and a "national" one, was in itself 
controversial, but was representative of the philosophy of many Jewish and other 
minority groups, and many sections of the media."^  ^ Shelomo Selinger's centrepiece 
sculpture, unveiled at Drancy in 1986, typified the new approach in that it contained an
B arcellini in Vingtièm e S iècle, n°45.
Interview  o f  23 March 1999.
5 Februaiy 1993.
L e M onde, 5 February 1993.
B arcellin i in Vingtièm e S iècle , n°45.
On F rance  5 on 16 July 1993 Jean Kahn, president o f  the CRIF {con seil re p ré se n ta tif  des institu tions 
ju iv e s  de F rance), w as introduced as a representative o f  "la comm unauté juive". The term was also used 
in an earlier new s programme on the sam e channel.
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inscription in Hebrew as well as in French. The language of the Republic was not seen 
as the only appropriate means of expression. The symbolism of the sculpture was 
borrowed from Jewish tradition: the tliree blocks of the monument formed the Hebrew 
letter "Schin", inscribed above the doorway of Jewish homes; the cube shape on the 
head of the central figure represented the "téfilin", the Jewish symbol of prayer; and the 
ten stylised figures composing the sculpture made up the number required for "minyan", 
or collective prayer."^ "^
From a Republican perspective this gave rise to a dilemma. Should it consider that 
communautarisme was a reality within the Republic, and take the appropriate measures 
to recognise the communities? Or should it stick to pure Republican principles and 
refuse to recognise any community mediation between the state and its citizens? 
Initiatives such as the decree of February 1993 appeared to take the first direction, yet 
there was never any formal recognition of a communitarian philosophy. The term 
"Jewish community" was never used, and the Republic had to remain one and 
indivisible. Officially, the collective memory of the Republic, as expressed by 
commemorative practice, had been expanded, not sub-divided.
The significance of the decree of 4 February 1993 is that it broke with a long 
tradition, as old as the concept of the nation-state: for this national commemoration was 
no longer primarily in the service of an exemplary national identity. To quote Serge 
Barcellini, it transformed the notion of national commemoration "en rompant avec les 
commémorations identitaires"."^^ Essentially what he is talking about is the raison d'etre 
of commemoration in a nation-state like France. What is the priority? Is it simply to 
remind the nation's citizens of what unites them and enable them to forget past quarrels?
Explained by Salinger on w ebsite o f  "Conservatoire Historique du camp de Drancy" 
(http://w w w .chez.com /cam pdrancy/).
45 Vingtième Siècle, n °45 .
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Or is the priority to ensure that each group or community is able to commemorate its 
own unique, authentic experience?
One of the problems about adopting a specific, compartmentalised approach to 
collective memory is that it can become a never-ending process. One can identify the 
Jews as a specific persecuted minority in Vichy France, but, having done that, the next 
step would be to recognise that it was essentially the non-integrated Jews who were 
persecuted. Those who had lived in France for centuries, spoke French perfectly and 
had often moved up the social ladder could be put in a separate category from those who 
had arrived recently in France from Eastern Europe, spoke French as a second language 
or hardly at all, and struggled to make a living. While France had allowed these people 
to come and live on its territory, the process of Republican integration had not yet taken 
effect. The Eastern Jews were seen as outsiders by most French people, including 
French Jews. For the moment the Jewish community has not been keen to take 
specificity to this next stage, just as the French state and the mainstream deportees were 
initially unwilling to take specificity to its first stage.
The process by which a specifically Jewish memoiy gained recognition is 
inseparable from the process by which the French collective memory incorporated an 
element of self-criticism (detailed in chapter four). So complete was the recovery of the 
memory of the French-Jewish experience that by the end of our period it would have 
been difficult for younger generations to conceive of a time when it was undervalued. 
Indeed, of the three official national commemorations of World War Two officially 
recognised, two - the Deportation Day in April and the Vél' d'Hiv' anniversary in July - 
recalled in some way the anti-semitic nature of Vichy and Nazism. (The other was the 8 
May commemoration of the final defeat of Nazi Germany.)
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In an ideal world, the French collective conscience would have incorporated 
revelations of antisemitic persecution as a necessary adjustment to a previously 
distorted memory. The heroic aspects would have simply ceded some ground to the less 
heroic aspects; the monolithic national framework for remembrance would have 
admitted some community-based diversity. Former CRIF president Théo Klein claimed 
that the development of a specifically Jewish memory of wartime France need not 
efface any o th e rs ,b u t this is to overestimate the subtlety and adaptabilty of collective 
memory, and its capacity to take on board apparently contradictory elements. When the 
pendulum starts to swing it does not stop in the middle, but swings as far again in the 
opposite direction. The danger of this occurring with regard to Vichy began to alarm 
some people. In 1992 the rabbi David Farhi even found it necessary to remind people at 
a memorial ceremony that the Jews were not the only ones who had been deported. "II 
ne faut pas oublier la communauté tsigane et les résistants français", he u r g e d .More 
recently Simone Veil, herself a survivor of antisemitic deportation, also warned that 
Resistance deportees must not be forgotten .W ho, in the 1950s or the 1960s, would 
have thought it possible that one day a rabbi would have to speak out on behalf of the 
French Resistance lest it be forgotten?
Claude Lanzmann, director of the documentary film Shoah, was also concerned 
enough about the trends outlined in this and the previous chapter to issue a call for 
balance in France. The irony was that people like Lanzmann, who had worked to make 
everyone aware of the reality of deportation and genocide, were seeing their roles 
reversed. Instead of endeavouring to qualify a positive mythology, they found 
themselves trying to prevent the implantation of a wholly negative one. Casting an
On Le G ra n d  D é b a t  'Faut-il oublier V ichy?', F rance-C ulture, 28  N ovem ber 1994.
Speech at Y om  Hashoah cerem ony on 30 April 1992 at the P la ce  des m artyrs ju ifs  du vélodrom e  
d'hiver {Le M onde, 3-4 M ay 1992).
M entioned by M. Perrot, president o f  U N A D IF . Interview o f  27 April 1999.
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experienced eye on France's fiftieth anniversary commemoration of the Vél' d'hiv' 
arrests, Lanzmann perceived that the self-critical instinct had indeed gone too far. If 
France had not been entirely "résistante", he said, she had not been totally "collabo" 
either: "il est tout aussi faux de céder à l'autre terme du manichéisme, comme on semble 
le vouloir aujourd'hui à l'instant de célébrer le cinquantième anniversaire de la grande 
rafle".
La Croix, more predictably perhaps, detected a tendency among the general public 
to detach Vichy from its wider context. It felt the need to remind people that "La 
destruction a son centre - c'est l'Allemagne nazie - et sa périphérie - les pays qu'elle 
occupe et donc la France", and regretted that, according to the version of events that 
seemed to prevail, "on est déporté par Vichy, gazé par V ich y " .T h ese  concerns were 
echoed by a number of specialists, including Renée Poznanski, in Les Juifs en France 
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, and Philippe Burrin in La France à l ’heure 
a lle m a n d e .Denis Peschanski alluded to an "interprétation réductrice" which tended to 
"appauvrir singulièrement la compréhension de l'Etat français en le réduisant à sa seule 
politique antisémite
The French state's guardians of memory did not talce to the new state of affairs 
with enthusiasm. At the Elysée, the increasingly community-orientated, self-critical 
reality had to be taken into account, but was eyed with suspicion. Privately Jean Kahn, 
who advised president Mitterrand on commemorative matters, has expressed resentment 
at the actions of what he saw as "fundamentalist" pressure groups, concerned only with 
advancing their own aims. Kahn was extremely critical of what he saw as a scurrilous
Le M onde, 17 July 1992. 
14-15 July 1992.
Paris: Hachette, 1997; Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995. 
1997 p .l2 .
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campaign to discredit Mitterrand personally.M itterrand loyalists felt that it was 
extremely unjust that Mitterrand should be pilloried where previous presidents were not 
troubled, particularly as he had been more respectful towards the Jewish memory of the 
war than had his predecessors. On the Vél' d’hiv' issue, Jean Kahn blamed the 
president's opponents, Jewish and non-Jewish, for deliberately putting Mitterrand in a 
difficult situation on a sensitive problem that was likely to turn even his own side 
against him.
Mitterrand himself was privately incensed at what he saw as a scurrilous 
campaign to discredit him by an over-influential hard core within the Jewish 
community. He realised that it would be counter-productive to give free range to his 
opinions in public, but, in 1999, Jean d'Ormesson claimed that the president had 
complained about the behaviour of an extremist "lobby j u i f Mitterrand had invited 
d’Ormesson to breakfast on the morning of Jacques Chirac's inauguration, on 17 May 
1995. According to d'Ormesson, the conversation turned to Mitterrand's friendship with 
Vichy official René Bousquet. "Vous constatez là", said Mitterrand, "l'influence 
puissante et nocive du lobby juif en France" . Jean Daniel, who was convinced that 
Mitterrand was not an antisémite, nonetheless confirmed that he had heard him use the 
expression "lobby ju i f  and "lobby sioniste". The president, said Daniel, did not mean to 
refer to the whole of the French Jewish community, but only the more vocal, right-wing 
element within it - the element that Daniel characterised as a "groupe de pression qui 
manifeste une arrogance quasi (. . .) américaine".
Interview s o f  March and April 1999.
In Le R ap p o rt G abrie l (Paris: Gallimard, 1999).
Extract in L e N ouvel O bservateur, 26 A u gu st-1 September 1999. 
Le N ou vel O bserva teur, 26  A ugust-1 Septem ber 1999.
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As far as the Elysée was concerned, there was a line that the Republic could not 
cross in dealing with its communities, just as there was a line that Mitterrand refused to 
cross in dealing with Vichy. This was apparent in his reaction to the Vél' d'hiv' 
controversy in 1992. In January 1994 President Mitterrand was invited to attend a 
ceremony to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the CRIF. The invitation was 
declined on principle: Jean Kahn's advice on this occasion was that "le président ne 
devrait honorer (la cérémonie) ni de sa présence ni même d'un message", since this 
would compromise the secular foundations of the Republic.
Serge Barcellini has complained that the revamped Deportation Day ceremonies 
(details given above, p. 148) soon proved to be "une réponse insuffisante à la montée de 
l'idéologie des droits de l'homme et à la poursuite de la course identitaire de la 
communauté j u i v e Similarly, when Jacques Chirac officially assumed responsibility 
on behalf of the state for the crimes of Vichy he was criticised by Kofi Yamgnane, 
former minister for "integration" under Mitterrand, and chairman of the "Foundation for 
Republican Integration". The essence of Yamgnane's criticism was that Chirac had 
betrayed the values of the Republic by pandering to communitarism. In making the 
apology to a specific ethnic group within the French nation, Jacques Chirac had 
recognised the existence of a "communauté juive", thus implicitly undermining "le 
principe fondateur du modèle français d'intégration républicaine".^^ Jean Kahn called 
Chirac's declaration "malheureuse" for the same reason.^^ We seemed to have reached a 
philosophical impasse here: in seeking to denounce, among other sins, Vichy's 
malicious flouting of the republican tradition of civic -  as opposed to ethnic - 
nationality, the new President was himself accused of flouting that republican tradition.
Vingtièm e S iècle, n°45.
Le M onde, 14 A ugust 1995. 




The Jewish experience was foremost among a number of distinct memories that 
had been marginalised by the dominant "national narratives", but which were finding 
space to assert themselves in a changing commemorative context. Again, it is clear that 
collective memory is bound up with the way in which the collective entity organises 
itself and thinks about itself. A more realistic attitude to national prestige and to the 
"indivisibility" of the Republic meant that other "difficult" memories were able to come 
to the fore. France was starting to remember officially that the "la France combattante" 
was not the definitive French experience; indeed, that it made more sense to talk of the 
diverse experiences of "les France"; and that the complex and problematic nature of war 
and occupation had to be aclcnowledged and confronted. This translated into changes in 
commemorative discourse and practice, which were more or less significant according 
to the episode or the group in question.
The Mitterrand years, then, were marked by a process of loosening of France's 
centralised state structure, which was thought to be too constricting, both for the regions 
and for France's ethnic, religious and linguistic minority groups. During the 1980s the 
new-found assertiveness of sub-national or supra-national groupings met with a 
willingness on the part of the state to allow that assertiveness to express itself. A "user- 
friendly" approach to the integration of minorities was one of the innovative features of 
socialist government. The theme of foreign participation in resistance to occupation and 
collaboration was seen as a perfect vehicle for the new approach. What better way to 
promote integration than by recalling the heroism of non-French Resistance fighters, 
and their crucial contribution to France's eventual liberation?
For many o f  the details that fo llow  I am indebted to Barcellini and W ieviorka’s P assan t, souviens- 
to i (Paris: Plon, 1995).
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Even more so than for other aspects of war commemoration, young people were 
the target group here. Indeed the national monument to Les Etrangers dans la 
Résistance at Besançon started off as a pedagogical ini t ia t ive . In 1989 the ministries of 
Education and Culture, along with the Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs 
immigrés et leurs familles (PAS) got together to sponsor a project for schools on the 
theme of foreign contributions to the French cultural heritage. Two schools in the 
twentieth arrondissement of Paris decided to create a wooden sculpture in honour of 
foreign résistants, and enlisted sculptor Jorge Soler to help them. The resulting 
sculpture was put on display at La Défense for an exposition entitled "Composition 
française", in 1992. It then went to the museum of Resistance in Besançon for its 
exposition on the theme of "les étrangers dans la Résistance". With the financial help of 
another socialist creation, the fonds de la commande publique, the wooden statue was 
then recast in stone and bronze. On 21 February 1993 a scale model of the proposed 
sculpture was presented to Kofi Yamgnane, secretary of state for Integration (a ministry 
created by Mitterrand), and M. Schwint, deputy mayor of Besançon. They were 
participating in a ceremony to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the execution of Affiche 
rouge foreign resisters.
The president, often accused of being evasive with regard to certain aspects of war 
and occupation, was keen to lend his personal support to the type of initiative dealt with 
here. In September 1993 he went to Besançon to unveil the completed monument to the 
foreign resistance fighters. In his speech he warned against the "tentation constante" of 
drawing a "xenophobic" distinction between French people who resisted and foreigners 
who resisted. This was a false distinction, he said, and one which Vichy had attempted 
to exploit at the time.
Inform ation in this paragraph taken from  Barcell ini  and W ieviorka ,  pp. 2 8 2 ,  2 8 3 .
161
162
The memory of the persecution suffered by travelling people in France was also 
reactivated in the 1980s. A key event was the appearance of Jacques Sigofs Un camp 
pour les Tziganes et les autres. Montreuil-Bellay, 1940-1945. It was first published in 
1983 and re-issued in 1994. In 1988 a monument was erected at Montreuil-Bellay 
(Loiret), in a joint venture between the municipality and the state that was partly 
inspired by Sigofs book. Even on this inscription, though, figures were vague: it refers 
to the internment of "plusieurs milliers" persons. There was also uncertainty over their 
precise fate. Evidence of systematic deportation and genocide of gypsies living in 
France is not conclusive. The inscription said only that they were "victimes d'une 
détention arbitraire".^^
In 1991 there were memorials erected at Poitiers (Vienne) and Jargeau (Loiret). In 
June 1991, a ceremony was held for the first time to commemorate an act of "genocide 
tsigane" (again the use of the term "genocide" is debatable) at Saint-Sixte (Lot-et- 
Garonne), in which a family of fourteen were massacred by the Germans. Following 
that innovation some gypsy associations started lobbying (so far unsuccessfully) for a 
memorial in Paris to gypsy internment and "genocide".
Clearly, the climate of the Mitterrand years was favourable to a reappraisal of 
minority memories, which could claim to have been unjustly neglected beforehand. It 
was also a time during which there was considerable political capital to be gained from 
being considered a "victim" of the extremist politics of the time. This situation gave rise 
to excesses: we have seen that the gypsy community had begun to talk of "genocide", 
and that people had come to equate deportation with antisemitism. Homosexual 
activists, for their part, were attempting to have themselves included amongst the
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .323. 
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .324.
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deportees, even though there had been no policy of deportation of homosexuals because 
of their sexual orientation. (In the annexed territories the situation had been different, 
but these were treated in the same manner as the rest of Germany and Austria.) This 
gave rise to a minor incident on the periphery of the 1994 Deportation Day 
commemoration. A few hundred activists staged a demonstration designed to draw 
attention to the paradox of "la mémoire oubliée des déportés homosexuels".^"^ Aecording 
to the leaflets being distributed, they had previously been snubbed by other deportees 
associations. The UNADIF had written to them in uncompromising terms, saying that 
"la reconnaissance que vous recherchez ne passe pas par un travestissement des faits 
historiques (. . .) Il n'y a aucune raison pour faire quelque place que ce soit aux 
homosexuels dans la déportation". In Le Déporté (UNADIF-FNDIR) of April 1999, 
Jean Manson stated categorically that "il n'y a eu en France aucun homosexuel déporté 
en tant qu'homosexuel".
In the post-war period the French camps in which "undesirables" had been 
interned had not figured at all prominently in official or popular memory. These camps 
had been set up before the war, and included Spanish republicans, communists, Jews, 
gypsies, and politically suspicious foreigners. The familiar signs a of resurgent memory 
- publications, films, creation of amicales, memorial plaques, ceremonies, projects for 
museums - began to appear in the late 1970s, and were abundant by the middle of the 
1980s. It was only in 1978 that the cemetery for the camp of Septfonds (Tarn-et- 
Garonne) had been opened. The plaque on the chateau de Vaudeurs (Yonne), where 
eighty one "éléments politiquement suspects" were interned, was put up by the ADIRP^^ 
in 1984. On the site of the former camp of Mauzac the memorial plaque was unveiled in
Le M onde, 26 April 1994.
A ssocia tion  départm en ta le  des internés, résistan ts et pa tr io tes.
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1985. At the site of the camp of Agde, in the Hérault, the monument dates from 1989. 
The stela at the former camp at Sabou (Dordogne) was unveiled on 22 April 1990.^^
In the "camp des Milles" (Bouches-du-Rliône) two distinct populations were 
interned successively, and this was to give rise to a minor "bataille de mémoire". From 
September 1939 until the spring of 1940 the camp's inmates were mostly enemy 
nationals, many of them Germans. From November 1940 the camp served as a transit 
camp for Jews. Between 12 August and 20 September 1942, notably, 2000 Jews were 
transfered to Drancy for deportation.^^
The memory of the camp was resuscitated at the beginning of the 1980s, when a 
historian rediscovered the site along with some fresco paintings by internees, notably 
Max Ernst and Hans Bellmer. Two associations were formed: the Comité de 
coordination pour la sauvegarde du camp des Milles and the Association européenne 
pour le souvenir du camp des Milles. The latter association tended to concentrate on the 
initial period of the camp, while the former put the accent on the second period. This is 
borne out by the inscription on the commemorative plaque it put up, which referred only 
to the period August-September 1942: "Souvenons-nous, août-septembre 1942, des 
trains quittaient ce lieu en emportant vers les camps de la mort en Allemagne, livrés 
volontairement aux hitlériens par le gouvernement de Vichy, mille neuf cent vingt 
hommes, femmes, enfants juifs, réfugiés d’Europe centrale et des Français internés au 
camp des Milles".
The French state felt it necessary to intervene to encourage the development of a 
global memory, thus subduing the rivalry between the two associations. In 1983 the site, 
an old tile factory, was placed on the state's inventory of historical monuments; in 1989
Information in this paragraph taken from Barcellini and W ieviorka, pp .316-319 . 
Barcellini and W ieviorka, p .320.
B arcell in i  and W iev iorka ,  p .320 .
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the ex-servicemen's ministry took possession of the workshop in which the frescos were 
discovered, and undertook to restore them.^^ In April 1989 the minister, André Méric, 
decided to create a memorial-museum of internment. However, the project was bogged 
down in the type of rivalries with which we are now familiar. The site of Gurs was 
chosen then rejected in favour of Rivesaltes, and there was talk of president Mitterrand 
presiding at an opening ceremony on Deportation Day in 1995.^^ Eventually the 
proposed site was changed again - to Le Vernet - before the memorial campaign finally 
ran out of momentum.^^
So while it seemed for a time that the memory of internment was about to make a 
spectacular comeback, this never quite materialised. In 1991 Serge Barcellini wrote that 
the previous year, 1990, had been the "coup d'envoi" of a revival, with, notably, projects 
for turning former camps into museums, as well as the proposed national m u s e u m . S o  
it must have seemed like a significant development at that time. Ultimately, however, 
there was no massive rehabilitation of the internees' experience as there had been of the 
Jewish experience.
Dealing with defeat
The collective memories of ethnic, religious or sexual minorities were not the only 
problematic ones. Certain experiences had been deprived of attention simply because 
they sat uneasily with the "national narrative" that had been propagated since liberation. 
Chronologically, the first anniversary of the Second World War had to be the 
declaration of war on Germany. Traditionally, however, this date, the 3 September
B arcellin i and W ieviorka, p .321.
D ocum ent dated 3 April 1991, sent from Serge Barcellini to Jean Kahn. Jean Khan's archives. 
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p .321.
D ocum ent dated 3 April 1991, sent from Serge Barcellini to Jean Kahn. Jean Khan's personal archives.
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1939, had received little commemorative attention. Plaques recalling the order to 
mobilise, given on 2 September 1939, are rare. Where they exist they are generally 
within regimental barracks, and were put up by veterans associations.
The ex-servicemen's ministry organised two ceremonies for the fiftieth 
anniversary. Curiously, the first of these had only a tenuous link with the event in 
question. In March 1989 a plaque was put up on the wall of the former Orsay station. It 
recalled that, "Entre avril et août 1945, un grand nombre de rescapés des camps de 
prisonniers, des camps de concentration, des camps de travail forcé, tous victimes du 
nazisme, furent, à leur retour, accueillis dans la gare d'Orsay, le plus important centre 
français de rapatriement".
The ceremony and the inscription owed much to the minister for ex-servicemen 
André Méric, who had been preoccupied since the end of the war with the status of 
"victims of Nazism". Méric was convinced that no differentiation should be made 
between the different categories of victim, and was committed to ending the selective 
nature of collective remembrance. Instead, he wanted to democratise the "hierarchy of 
remembrance"^^ that had implanted itself. This all-inclusive plaque was to be a lasting 
monument to these convictions. In such a way is official memory, in theory impersonal 
and representative of a collective experience, influenced by the personal convictions of 
its executives. This is one of the enduring paradoxes of any collective entity.
As expected the wording of the inscription was unacceptable to some 
representatives of former deportees. They pointed out first of all that most surviving 
deportees had been received at the Hôtel Lutétia, not Orsay Station, on their return; and 
secondly that, from those who had worked under the service du travail obligatoire to 
prisoners of war, to political or resistance deportees, there was a significant difference
B arce ll in i  and W iev iorka ,  p. 116.
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in the cause and nature of their "victimhood"/"^ Once again we encounter a familiar 
problem: should official, national commemoration impose this sort of amalgam, or is it 
better to draw distinctions according to the more complex historical reality?
The second ceremony, in September 1989, was a more grandiose version of the 
annual "rekindling of the flame" at the Arc de Triomphe. The ceremony was organised, 
as always, by the Fédération nationale des anciens combattants, prisonniers de guerre 
(FNCPG). It was traditionally a sombre and low-key affair, but in 1989 some 
concessions were made to the contemporary penchant for "memory-as-spectacle" as 
exemplified by that year's bicentenial of the French Revolution (see also chapter seven, 
p.234). Thus the ceremony at the Arc de Triophe featured thirty "figurants" dressed in 
military uniforms of 1939. An enlarged copy of the affiche de mobilisation was also 
placed in front of the Arc de Triomphe.
For obvious reasons the question of whether, and in what way, the disastrous rout 
of 1940 would be officially remembered was a vexed one. Former soldiers were keen 
that their battles be commemorated as fully as possible, since men had fought and died 
for France even if the end result was defeat. Since the war ended, in fact, veterans of the 
Battle of France, organised into two principal associations,^^ had been fighting for 
"rehabilitation", for a reinsertion into the wider narrative of "France's resistance to its 
enemies". Memorial plaques often made reference to the "resistance héroïque" of a
Letter o f  28  A ugust 1989 from G eorges Arjaliés, general secretary o f  the A m ica le  des R ésistants, 
p a tr io tes , em prisonnés à  E ysses  (affiliated to the FND IR P) to André M éric. Jean Kalin's archives.
N am ely  the A ssocia tion  nationale  des anciens com battan ts de la ligne M agin o t and the A ssocia tion  
nation a le  des anciens com battan ts F landres-D unkerque 40. (B arcellin i and W ieviorka, p .66 .)
167
168
particular r eg i m e n t . A s  one would expect, the fiftieth anniversaries were seen as a 
perfect opportunity to advance the process of rehabilitation.
On the whole, the French state, outwith the ex-servicemen's ministry, was less 
enthusiastic. In September 1989 Elysée counsellor Jean Kahn advised François 
Mitterrand that "il faudra mettre un frein à la vague de commémorations que laisse 
craindre le cinquantième anniversaire de 1940". He feared that the demands for official 
backing or presence would be too onerous for the president to fnlfill.^^ Also, in 
November of that year the ex-servicemen's ministry was to release a statement to the 
conseil des ministres and to the press, giving notice of its commemorative intentions for 
the following year. Initially, the passage that referred to the Battle of France took the 
epic tone: "La Bataille de France, avec ses défaites collectives et ses héroïsmes 
individuels, sera rappelé dans le cadre des commémorations nationales organisées sur 
les principaux champs de bataille". After discussion with the Elysée, the passage was 
redrafted to the shorter and more sober, "la Bataille de France: un hommage sera rendu 
aux 120 000 soldats tués sur le champ de bataille en mai et juin 1940".^^
The principal ceremony took the form of a musical tribute featuring music by 
composers killed in combat. It was held at the Marigny theatre on 10 May 1990. The 
musical ceremony was followed by a ravivage de la flamme at the Arc de Triomphe. 
Both ceremonies were attended by ex-servicemen, dignitaries and "des jeunes", but not 
by president Mitterrand. Serge Barcellini, at the ex-servicemen's ministry, had 
suggested that "la présence de M. le Président de la République (. . .) pourrait être (. . .) 
symbolique (. . .) pour la capacité de la France à rendre hommage à ceux qui sont morts
For instance the inscription on the m onum ent at Toul (M eurthe-et-M oselle) reads; "le 2 2 T  RI du 17 au 
22 juin 1940 opposa une résistance héroïque de Toul au bois de Chanot aux attaques de l'armée 
allemande". (B arcellin i and W ieviorka, p .65 .)




'en dehors de la victoire'". It was equally symbolic, then, that Mitterrand did not attend. 
He declared privately that "Je ne souhaite pas célébrer ees tristes jours que j'ai vécus". 
Instead a message was sent from the president, to be read by ex-servicemen's minister 
André Méric. At the Elysée every effort was made to ensure that the defeat of 1940 
would be seen in the wider context of war, oecupation and liberation, rather than as a 
tragedy in itself. In the words of Jean Kahn, the defeat was to be "replacée dans la 
perspective des événements qui l'ont suivie: résistance française, victoires alliées, 
libération du territoire".^^ So while the president avoided the commemorative ceremony 
of 10 May, he did pay homage to those who fought in the battles of Pont du Veurdre 
and Port-Vendres, where French troops had fought heroically to hold back the German 
advance.
Another difference of opinion emerged when the effusive ex-servicemen's 
ministry, along with diverse veterans' associations, mooted the idea of a special stamp to 
commemorate the battles of 1940. Reaction from other branches of the state was 
negative. The minister for postal services was reluctant to back a proposal "qui feraient 
référence à une période douloureuse de notre histoire et risquerait d’être mal perçue par 
l'opinion p u b l i q u e E l y s é e  adviser Jean Kahn agreed that "on ne peut songer à 
commémorer ni l'entrée en guerre de la France ni les guerres perdues" .The  idea was 
not taken any further.
Letter o f  8 March 1990 from Serge Barcellini to Jean Kalin; note o f  15 M arch 1990 from Jean Kahn to 
François Mitterrand. Jean Kalin’s archives.
N ote o f  30 October 1989 from Jean Kahn to François Mitterrand. Jean Kahn's archives.
N ote o f  15 Septem ber 1989 from M arie-A nge Theobald, chargé de m ission  at the P résiden ce  de la  
R épublique, to François Mitterrand. Jean Kahn's archives.
In note as above (15 Septem ber 1989, M arie-A nge Theobald to François Mitterrand).
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Imprisonment and forced labour
Since the vast majority of French prisoners of war attained that status after a 
humiliating defeat, their experience was never going to enjoy a privileged position 
within the nation's collective memory. They had no recognised day of remembrance to 
call their own, and most monuments and plaques were confined to cemeteries, excepting 
the "Memorial national de la captivité", erected in 1961 in Montauville (Meurthe-et- 
Moselle). There were no more than a handful of books on the prisoners' experience, 
compared to the thousands of studies of resistance or collaboration. Once again here we 
find that collective memory does not operate a system of proportional representation. 
There were 1 850 000 prisoners of war, compared to, at most, a few hundred thousand 
active resisters. But the resistance experience was much more dominant than that of the 
prisoners. It is true that imprisonment can be a rather monotonous affair, compared to 
the intrigue and drama sometimes involved in guerrilla warfare, and that those who 
were taken prisoner in 1940 had little impact on the outcome of the war. However, this 
does not fully explain the failure of popular consciousness to integrate the prisoners'
83experience.
In fact former prisoners of war associations, principally the Fédération nationale 
des prisonniers de guerre (FNPG), flourished after the war. Because of their numbers, 
as well as the solidarity and reflection that came from long-term imprisonment, the 
former prisoners’ strength and influence was an important force in post-war France. But 
that force was applied to the immediate problems of pensions, civil status of prisoners, 
the rights of widows, rather than to the "bataille de mémoire". Former prisoners were 
much more interested in rebuilding France than in dwelling on a frustrating period of 
captivity. Partly as a result of that captivity, indeed, there was a lot of pent-up energy
In Britain and the U nited States prisoners o f  war had the status o f  heroes in popular lore, partly thanks 
to film s like The G rea t E scape.
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waiting to be expended. This explains in part the success of the process of the post-war 
reconstruction of France. To this day, the FNPG emphasises its social and humanitarian 
projects more strongly than any memorial initiatives. The information pack produced by 
the federation devotes a page-long chronology to "sa politique sociale" and only four 
lines to "sa mémoire".
We have seen elsewhere how the notion of "la France combattante" was essential 
to the post-war French mindset. Former prisoners of war, therefore, were keen to recall 
that before being prisoners they were soldiers. In 1963 the FNPG added the word 
combattants to its name, becoming the Fédération Nationale des Combattants 
Prisonniers de Guerre. This fitted in with the federation's presentation of itself as an 
"emblème du monde combattant".^^
Some prisoners of war escaped from the camps and established resistance 
movements. The memory of these heroes is faithfully preserved, although they are not 
household names for the layman. Foremost among these heroes is Antoine Mauduit, 
founder of "la Chaîne", a support network for escaped prisoners. François Mitterrand 
was involved in its organisation for a time. In August 1986 Mitterrand unveiled a plaque 
in memory of Mauduit at Montmaur castle, where "la Chaîne" was created in 1941.^^ 
The inscription described "la Chaîne" as "un des premiers maquis de combat". Again, 
the memory of the prisoners of war is linlced to that of the Resistance, and therefore "la 
France combattante".
F ollow in g  the colonial wars in North A frica more prisoners w ere allow ed  to jo in  the federation. The 
full name is now  la  F édéra tion  N ation ale  des C om battan ts P risonniers de G uerre e t C om battan ts  
d'Algérie, Tunisie, M aroc.
From press release kindly supplied by M. Girard o f  the FNPG.
B arcellin i and W ieviorka, p .l2 7 . The inscription reads, "Commandant A ntoine M auduit, 1902-1945; 
officier de la légion  étrangère, créateur du m ouvem ent "la Chaîne" 1941, un des premiers maquis de 
combat; co-fondateur du M N PG D; mort pour la France en déportation".
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In order to further the war effort, Nazi Germany required French labour for its 
factories. Initially, a call for volunteers was issued. However, when this proved 
ineffectual, it was decided that work in German factories would be made obligatory. 
The first departures came in June 1942, and the process was accelerated by the laws 
promulgated by the Vichy administration on 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943 
(which marked the official beginning of the Service du Travail Obligatoire) and 1 
February 1944. Between June 1942 and July 1944, 732,626 French men went to work in 
Germany under this scheme.
Subsequently, the former STO workers were not well placed in what Robert Frank 
has called the national "hiérarchie des souffrances".^^ Nonetheless, associations of 
anciens and families were created almost immediately after the war. On 12 September 
1944, the Entraide française pour les travailleurs déportés en Allemagne et leurs 
familles was founded. This became the Fédération nationale des déportés du travail on 
14 November 1945. The immediate priority was official status and pensions, but the 
memory of its "martyrs", that is to say those who died in Germany, was also among its 
principal concerns. The number of deaths was put at around 60 000, of whom 15 000 
were executed by the Germans.
The federation's first victory was quick and crucial: those who had died were 
deemed worthy of the title of "morts pour la France", and survivors were included 
within the category of deportees. Their names could, therefore, be put on the official 
war memorials, and their dependents' rights and allowances were more substantial. 
Partly to compensate for the lack of an STO corpse at the "France combattante" crypt at 
Mont-Valérien, the coipse of a "travailleur requis inconnu" was laid to rest at Père- 
Lachaise on 22 June 1947.
Robert Frank, 'la m ém oire em poisonnée', pp .492-493. 
A bove from B arcellin i and W ieviorka, p.437.
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There was a major setback in 1951 when a law was passed creating a separate 
statute of "personnes contraintes au travail au pays ennemi" for the former STO 
workers. Thereafter, much of the energy of the FNDT was devoted to this particular 
"bataille de mémoire". The struggle to be considered officially as "deportees" was 
fought in parliament and in court. However, February 1978 saw another reverse, when a 
Paris appeal court ruled that the FNDT could no longer legally use the term "déporté" in 
its title. It was forced to change its name to "Fédération nationale des victimes et 
rescapés des camps nazis du travail forcé".
When he was a presidential candidate in 1981 François Mitterrand had given to 
believe that he would support a change in the status of former STOs, but little was done 
until the early 1990s.^^ On 31 January 1992 the Cour de Cassation clarified the status of 
deportees in the following terms: "seuls les déportés résistants et les déportés politiques 
à l'exclusion des personnes contraintes au travail en pays ennemi pourront se prévaloir 
du titre de déporté". Then, in June 1993, a bill was proposed
tendant à remplacer dans l'inutilité de la loi n° 51-538 du 14 mai 1951 les mots: 'Personnes 
contraintes au travail au pays ermemi, en territoire étranger oceupé par l'ennemi ou en territoire 
français annexé par l'ennemi' par les m ots 'V ictim es de la déportation du travail'.^'
However, the bill did not survive its journey through parliament, and the STO 
associations did not succeed in advancing their cause.
Throughout France there were a number of stelae and plaques dedicated to the 
"déportés dll travail" who died in Germany. However, these had been erected by the 
FNDT rather than the state, whose attitude appeared to be somewhat ambivalent. Prior
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p.443.
A ccording to Jean Kahn.
D ocum ent distributed on 15 June 1993. Jean Kahn's archives.
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to 1993, the STO workers had been notable by their absence from the panoply of 
commemorative plaques at the gare de l'Est. In the 1950s a plaque had been erected in 
honour of the "patriotes français" deported from the station. Another commemorated the 
"prisonniers de guerre et déportés politiques". Later the fils et filles des déportés juifs de 
France had put up a plaque in remembrance of Jewish deportees.
The STO workers were reintegrated to some extent by the inclusive plaque at the 
musée d'Orsay, dedicated to "all the victims of nazism", which was unveiled in 1989 
(mentioned above, p. 166). At the gare de l'Est another plaque, financed by the ex- 
servicemen's ministry, finally appeared in 1993. This time it was specific to the memory 
of the victims of the STO. In accordance with the more rigourous memory that was 
being implanted at this time, the inscription was quite detailed, and included the exact 
dates of the laws establishing the STO. Indeed the unveiling of the plaque coincided 
with the fiftieth amiiversary of the promulagation of the law of February 1943.
There were isolated acts of resistance to the forced labour policy. Again these are 
generally commemorated by plaques, some of which were put up or updated for fiftieth 
anniversaries. In October 1989 André Méric and Jacques Mellick^^ unveiled a 
commemorative plaque at place Fontenay in Paris where, on 25 February 1944, a 
Resistance commando unit had destroyed the files relating to the next batch of potential 
STO w o r k e r s . A  similar plaque commemorating a similar incident was unveiled in 
Quimper (Finistère) on 16 January 1994.
So it was with differing degrees of success that the groups alluded to in this 
chapter attempted to reaffirm the importance of their unique experiences, and to make a 
lasting impact on the collective consciousness. French Jews certainly managed to make
M inisters for ex-servicem en and "the sea", respectively. The latter M inistry occupied  the buildings 
form erly occupied  by the com m issaria t gén éra l du trava il obligatoire.
Barcellini and W ieviorka, p .445.
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their memorial presence felt; other specific groups had a more mixed balance sheet. 
What is significant, however, is that so many different groups considered that that it was 
an opportune time for action. This is obviously due in part to the potential for increased 
exposure that anniversaries afford. But there was also a sense that the wider context was 
favourable to a reappraisal of the nation's past, to a broadening of the very concept of 
collective memory, and to a reworking of the relationship between specific group 
identities and national identity.
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C HAPTER SIX  
THE PAST APPLIED TO THE PRESENT
"The fashion in which we think changes like the fashion of our clothes, and . . .  it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for most people to think otherwise than in the fashion of 
their own period".
George Bernard Shaw, preface to Saint Joan
Commemoration as education
We have seen that commemorations are interfaces between the past, present and 
future, permitting the transmission of values enshrined within memory. This process 
ensures a degree of continuity from generation to generation, and provides the 
psychological coherence and direction that all collective entities require. The multitude 
of bonds - political, moral, social, intellectual, physical - that tie the individual to the 
group are reinforced by the emotional gravitas of solemn ceremony and the "culte des 
morts", or equally by joyous celebrations of the common past. In France, this has been 
linlced to a long tradition of "commemorative pedagogy", at least as old as the Republic 
itself. The Revolution had barely got under way when already the fête révolutionnaire 
was commemorating it. This form of celebration was called upon to become nothing 
less than 'Tinstitutrice de la nation", inculcating the new national and republican values 
and forming the masses into citizens.^ In Pierre Nora's Lieux de Mémoire there is a 
photograph of a group of Third Republic schoolchildren taking part in a ceremony at a




cenotaph. The photograph carries a caption which confirms these ideas: "Le culte 
civique est en même temps leçon de morale. D'où l'importance de la participation des 
enfants".^
In the wars of the twentieth century the loss of life, often innocent civilian life, has 
been so horrifyingly massive that it would seem utterly absurd and demoralising if it did 
not serve a purpose as a "lesson" for the future. The human mind can cope with almost 
anything, but has a powerful aversion to any ordeal that appears completely futile, that 
could be construed to have happened "in vain". Nothing would be less acceptable than 
to leave even a suspicion that death on such a scale could be meaningless, or that we can 
learn nothing from it. One of the golden rules of war remembrance is that the dead must 
be seen to have died for  something: freedom, human rights, honour, la patrie? Thus one 
of the express aims of commemorating the past is to project the lessons learned and the 
values exemplified onto the present, and from there into the future. Organisers tend to 
be anxious that commemorative events be seen not merely as moments of mourning for 
the dead or as nostalgic reunions of les anciens. They must also be seen to be 
contributing something positive to the present.
While all commemorations have in common a mission to educate, to pass on a 
message, they are not simply school lessons writ large. The other side of the 
commemorative coin is emotion, or attacliment. Commemoration is not history. The two 
can sometimes compliment one another, and commemoration can help to inspire 
historical enquiry but, because of the emotional commitment alluded to above, it can 
also be an obstacle to it. The memorial complex at Mont-Valérien provides a succinct 
example. Mont-Valérien had been the execution site used by the Nazis for résistants
 ^ vol.I, p .197.
 ^ Here I am paraphi'asing Robert Franlc, w ho said that "rien ne serait plus insoutenable que de laisser 
croire que des centaines de m illiers jeunes gens se sont sacrifiés pour rien" (C N R S, p .373).
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from the Parisian region. There was great uncertainty over the number of people who 
were shot there, but in November 1944 de Gaulle laid a wreath which paid homage to 
4000 martyrs. On 2 November 1959 a commemorative stone was unveiled in the middle 
of the "clairière des fusillés". It put the number of executed resistance fighters at 4500. 
Yet the three most reliable historical studies that were carried out, in 1945, 1986 and 
1989, concluded that there were, respectively, 939, 953 and 1039 victims.'^
So we do not commemorate as a dispassionate academic exercise, but because the 
events remembered engage the group emotionally, however vague, ill-defined or uneven 
that emotion may be. It is the double thrust of these motors - pedagogy and emotion - 
that gives commemorations their force and their raison d ’être. The practice of 
commemoration is a quintessentially human activity in that it occupies the no man's 
land between the rational and the irrational, between the scientific and the spiritual. It 
combines all the primitiveness of a cult of the dead with the humanistic ambition to 
master man's destiny by learning from his history.
These themes were touched on by all of the acteurs de mémoire that I spoke to 
during my research. Each one of them pointed out that people who had participated in or 
observed war and occupation in France were becoming rarer all the time, and that it was 
essential that a certain "message" and certain "values" be transmitted to those who had 
not lived through the events in question. (Incidentally most of these interviewees were 
optimistic that their message had been understood.)^ And it is this demographic shift 
that explains the growing preoccupation with the pedagogical aspect of commemoration 
of the Second World War. At the time of the fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p. 166. The studies referred to w ere carried out by Robert D or (21 February 
1945), Serge Klarsfeld (1986), and the D éléga tion  à la m ém oire et à  l'inform ation  h istorique  (1989).
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celebrated during our period, les anciens were in a minority. By 1994, 70% of the 
population of France had not been born at the Liberation, far less been of an age to 
understand or participate.^ Formerly, les anciens had often used commemorations to 
remind the nation of their numerical or moral strength. This, in turn, made it easier to 
exert pressure with regard to pensions and other rights. By the 1980s, this aspect had 
become less important. The last members of the war generation felt more keenly than 
before an obligation to ensure the transmission of memory before it was too late. There 
was a quite natural desire on the part of this generation to tell its own story in its own 
words. François Mitterrand's actions during his second septennat, notably his 
cooperation with Pierre Péan to reveal his right wing and Vichyite past, would certainly 
corroborate that interpretation. In most of the fifteen speeches Mitterrand gave at 
commemorative ceremonies between 17 June 1993 (the liberation of Corsica) and 9 
May 1995 (the end of the war in Europe), there was some kind of reaffirmation of the 
necessity of passing on the memory of that period.^ Especially resonant was his 
quotation of Pierre Brossolette's words at a ceremony marking the fiftieth anniversary of 
his death: "Ce que demandent nos morts, ce n'est pas de les plaindre, mais de les 
continuer".^
Although the lessons and values do not concern young people exclusively, it is 
they who are targeted most explicitly. In his contribution to a 1986 CNRS study on the 
subject François Marcot observed that, "Depuis quelques années (. . .) on constate que 
se développent des pratiques festives ayant pour but d'associer les jeunes aux
 ^ Jean-Jaques de B resson was a notable exception  to the general optim ism . H e expressed  concern that the 
values defended by de G aulle, particularly during the war, were being eroded by social changes 
(Interview o f  21 M ay 1999).
 ^This fact w as m entioned by François Mitterrand in his speech o f  22 March 1994 com m em orating the 
heroic suicide o f  Pierre Brossolette.
’ T exts o f  speeches kindly supplied (and com m ented) by Jean Kahn o f  the Institu t F rançois M itterrand. 
(In fact, M. Kahn w rote or helped to write m ost o f  these speeches.)
® Speech o f  22  March 1994.
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manifestations"^. His observation is borne out by the evidence. In 1993 François 
Mitterrand issued his decree instituting a "journée nationale commémorative" of Vichy's 
crimes (details in chapters four and five). He had been expected to make some sort of 
official declaration, but chose the commemorative option because of its more durable 
"valeur pédagogique".^^ On 3 November 1993 the ex-servicemen's ministry released a 
communiqué announcing its plans for the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary 
commemorations. According to this communiqué, these commemorations would have 
"une double finalité". On the one hand they were to "honorer des faits d'armes". On the 
other hand they were to "instruire les jeunes générations (. . .) en les appelant à la 
vigilance à l'égard des comportements ou des idéologies qui ont été la cause de tant de 
crimes et de souffrances".^^
Similarly, Jacques Chirac announced on the fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation 
of Paris that "je souhaite que les Parisiens mais aussi tous les Français, et surtout les 
plus jeunes, voient dans cette célébration un témoignage de courage, de persévérance et 
une leçon pour l'avenir". Seven thousand young people participated in the show on the 
Champs-Elysées on 26 August. Entitled "Libération, j'écris ton nom", it was based on an 
extract from Charles de Gaulle's mémoires, and featured the music of Jean-Michel Jarre 
(presumably an attempt to "jazz up" the event for young people).
There was a strong pedagogical flavour to all the commemorations dealt with in 
this study. As part of the "aimée de Gaulle" of 1990,'^ the organisers harnessed an 
already successful formula for involving young people, the annual concours national de 
la Résistance et de la Déportation. For the 1989-1990 school year the theme of the
V-36,
Le M onde, 5 February 1993.
“  From Jean Kahn's archives; my italics.
P aris-M atch , 1 Septem ber 1994; m y italics.
The one hundredth anniversary o f  his death, the fiftieth o f  the a p p el du 18 ju in ,  and the twentieth o f  his 
death all fell in 1990.
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concours was the life and times of de Gaulle. The numbers of pupils participating were, 
according to the Charles de Gaulle Institute, exceptionally high. Also in this year, the 
Ministry of Education cooperated with the Charles de Gaulle Institute on a series of 
educational projects aimed at furthering knowledge of the same subject. And, in each 
académie, the Charles de Gaulle Institute and the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent 
organised a system of contacts between témoins - essentially those who had fought on 
de Gaulle's side in the war - and school pupils wishing to learn about their 
experiences.^^
Jean-Pascal Lévy-Trumet, coordinator of the 1994 commemorative project in 
Normandy, declared himself to be primarily concerned with "la transmission du 
souvenir aux jeunes générations".^^ Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, the president of France- 
Télévision, was very much aware of the need for an educational dimension to 
television's treatment of the 1994 anniversaries. Previewing his company's programmes 
he said that the aim was to "participer à l'enrichissement de la mémoire collective". He 
hoped especially that the various programmes would become "une collection de 
cassettes pour les générations futui*es".
There were many other pedagogical projects, too numerous to list fully. One of 
the most notable was the Franco-American University at Abbaye d'Ardenne, near Caen. 
It was inaugurated during the commemorative period of 1994, by Henry Kissinger. The 
purpose of this establishment was to provide facilities for young people from the USA 
and other countries to come to Europe in order to learn about the Second World War, 
and to propagate an internationalist message of peace and tolerance. Similarly, the state- 
of-the-art memorial complex in Caen had been conceived from the outset as a piece of
Jean-Louis Matharan, 'Les enseignem ents des projets d'activité éducative et du concours de la 
Résistance', in M alet, éd., I, p .390.
181
182
pedagogical apparatus.'^ The hundreds of thousands of school children who visit are 
provided with a workbook to complete, adapted to their academic level, and there is a 
brochure produced each year giving details of the "activités pédagogiques" taking place 
that year.
On the eve of the momentous anniversary year of 1994 the Education nationale 
gave detailed instructions to its teaching staff on how to deal with the commemorative 
period. These instructions were accompanied by a call for prudence. An effort must be 
made to avoid imposing a cult of memory for its own sake: "Autant les jeunes sont 
touchés par l'évocation des destins individuels fauchés par la guerre, autant la 
célébration pour elle-même qui impose aux jeunes générations d'entrer dans le culte du 
souvenir par l'admiration contrainte, est artificielle et f i g é e " . Teachers were asked to 
encourage reflection on what were now deemed to be the important themes -  freedom, 
dignity, human rights, the "devoir de mémoire", vigilance, forgiveness.
The ex-servicemen's ministry attempted to provide a forum for all this 
pedagogical activity. Its monthly bulletin. Les Chemins de la mémoire, featured a 
section entitled "Mémoire et éducation" ■ which was devoted to exhibitions, 
presentations, discussions and other memorial projects organised in educational 
establishments throughout France. A brief glance at some of the commemorative events 
organised for the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Paris gives a flavour of what 
was offered. The municipal authorities took the step of distributing information on 
commemorations to all of its collèges and lycées; during the showpiece commemoration 
the message of the main public "spectacle" was directed primarily at those who were too 
young to have Icnown the war. The marche des libérateurs that was organised on the 25
L e M onde, 15 March 1994. The agency, "Travaux publics", had been chosen  from  a shortlist o f  four by  
m inister o f  culture Jacques Toubon. The cost o f  the spectacle was thiity m illion  francs, shared betw een
the culture m inistry and the co llec tiv ités loca les  o f  Basse-Norm andie. 
The m useum  w as opened by François Mitterrand on 6 June 1988.
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August in Paris was intended quite simply to "transmettre aux jeunes générations le 
souvenir et l'Histoire"/^
By this time, then, "pedagogy" had become a ready made justification for any 
initiative involving history or memory. By the same token it had become an effective 
platform from which to criticise initiatives one disagreed with. Speaking on France- 
Culture in 1994, Michel Winock's main objection to François Mitterrand's practice of 
laying a wreath at Pétain's tomb was that it constituted an "acte anti-pédagogique".^^ 
When one considers the number of potential lines of criticism open to him, Winock's 
words go some way towards conveying the extent to which the educational aspect of 
memory and commemoration was a preoccupation during our period. Moreover, the 
presenter of the radio programme in question, Patrice Gélinet, confirmed the tendency, 
and underlined the importance attributed to commemorative gestures, by claiming that 
Mitterrand's anti-pedagogical gesture "counted more than any book" in terms of the 
negative impression made on the collective appreciation of the war and occupation.
Memory as "devoir'^
Not only was the educational dimension starting to predominate, its character was 
undergoing a significant change. Traditionally it had been assumed that young people 
should be given examples to follow. They should be told about heroic figures, such as 
de Gaulle, Jean Moulin, Lucie and Raymond Aubrac, Pierre Broussolette, that they 
would naturally want to imitate. The wartime heroes and heroines tended to be 
presented in a style that owed more to "boy's own" type story books than historical 
journals. Serge Barcellini has called this "la pédagogie gaulliemie de l'honneur national"
D esquesnes, p. 177.
L e F igaro , 24  A ugust 1994.
183
184
(also referred to in chapter three, p.78)/'^ But following the watershed period of the 
1970s^  ^ there had been a steady stream of writers and journalists seeking to reveal the 
dark side of the national heroes to a people loath to appear docile and gullible. 
Consequently, the pedagogical impulse started to take on a negative aspect: it often 
seemed that, if there was a lesson to be passed on, it was "don't be like your elders", and 
that the value of any remembered event increased in direct proportion to its 
unpleasantness. One of the more original memorial-pedagogical projects of 1993 was 
the "tour de la France de la mémoire". Organised by the Union des Etudiants juifs de 
France, the tour took in the sites of the principal camps of Jewish internment and 
deportation, as well as other lugubrious lieux de mémoire?^
Memory, articulated in these terms, was no longer a matter of giving people 
heroes to live up to and heroic achievements to aspire to. It had become nothing less 
than a moral obligation, and almost a categorical imperative - the famous devoir de 
mémoire?'^ The ethics of the devoir de mémoire, in so far as it relates to the Second 
World War, do indeed have a distinctly Kantian flavour: the act of remembering has 
value precisely because it is dictated by conscience, precisely because it is difficult to 
accomplish. In the introduction to his book about a rafle of Jewish patients at a 
sanatorium, published in 1993, Jo Amiel explained that for many years circumstances 
had prevented "ce que je ressentais comme une impérieuse obligation morale". Until the 
1990s he had been unable to carry out his "moral duty" of committing his memories to 
paper.^ "^
Participating in Le G ra n d  D éba t, 'Faut-il oublier V ichy?’, F rance-C ulture, 21 N ovem ber 1994.
In 'D iplom atie et comm émoration'.
Heralded by Ophuls' 1971 film  L e C hagrin et la p itié , and Robert Paxton's L a F rance de Vichy, 
published in France in 1973.
B arcellini and W ieviorka, p.471.
The term was introduced by Primo Levi in his writing on his experience o f  a N azi concentration camp. 
L a rafle: un san a très ordinaire 1942-1944; my italics.
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Other nations, such as Germany, had already been through this process; in France, 
it came later, arguably reaching its peak towards the end of the Mitterrand era. The high 
water mark was 1992 to 1993, not 1994. That is to say, the "devoir" was more pressing 
with regard to the fiftieth anniversaries of the Vél' d'hiv', the first deportations, the 
creation of the milice, and the torture and murder of Jean Moulin, than it was with 
regard to the Normandy landings, the Provence landings, and the liberation of the 
national territory. Remembrance of these things was not such a pressing devoir 
precisely because it came more naturally. The prime minister Edouard Balladur was 
almost obliged to use the expression in his speech at the Vél' d’hiv' memorial, on 16 July 
1993. Commemoration of Vichy's crimes was, he said, "un devoir de la morale, et un 
devoir de la mémoire
In May 1993, an audience of high school students was invited to take part in a 
television programme entitled "Paroles de résistants", thus exercising its "devoir de 
mémoire", even if, strictly speaking, young adults were not in a position to "remember" 
the 1940s. Again in 1993, a series of questions was set in parallel to samples of 
Americans, English and French nationals. One of them broached the issue of the 
importance or otherwise of laiowing the facts about the Holocaust: "D’après vous, est-il 
important que tous les Français (or Americans or English where appropriate) soient 
informés et comprennent ce qui s'est passé avec l'Holocauste: est-ce essentiel, 
important, un peu important, ou pas important?" The French were much more numerous 
in considering that it was essential: 45% of French respondants gave "essentiel" as their 
answer; 43% gave "très important"; amongst both the English and American sample 
groups, the results were less emphatic: 33% and 39% respectively.^^ In other words, the 
French believed more wholeheartedly than their English or American counterparts that
T elev ised  on F rance  5, 16 July 1993.
Louis-Harris for The Am erican Jew ish Com m ittee, N ovem ber 1993.
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to remember that terrible episode was necessary, not something that was merely 
important or desirable.
The survey also suggested that all the pedagogical activity in France had achieved 
positive results from the point of view of factual knowledge of the period. The results 
demonstrated that, far from being benighted by silence and taboo, the French were 
consistently better informed than their British and American counterparts. When asked 
what was meant by "The Holocaust", 35% of French, 33% of British and 24% of 
American people were able to give a completely accurate answer. Asked more detailed 
questions, the French performed even more impressively. 45% knew that around six 
million Jews were killed in the Holocaust, compared to 41% in Britain and only 35% in 
the US; 90% Imew that Auschwitz, Dachau and Treblinka were concentration camps, 
compared to 76% and 62%; 88% knew that Jews were forced to wear the yellow star, 
compared to 56% and 42%; 94% considered it "impossible" that the Holocaust never 
happened, compared to 84% in Britain and a disquieting 65% in the USA. One could of 
course argue that the French had had first hand experience of some of these things, such 
as the yellow star of David, and that they therefore had good reason to be familiar with 
the facts. Also, the questions did not focus specifically on France's role. Nevertheless, 
the results of this survey confirm that, in comparative terms, the lessons of the 
Holocaust were being passed on effectively in France.
It was in 1993, also, that the baccalauréat examiners caught on to the Zeitgeist. 
The questions in the Philosophy paper often try to strike a balance between timeless 
questions and contemporary issues. It was fitting, then, that the paper set for June 1993, 
when there was animated discussion around Bousquet, Touvier, and the French
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internment camps, not to mention chouan risings in the Vendée, should have included 
the question, "Pourquoi y a-t-il un devoir de mémoireT'^^
Apart from being thought-provoking, the question is also extremely revealing, 
because it points to an important assumption: that the issue of whether the obligation or 
duty exists is already resolved, and it only remains to determine why it exists. It is not 
"Est-ce qu'il y a", but "'pourquoi y a-t-il. . The second part of the assumption, of 
course, is that memory is linlced to morality, the domain in which any devoir operates. 
There are convincing arguments to back this up, concerning the manner in which 
memory is a condition both of humanity and individuality, its capacity to bind people 
together in collective entities, and its pivotal position in most legal and educational 
systems. The counter argument is that memory is not in itself a moral duty, but should 
be governed by morality. In other words, that it should not be used for unethical ends.
These issues were discussed by an illustrious panel of experts in a television 
programme broadcast some weeks after the bac in question. "Le devoir de mémoire", 
part of la Marche du siècle series on France 3, conducted the debate in the context of a 
short documentary film on the subject of Vichy's transit camps and France's official 
archives policy. One of the guests, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, summed up the 
obligatory aspect of memory by speaking of "une dette envers les morts". The French- 
Jewish memorial activist Henry Bulawko has used the same expression when explaining 
what motivates his work.^^ This conception of memory is particularly apt for violent 
conflict, and even more so for violent conflict involving collective entities, where the 
sacrifice of the dead is transformed, by statute and ceremony, into a lesson for the 
living. So the relationship is often expressed in terms of debt: we "owe" it to those who 
died not to let their memory disappear at the same time as their physical presence.
M y italics.
Broadcast on 30 June 1993.
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So the idea of memory as devoir as opposed to fête, as a warning as much as an 
example, was solidly anchored in France by the 1990s. It was considered salutary to 
pass on a well-rounded collective memory to younger generations, a memory containing 
self-criticism as well as praise. In 1994 communications minister Alain Carignon took 
the step of asking the "radios jeunes", such as Fun, Skyrock and NRJ, to make a 
concerted effort to "sensibiliser" young people to the "drame des années noires". 
Although they normally served up a diet of throw-away pop music and pop culture, Fun 
and Skyrock in particular reacted favourably, illustrating the extent to which the 
comprehensive pedagogical mission was taken seriously.
Critics of the devoir"
The conception of memory as a state of moral awareness that can prevent 
repetition of the mistakes of the past, summed up concisely by the French expression, 
"le devoir de mémoire pour que plus jamais ça", had come to be taken for granted. Yet 
some observers have pointed out that the notion is simplistic in the extreme, and does 
not even attempt to do justice to what is in reality a complex psychological process. 
Memory is not simply a commodity, like contentment or kindness, that one is duty 
bound to maximise; it is a psychic process that implies selection and distortion, and 
hidden purposes that are not always very moral. Memory is not a synonym for 
conscience.
Hemy Rousso has gone so far as to use the expression 'T idéologie croissante du 
devoir de m é m o i r e " , implying that this was no fragile fad, but a coherent body of 
ideas. It had, he said, installed itself as a new orthodoxy, with its own set of taboos and
Interview o f  19 April 1999.
Reported in Le M onde  o f  17 March 1994.
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its own langue de bois?^ Emma Slinur, whose family was almost wiped out by the 
Nazis, expressed astonishment that, at the end of a century overshadowed by Freud, the 
nuances of the human psyche could still be ignored for the sake of a pithy formula 
which she resumed as: "On vous fait connaître une réalité monstrueuse, on crée un 
traumatisme moral, et vous voilà vacciné contre le mal".^^ Rather than the shock tactics, 
Shnur advocated a process whereby the intellect would be put to work, slowly and 
deliberately. "II y a des lieux et des temps pour la commémoration et l’hommage aux 
victimes, mais il faut aussi des lieux et des temps distincts pour la froide analyse 
his tor ique".For  Shnur, this would imply not just a recognition that genocide was 
committed at Auschwitz and elsewhere, but also a knowledge of the history of the 
previous three decades, at the very least.
Serge Barcellini had ample time to reflect on the nature of collective memory 
during his ten years in charge of the Ministry for Ex-Servicemen's Délégation à la 
mémoire et à l ’information historique. Despite having been responsible for the 
transmission of an important part of the national memory, Barcellini was wary about the 
lack of perspective that had turned the elusive and ambiguous notion of "memory" into 
a moral absolute. Memory for memory's sake, he said, was dangerous. Far from being a 
moral obligation, it was merely a tool, which could be used for good or ill. He gave as 
an example the vast "travail de mémoire" that he had seen the Bosnian Serbs 
accomplish in the early 1990s, before they translated that memory into bloody action. 
One might also mention the "duty to remember" that has hampered efforts to find peace
M y italics.
Interview in M arianne, 30 M arch-5 April 1998. 
Le M onde, 5 D ecem ber 1997.
34 Le Monde, 5 D e ce m b e r  1997.
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in Northern Ireland, the Basque country, the Middle East, and elsewhere/^ "Memory- 
as-tool" is only as good or as bad as the end for which it is used.
Barcellini was also worried by the move away from an exemplary pedagogical 
model towards one which taught people to be ashamed. He thought that it was 
dangerous, particularly when dealing with young people, to privilege negative role 
models at the expense of positive ones. "La composante pédagogique (of a memorial 
policy) doit prôner l’exemplarité", he said uncompromisingly.^^ His view was echoed by 
the minister for ex-servicemen, Philippe Mestre. Mestre spoke in a tone redolent of the 
nationalists of the Third Republic when he said, in the context of the commemorations 
of June 1994, said that "il faut que (la jeunesse) apprenne les noms des héros qui sont 
tombés pour que revive la France".
To the critics, the complementary trait of invoking "la mémoire" and "les jeunes" 
was nothing more than a ruse intended to lend gravitas to an often shoddy product. The 
media found themselves under attack here. Conan and Rousso were particularly 
unimpressed: "c'est une pratique devenue l’alibi le plus courant de la télévision pour se 
donner un semblant de vernis pédagogique’’.^  ^ There was indeed a problem when the 
quality of the programme or article did not square with the noble motives given to 
justify its diffusion; or when due consideration was not given to the enormous 
responsibility that comes with any "pedagogical" undertaking. It was easy to overlook 
this responsibility when the duty to transmit memory had become such an apparently 
self-evident truth.
D issatisfaction  w ith the notion o f  d evo ir de m ém oire  continued beyond the period covered here. In 
M arch 1998 the A cadém ie  un iverselle des cu ltures  (chaired by E lie W iesel) organised a conference on the 
them e o f  "Memory and History". Speakers at this conference seem ed determ ined to set lim its to the 
d evo ir  de m ém oire. Paul Ricoeur preferred to talk o f  a tra va il de m ém oire, and recalled that society  also  
needs "I'oubli" in order to function (reported \n L'H umanité, 28 March 1998).
Raim ond, p .86.
Interview in L e F igaro , 26  April 1994.
Conan and R ousso, p .3 11.
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Emma Shnur, observing the "leitmotiv" of an "affirmation répétée d'un devoir de 
mémoire et d'un devoir de transmission aux jeunes générations", wondered how it could 
be that "on n'est pas saisi par le doute, effrayé par une telle responsabilité"/^ Perhaps, 
she suggested, a little more humility was in order, along with a recognition that this 
willingness to "transmit" was not enough to appease the collective conscience. Shnur 
feared that young people would be oppressed by the sheer weight of knowledge of 
something like the Holocaust, that the scale and nature of the evil, in the context of an 
already daunting world, might increase feelings of hopelessness or resignation. There 
had to be a deeper understanding, and even a measure of awe, of the momentous events 
in question, before any lessons were passed on to such an impressionable audience.
If the "devoir de mémoire" were just another media-friendly sound byte, then one 
would be entitled to dismiss it lightly. Yet the preoccupation with memory and its 
transmission is a feature of human nature that is more profound than that. It must not be 
forgotten that transmission of memory often springs from the noblest ideals. In certain 
situations, the memory to be passed on to posterity is regarded as so valuable as to be 
worth dying for. Isaac Schneersohn, a Jew living in wartime France, went to incredible 
lengths to assemble and co-ordinate a group of archivists whose task was quite simply 
to record what was happening. All that mattered was that the truth be preserved: "Je ne 
savais pas si je survivrais, aucun de nous ne croyait qu'il sortirait vivant de l'enfer. Mais 
je n'avais qu'un seul désir, aussi longtemps que je le pourrais, consigner ce qui se 
p a s s a i t " . These were the straitened origins, in 1943, of the Centre de Documentation 
Juive Contemporaine.
Interview in L e M onde, 5 D ecem ber 1997. 
A utrem ent, n°88 (March 1987).
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Such commitment may seem rather tragic or even futile in view of the horrors that 
have continued in the latter half of the twentieth century in spite of World War Two's 
"lessons", but it is also commendable. For the traditional alternative to this reaction - 
distorting or burying the unpleasant aspects of one's history for the sake of present 
peace of mind - can be extremely dangerous. As soon as one admits that it is possible or 
even desirable to pass on a falsified version of history to posterity, then the way is open 
to an Ingsoc-style rewriting of the past according to the prerogatives of the present. It is 
a temptation that can never be discounted, as we have seen in relation to France, but in a 
healthy society it should be counterbalanced by those who seek to transmit the harsh 
facts, that they may serve as lessons. The makers of the Marche du siècle programme of 
30 June 1993 interviewed a former member of the Resistance who had been deported to 
a concentration camp. Fie was emphatic about the need to record facts for posterity, and 
said that the deportees biggest error was not to have appointed historian-scribes to write 
everything down as it was happening. This man had little faith in the willingness or 
ability of humanity to always bear witness to the historical truth, but it would be more 
accurate to say that humanity has a love-hate relationship with that particular concept: 
certain people, at certain times and in certain circumstances, have gone to extraordinary 
lengths to uncover, reveal and preserve it; others, or even the same ones, at other times 
and in other circumstances, have gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal, distort and 
destroy it.
Memory, structured into formal acts of remembrance, is thus seen as a way of 
enabling someone or something to "live on" after it has physically gone. In fact French 
civil society makes provision for this transition tluough the system of "fondations". 
Their legal status as "personnes morales" makes them perpetual, whereas "associations"
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and the like only live as long as their members, as "personnes physiques", are alive. 
During our period, then, some of the federations and associations with their roots in the 
war years came together to create foundations statutorily equipped to survive beyond 
the last eyewitness. In 1990 former deportees created the influential Fondation pour la 
mémoire de la Déportation. In the same year the Fondation de la Shoah was 
established. The Fondation de la Résistance was recognised "d'utilité publique" in 
March 1993. Its motto was, "la flamme de la Résistance ne s'éteindra pas"."^ * The 
Charles de Gaulle Institute made similar provision for the future, by establishing the 
Fondation Charles de Gaulle in 1992. More inventively, but still with the same 
objective of keeping memory alive, the "Compagnons de la Libération", the élite group 
honoured by de Gaulle for active resistance to Vichy and Nazism, decided that, when 
there were no more compagnons remaining, their memory was to be preserved by the 
French towns honoured by the title of "Compagnons de la Libération", namely Paris, 
Nantes, Grenoble, Vassieux and Vercors.
Allied to this notion of compensating for human mortality was the image of an 
ongoing war between memory and nothingness, a war which was ultimately more 
important, and certainly less one-sided, than that between life and death. As Tzvetan 
Todorov put it, referring to Serge Klarsfeld's Mémorial de la Déportation des Juifs de 
France, there was the feeling that, "la vie a perdu contre la mort, mais la mémoire gagne 
dans sa bataille contre le néant
This martial conception of memory enabled a new form of "resistance" to be 
undertaken, Elie Wiesel gave notice of this with his paper entitled "La Mémoire comme 
Résistance", delivered to a conference in Lyon in October 1992."^  ^ His theme evidently 
struck a chord, and became something of a battle cry in the years that followed. At the




official unveiling of a monument to foreign resistance fighters in Besançon, the mayor, 
Robert Schwint, said that, "en rendant hommage aux étrangers dans la Résistance, nous 
entrons nous-mêmes dans la Résistance, dans la Résistance à l'oublf.^^ In April 1994 
François Mitterrand, presiding at the official opening of the memorial-musuem at Izieu, 
praised those who had "maintenu ici la résistance à VoubW.^^ Similarly, a sub-heading 
in Le Monde in 1994 ran, "Préparant l'anniversaire du débarquement allié en 
Normandie, les acteurs du 6 juin 1944 combattent contre l'oubli"/^ In the war against 
forgetting, of course, failure to remember was regarded as collaboration with the enemy, 
a form of treason. Hence the motto of the Resistance museum in Besançon: "ne pas 
témoigner serait trahir".
Expressed in such terms, "I'oubli" was figured as an aggressive, independent, 
external force, but this was really just a manner of speaking. The battle was an 
existential one, between the temptation to forget and a putative moral obligation to 
remember. Yet it became fashionable to speak of this combat against "I'oubli" as if 
"I’oubli" could some day be eradicated forever. When examined closely this turns out to 
be a trick of language. Memory implies both conservation and effacement: the human 
mind does not function like a computer, simply storing every piece of information that 
is fed into it. It engages in a massively complex process of selection, retaining certain 
items, prioritising some of those it retains, definitively forgetting some items, 
provisionally putting others to one side. In this respect, collective memory is less 
flexible, and more predictable, than individual memory, because there has to be a degree 
of consensus and simplification before anything can properly be said to belong to a
M alet, ed.
The cerem ony took place on 28 Septem ber 1993. Text o f  speech in Jean Kahn's archives. 
T ext o f  speech  taken from Le D ép o rté  o f  M ay 1994.
46 17 M a y  1994.
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collective consciousness/^ Since it is neither possible nor desirable to remember 
everything, the battle against 'Toubli" is in reality a battle against specific instances of 
forgetting. One joins the battle when one considers that a certain episode is not 
sufficiently present in the collective memory. This collective memory is a pattern 
formed by a unique combination of remembering and forgetting; therefore, when one 
engages in a "lutte contre I'oubli", what one is actually doing is endeavouring to 
rearrange this pattern of memories and lacunae/^
So Ernest Renan was surely correct when he pointed out that collective memory 
was necessarily self-censored. Collective entities, especially nations, would not be 
formed if it were not for the capacity to forget: "I'oubli, et je dirai même l'erreur 
historique, est un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation. Unity is rarely 
achieved without a certain amount of struggle, and therefore violence. This, at any rate, 
has been the experience of most nations. Perhaps future supra-national units -  a 
European federation, for example, will be created pacifically. Renan's point was that, if 
every past dispute were inscribed indelibly in the memory of those involved, and if that 
memory were used as the basis for present behaviour, then society would be nothing 
more than a patchwork of communities, coexisting uneasily in a state of mutual 
mistrust.^^ After a particularly cruel civil war in Ancient Greece, the Athenian 
democrats imposed an oath by which all citizens agreed not to recall the events of the 
recent past. Betrayal of the oath was punishable by d e a t h . W i t h i n  the national 
community, some aspects of the past are instinctively played down or passed over, for 
the sake of a workable harmony. Other aspects, the great successes, and perhaps
Todorov, p. 14.
Robert Frank, 'la m ém oire em poisonnée', p.487.
Ernest Renan, O euvres com plètes, I (Paris: Calm ann-Lévy, 1947), p .891.
In a sim ilar vein , G eorge M itchell, in his days as a U S senator, was w ont to com plain that Am erican  
schoolchildren knew  little about history; after his experience as m ediator in Northern Ireland, he realised  
that it is also possib le to have too great a sense o f  history. {The E conom ist, 21 D ecem ber 1996). 
Jacqueline de R om illy  in Le F igaro , 26 March 1998.
195
196
failures, experienced collectively, are, naturally enough, remembered collectively, as a 
nation. "Un instinct nous dit", said Lucien Febvre, "qu’oublier est une nécessité pour les 
groupes, pour les sociétés qui veulent vivre. Ne pas se laisser écraser par cet amas 
formidable, par cette accumulation inhumaine des faits hérités".
From this vantage point "national narratives" like de Gaulle's "France résistante", 
or the homogeneous group of "victimes du nazisme", seem less incomprehensible. Myth 
was provided where detailed analysis of the past seemed inappropriate. The myth, when 
viewed objectively, is of course exposed as false: as we have seen, there was much 
more to France during the war than resistance; and some people were victims not of 
Nazism but of French collaboration. No wonder Renan also said that "le progrès des 
études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger".^^ It comes as no surprise 
that the Resistance fraternity, among others, has often seen history as a deadly enemy, 
sowing division where once there was unity. Historians are by no means at fault for 
pursuing the truth, of course, but it is unrealistic to expect a national consciousness to 
balance serenely two contradictory ideas: that it is at once unified and deeply 
fragmented.
The state's method of encouraging its members to forgive and forget is the 
amnesty, a word which derives from the Greek amnesia, meaning forgetfulness. That 
tactic has been employed on many occasions in France, generally after bitter instalments 
of the "guerre franco-française". The centrality of this tradition has been confirmed on 
the highest authority: François Mitterrand, for one, observed that, "Dans I'histoire de 
France, il est rare que les grands déchirements n'aient pas été effacés par des amnisties




ou des oublis volontaires dans les vingt ans qui ont s u i v i " Looking back at French 
history, Mitterrand's point is justified. Amnesties were proclaimed after most of the 
recent outbreaks of civil war which France has endured: the Dreyfus affair, Vichy, 
Algeria, New Caledonia. On each of these occasions the claims of justice and "le devoir 
de mémoire" were passed over in favour of the claims of social harmony. The Fourth 
Republic's generous amnesty policies of the late 1940s and early 1950s meant that, by 
1958, the number of collaborationist prisoners had been reduced from 43 000 to 19/^ in 
1953; the National Assembly intervened in the trial of SS soldiers accused of the 
massacre of 642 men, women and children at Oradour-sur-Glane. The deputies decided 
that, in the interests of national harmony, it was imperative that the fourteen French 
Alsatians who had participated in the slaughter be granted an amnesty. The people of 
Oradour and the Limousin never forgot this betrayal of justice, but their outrage was 
considered an affordable price for keeping a more serious wound closed.
These ideas have never lost their relevance to French history; and they were 
revitalised in the decades which followed the German occupation. However, the concept 
of an oubli nécessaire, and with it the mythe nécessaire, was no longer deemed widely 
acceptable in an age that was solemnly devoted to the cult of memory, which it regarded 
as a moral imperative. Riding high on a wave of outrage after the Touvier case was 
dismissed, the notion that the uncomfortable truth had to be recovered reached a peak in 
public opinion in 1992. According to one survey in April of that year, only 16% of 
French men and women thought it necessary to "turn the page", whereas 79% preferred, 
"pour les générations futures", to continue to pursue war criminals.
O livier W ieviorka, N ous entrons dans la  carrière  (Paris: Seuil, 1993).




Although each one represents a subject in their own right, it is impossible to 
discuss collective memory of the occupation without mentioning the trials of war 
criminals which took place in France in the 1980s and 1990s. For these trials came 
about because of the predominance of two of the discourses referred to in this chapter: 
the pedagogy of memory and "le devoir de mémoire".
Trying alleged war criminals half a century after the crimes were committed was 
not primarily a matter of legal justice. These trials had far more to do with the battle for 
memory waged by those who wished to transmit certain facts and certain lessons to 
posterity. Their primary purpose and justification, as Alain Jakubowicz has said, was to 
"fixer la m é m o i r e " . There was a fear that the whole memorial edifice built up around 
World War Two might one day collapse if it was not shored up by the solid beams of 
legal judgement. In this respect, the role played by the trials of Barbie and Touvier (and 
later Papon) for "crimes against humanity" was not dissimilar to that played by other 
forms of commemoration. The intention was to anchor the past in the conscience of the 
present, in order that it would not be lost in years to come. The fate of elderly 
individuals who were unlikely to live for much longer was of little relevance, though it 
seems callous to say it. What counted was the impact on the collective consciousness of 
present and future generations. Paul Touvier's trial, like that of Klaus Barbie, was 
filmed. The aim was not to provide an diverting spectacle for television audiences, but 
to pass on the memory intact. The reels were thus consigned immediately to official 
archives, to be used as "les meilleurs réquisitoires" against what Jakubowicz identified
Le P aris ien , 16 April 1992. 
”  1995, p .l8 5 .
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as "cette volonté d'oublier un passé peu glorieux qui s'est manifesté tout au long de 
l'affaire Touvier"/^
"La justice," to quote Robert Badinter, "quand il s'agit de crimes contre 
l'humanité, est d'abord m é m o i r e . A  war crimes trial forty or fifty years after the event 
is above all a debate, and not a pleasant one, about the past (which also makes it a 
debate about identity, since identity breathes the oxygen of history). Thus in reviving 
the whole process by extraditing Klaus Barbie from Bolivia, the authorities were doing 
much more than attending to unfinished legal business, they were offering "un moment 
exceptionnel" to the collective m e m o r y . A s  Elisabeth Roudinesco pointed out at the 
time, such trials are unique in that the facts are not really in doubt, and the guilty verdict 
has, to all intents and purposes, already been passed. It amounts to a form of liturgical 
rite by which an entire moral and political system can be officially and symbolically 
condemned, and at the same time inscribed durably in the collective conscience. In the 
final analysis, there is little that is conventionally legal about a trial for crimes against 
humanity. "On juge un système à travers un responsable, surtout on reconstitue pas à 
pas ce qui s'est passé, contre la machine de mort qui veut tuer le souvenir lui-même de 
la mort".^^ The language of the trials of Barbie, Touvier and Papon is the familiar 
language of memorial and commemoration.
More specific to these "memorial trials" is the problem of coming to terms with a 
massively complex subject through the cross-examination of just one of its actors. Is it 
ethically or legally defensible to use a mechanism designed to establish the innocence or 
culpability of an individual in order to establish and diffuse "the truth" about a series of 
events so distant in time? Clearly, since the 1980s, the prevailing view has been that it is
1 9 9 5 ,p .l8 8 .
M onde, 18 July 1992.
R o u sso , Le Syndrome de Vichy, p .2 1 8 .
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not only defensible but necessary. Even so, some of those who accepted the need to 
straighten out the collective memory of les années noires expressed anxiety about the 
suitability of legal proceedings for doing so. Certain characteristics of the legal process 
detract from its suitability as a teaching aid, and trying a man in a context vastly 
different from that in which the crime was comitted throws up a number of practical and 
ethical problems. As Jean-Marc Varaut asked rhetorically, would it have been right to 
try a former Communard fifty years later, after the First World War, for crimes 
committed amidst the chaos of 1870?^^ Also, as time goes on the stock of potential 
witnesses is inevitably reduced by death, and the capacity of jurors to fully comprehend 
the context of the period is eroded. Then there is the peculiar nature of the legal process 
to consider: there is no specific requirement that legal proceedings must eventually 
reveal "the truth"; all that is required is that the accused be found guilty or acquitted 
according to the evidence presented. Although much time and effort is devoted to 
contextualisation during these trials - for that of Maurice Papon, historians were invited 
to fill in the background before the trial proper - in the final analysis it is not the general 
context that is being judged. Nor is it simply a matter of gathering as much reliable 
information as possible about the case and laying it out before the judges and jurors; the 
prosecution and defence are free to use any legitimate means to secure or avoid a guilty 
verdict. It may well be in the interest of one of the parties to sow doubt and confusion in 
order to render a safe verdict impossible. And it is usually in the interest of the 
prosecution to exaggerate the gravity of the deeds allegedly committed, just as it is in 
the interest of the defence to minimise them. Eric Conan's criticism of the Maurice 
Papon trial can be applied to any such trial: far from functioning as a weapon in the 
battle for la mémoire against I'oubli, under certain circumstances they can be made to
Quinzaine Littéraire, n °491  (A u g u st 1 9 8 7 ), p .17.
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switch sides. The judicial process "peut s’opposer à la mémoire", said Conan, since it is 
relatively straightforward for the accused to "s’esquiver dans le flou (. . .) et de dire le 
faux comme le vrai, entretenant des doutes que l'ouverture d'un livre d'histoire 
dissiperait dans l'instant.
When the Touvier case was still actual, it is true, faith in trial-as-history-lesson 
was not at the low ebb of the Papon trial, but there were some dissenting voices. Henry 
Rousso refused to testify at the trial of Maurice Papon, protesting that the pedagogical 
credentials attributed to the previous trials were completely bogus: "ces procès n'ont 
contribué en rien à une meilleure comraissance scientifique de la période, bien au 
c o n t r a i r e Writing in L ’Esprit in January 1991, Paul Thibaud said that there was a 
need for "d'autres moyens que le châtiment tardif de coupables longtemps planqués pour 
assainir la mémoire nationale". There is a certain incongruity in bringing an aged, frail 
and respectable-looking man before a court and having him represent four dark years of 
a nation's history. Needless to say, the defence is free to exploit the apparent reality- 
deficit: how can this man standing before us answer for crimes from another age?
The trial of Paul Touvier was criticised by certain historians because it gave only 
a partial view of the reality of the Milice.^^ This was inevitable, since Touvier was 
charged with crimes against humanity for his role in a specific, anti-Semitic incident. 
Legally, he could not have been tried for carrying out the duties which, as a member of 
the militia, would have occupied most of his time, that is to say attempting to nullify the 
maquis. This is not a crime against humanity. Basing one's appreciation of history solely 
on the trial, one could be forgiven for thinking that the militia spent all their time
M aurice Papon's lawyer, speaking on Le G ran d  D ébat: 'Faut-il oublier V ichy?' F rance-C ulture, 28  
N ovem ber 1994.
L 'E xpress, 26  February-4 March 1998.
L a H an tise  du passé . E ntretien  avec P h ilippe  P etit. Paris, Textuel, 1998. Quoted by Stéphane Audoin- 
R ouzeau in 'La Grande guerre, le deuil interminable'. L e D ébat, n°104, M arch-April 1999.
N otably Henry R ousso (again) in, for exam ple. L es C ollections du N ou vel O bserva teur, n°16, p.73.
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tracking and persecuting Jews, which, in spite of the undoubted antisemitism of the 
movement, and in spite of incidents like that of Rilieux-le-Pape, does not give the full 
picture. Thus the function of such trials as pedagogical lessons is compromised by the 
necessary restriction of the subject matter to a specific and legally recognisable type of 
crime.
To make matters even more complicated, the definition of what constituted a 
"crime against humanity", as established by the Appeal Court in April 1992, moved the 
goalposts, and caused the prosecution to redirect its aim. Prior to this, in order to obtain 
the maximum sentence, the strategy had been to claim that Touvier had acted 
autonomously in carrying out his vile deeds. But once the condition of "ideological 
hegemony" had been set, and the judges had decided that the militia did not fill that 
condition, it became clear that the best tactic would be to claim that the crimes were 
committed at the behest of the Germans, who clearly had an ideological agenda. What 
had previously been Touvier's defence - that he was only obeying orders - suddenly 
became the prosecution's best chance of success. It is difficult to discern the salutary 
"lesson" for youth in all of this juridical opacity. Good legal strategy does not 
necessarily make good history.
That said, it is undeniable that these hearings, flawed though they were, brought 
forth and recorded testimonies that seemed destined to remain unvoiced. And, though it 
may appear at times to lack credibility, the judicial system brings a certain gravitas to 
whatever it touches. The very things that people find frustrating - the slow progress, the 
pedantry, the sheer volume of information - are the very things that make them take a 
legal verdict seriously. More generally, high-profile court cases never fail to provoke 
wide-ranging public debate, even if only to question the wisdom of holding them in the 
first place. As with commemorations in general, one can be for or against their content.
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tone, or very existence, but the fact that they talce place at all gives the issue concerned a 
more prominent place in the collective consciousness. "Memorial" trials and 
commemorative ceremonies serve as "shop windows", displaying the subject matter for 
a public who might not otherwise stop and look. But if they are intended to transmit a 
balanced, global narrative then they are certainly deficient. They are most effective 
when treated as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, historical pedagogy.
Human rights
It is in the very nature of a commemorated episode that it be plundered for 
"lessons", that its relevance to the present he accentuated. And if there was one single 
theme that prevailed within the new pedagogy of war and occupation it was that of the 
universal nature of human rights. This is perhaps as it should be, since when we take 
lessons from any historical event we are inclined to relate them to the world as we find 
it. Indeed, the value of learning about history is that it contains lessons that can be 
applied to the present time. Necessarily, then, in a pedagogical discourse the general is 
privileged over the specific, the universal over the particular. And it is accepted that 
certain values, like human rights and freedom, ought to be considered as eternal, unlike 
political systems and national frontiers. Crimes against humanity are "imprescriptible" 
in French law, whereas crimes against individual human beings are not.
Any approach that dictates that lessons be learned and applied to current problems 
is not unproblematic. The most salient example is the persecution of the Jews. For if this 
is ceaselessly compared to other instances that look to be similar, there is the risk of 
banalisation. Too many examples of "genocide" make the Jewish genocide look 
unremarkable. Jewish groups were divided over this question, although it is fair to say
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that the more vocal ones favoured an interpretation that emphasised the uniqueness of 
the Shoah. On the occasion of national Deportation Day in 1986, the FNDIRP^^ issued a 
communiqué in which it applied lessons drawn from wartime deportations to the 
problem of famine in Africa. This met with a terse riposte from the "Agence 
télégraphique juive", which was unhappy that "en mettant en parallèle la déportation 
avec la famine en Sahel et en Ethiopie, il continue ( . . . )  à banaliser la S h o a h " . It is true 
that, made without due thought, such comparisons can be offensive to victims of 
deportation, extermination or persecution, and can foster an unhealthy climate of 
relativism, in which everyone appears to have been as bad as each other down through 
the years, so there is no point in reacting at all. On the other hand, if one holds that the 
Shoah was a unique event, then it loses its pertinence as a warning, as a lesson for 
present and future generations. If the camps, deportations and persecutions are 
presented as singularly freakish and diabolical, how can they be compared with 
anything else for pedagogical purposes?^^
The aspects of the past that are considered to be worth dwelling on inevitably 
reflect the preoccupations of the present time. By the end of our period it seemed 
anomalous that, of the 350 or so pages that constituted Pétain's "dossier" during his trial 
(for treason), only four of them related to specifically anti-Jewish activities; or that, in 
the archives of the Etat français, there were very few documents relating to the 
"question j u i v e " . The Israeli academic Asher Cohen, having analysed the pro-Vichy 
press, concluded that, even in that context, Judaism and the Jews was far from being one
F édéra tion  nationale des déportés, internés, résistan ts et p a tr io tes .
Serge B arcellini in Vingtièm e S iècle, n°45.




of the principal themes/^ As Jean-Mai*c Varaut pointed out (with questionable motives), 
"la question juive", which summed up the 1990s conception of Vichy, "ne se posait pas 
en 1945"/^
During the Occupation the issue of persecution of Jews was seldom broached. The 
London Free French, on behalf of whom René Cassin broadcast regularly on the BBC, 
only alluded to Vichy's anti-Je wish policies for the first time in 1941. Even then, the 
message of solidarity was only addressed to fellow French nationals, the "Israélites 
français"; there was no mention of non-French Jews, and no call to resist the anti-Jewish 
measures. The main thrust of the message was to assure the Jewish population that "le 
peuple français n'est pas responsable des mesures" taken against it.^  ^ Even when it 
became abundantly clear that the Jews of France were being deported and murdered, the 
Resistance did not change its priority, which was to salvage national pride and to 
contribute to the military defeat of Germany. None of the eighty five convoys of 
deportees that left France for the east between March 1942 and August 1944 were ever 
attacked or sabotaged.And there were even some Resistance movements, such as that 
led by Henri Fresnay, which approved the antisemitism of the Etat français, but 
disapproved the policy of collaboration.^"^ Another Resistance group, the Organisation 
civile et militaire, advocated stopping Jewish immigration in a pamphlet of June 1942.^  ^
While no one in France had ever claimed that human rights were irrelevant to 
war and occupation, the theme had not been prominent in the official and collective 
memory of the post-war decades/^ The Gaullian framework for understanding that
™ Cohen, p.v (R ené R ém ond’s introduction).
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period was concerned mainly with the nation and its territorial, political and moral 
integrity. Collective forms of remembrance were considered to be in the service of 
national unity and identity, and there was little encouragement for initiatives that might 
serve an alternative ideology putting crimes against humanity before crimes against the 
nation. Initially Vichy was regarded as criminal because it had betrayed France by 
negotiating the armistice of 1940 and subsequently collaborating with the occupying 
forces. During the period of épuration the suspected collaborators were punished as 
traitors, guilty of "intelligence avec l'ennemi", rather than as violators of human rights. 
The inscription on the tomb of the unlcnown STO martyr at Père-Lachaise reads, 
"victime de la trahison et de la barbarie n a z i e " . T h e  film director Clouzot was 
forbidden from working because his film le Corbeau was considered to be 
"a n t i f r a n ç a i s Georges Bernanos wrote that the "hommes de Vichy" were "jusqu'au 
bout prisonniers de l'armistice, c'est-à-dire d'une effrayante humiliation na t iona l e" . In 
other words, the key to the whole issue was national military defeat, not the treatment of 
individuals and minorities.
The 1981 victory of the left, with its human rights-orientated ideology, can be 
seen as a turning point. Despite its claim to be the "pays des droits de l'homme", it was 
only after the socialist victory of 1981 that France finally ratified the European 
convention safeguarding "human rights and fundamental d i g n i t i e s " . François 
Mitterrand declared in 1986 that "les Droits de l'Homme (. . .) sont au centre de tout".^^ 
It was also François Mitterrand who, in 1989, presided over a resolutely "droits-de- 
I'hommiste" bicentenial of the French Revolution. These developments typify a period
Barcellini and W ieviorka, p.441; m y italics.
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in which the rhetoric of human rights, and the abuse thereof, was brought to bear on 
many different domains of French life, and started to dominate attitudes to the Second 
World War. The Franco-German television company Arte thus proposed a double menu 
for its programmes on the 1994 annivesaries of landings and liberations. One set of 
programmes was to focus on the Second World War per se, the other on "des questions 
plus contemporaines," including "des problèmes spécifiquement français, comme la 
responsabilité de Vichy à travers le procès Touvier ou celle des fonctionnaires à travers 
les affaires Papon et Bousquet. There was no question of celebrating blithely the end 
of occupation; Vichy's human rights abuses had to be dealt with at the same time.
In France during the 1980s and 1990s, the sacrosanct nature of human rights was 
one of the few ideas that ellicited a consensual and relatively committed response. There 
was an overt interest in the rights of France's ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious and 
even sexual minorities. The rise of Harlem Désir's SOS Racisme is symptomatic of this 
preoccupation, as is, in a negative sense, the rise of the Front national. At the same time 
there was an increased awareness of humanitarian difficulties outwith national frontiers. 
Again, the mounting success and renown of a single organisation, Bernard Kouchner's 
Médecins sans frontières, can testify to this. The "no borders" label expressed the 
universalist philosophy of the age. In mainstream politics, too, the tone was much more 
pro-European and internationalist than it had been under previous Elysée tenants. The 
notion of "human rights" was certainly vague and open to interpretation, but the 
majority of people in France and the Western world professed to "believe in" it. It was 
grafted onto a memory of World War Two that had to be transmitted, because it was a 
duty, a devoir.
Le Monde, 11 N o v e m b e r  1994.
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Against the Gaullists' "pédagogie de l'honneur national" and Giscard's clumsy 
attempts to please the Germans/^ there developed a left-wing consensus that perceived 
the Allied victory essentially as a victory for democracy, tolerance and human rights 
over the ideology of Nazism. Instead of forgetting about the victory over Nazi 
Germany, it was to become, in the words of socialist ex-servicemen's minister Jean 
Laurain, "une magnifique leçon d'éducation civique", reminding younger generations 
that basic rights and democracy ought not to be taken for granted, and had only been 
attained through enormous sacr i f ice .As  early as 1982 the 8 May commemoration of 
Allied victory was reinstated and revamped, framing a pedagogical discourse that 
promoted international fraternity and human rights. Jean Laurain hoped that the 8 May 
would be an opportunity for "les jeunes du monde" to "communier dans un même idéal 
de paix et de f r a t e r n i t é L a u r a i n  was preoccupied with the themes of peace and 
human rights, and in 1982 the pedagogical-memorial branch of his ministry was 
reorientated in this direction/^ It was rebaptised "la Commission de l'information 
historique pour la paix".
This does not mean that the nation was suddenly abandoned altogether as a frame 
of reference. Debate in the National Assembly on the restoration of the 8 May national 
holiday, in September 1981, is revealing in this respect. The old narrative telling of a 
nation’s heroism triumphing over the evils of Nazism was not totally obsolete. Alain 
Hautecour, sponsoring the law, declared that "cette fête est celle de la liberté retrouvée, 
cette victoire est celle de la nation tout entière, sur la dictature et la barabarie nazie". 
The secretary of state for ex-servicemen, Jean Laurain, concurred: "Le 8 mai symbolise
N otably by abolishing the 8 M ay national holiday. 
D ebate at the N ational A ssem bly, 23 Septem ber 1981. 
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la volonté du peuple de France rassemblé dans l'élan de la résistance"/^ If the French 
account of the war years had taken on a more universalist tenor, it had not yet lost 
confidence in the nation's essential qualities. Vichy's crimes, in short, were not yet 
central to that account.
Eleven years later, in 1992, the National Assembly was again discussing war and 
occupation, but the tone was rather different. In the wake of the Vél' d'hiv' affair 
representatives discussed how best to commemorate persecutions committed during the 
period of collaboration.^^ Serge Barcellini has analysed both debates, and sees them as 
indicative of the change in emphasis that was taking place. Of course, the subject matter 
was not the same in each case, but this is in itself significant. In 1981, the terms "nazi", 
"hitlérien" and "national-socialiste" appeared 18 times in total; "Vichy" was alluded to 
twice, and Pétain was not mentioned. During the debate held in 1992, the terms 
"Vichy", "Etat français" and "Pétain" occured 20 times, with "nazi" and "allemand" 
appearing only six times.
From 1981 onwards, most of the changes to official and collective forms of 
remembrance took the human rights discourse on board. From the Vél' d'hiv' to the 
Matteoli commission, national prestige had to bend to pressure from individuals and 
communities. Where memorial inscriptions used to oppose "la barbarie allemande" and 
"les résistants français" or "les victimes françaises", they started to allude to, say, 
French malefactors and Jewish victims. Whereas Pétain and his supporters were tried 
for treason, Touvier and Papon were tried for "crimes against humanity", an offense that 
is now on the French statute books (thanks in no small measure to the efforts of 
MitteiTand). Every year since 1989 the war memorial complex at Caen, one of whose 
objectives is "la défense des droits de l'homme", has organised a "concours international
Serge B arcellini in Vingtièm e S ièc le  n®45, 1995.
This was subsequently made the object o f  a presidential decree.
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de plaidoiries pour la défense des droits de l'homme", which enables lawyers from all 
over the world to come and denounce current human rights violations. The esplanade 
leading into this complex bears the flags of all the nations, allied or not, who 
participated in the battle of Normandy.
In January 1991 a representative of the comités internationaux des camps de 
concentration nazis wrote to François Mitterrand with a proposal that these camps be 
taken out of the jurisdiction of individual nations and placed under the aegis of an 
international body such as UNESCO. The correspondent argued that these sites did not 
belong to any one nation, but "au patrimoine historique et moral de l 'humanité".The 
suggestion was never acted upon, but it is typical of the direction things were taking. In 
October 1992 a conference was held in Lyon on the theme of "Résistance et mémoire, 
d'Auschwitz à Sarajevo". Three of the papers given dealt with the subject of human 
rights.
In 1992 Noël Copin, in an editorial for La Croix, could state explicitly that "la 
faute du gouvernement de Vichy, c'est moins l'acceptation de la défaite devant les 
armées emiemies que la capitulation morale devant l'idéologie n a z i e " . War, in other 
words, was not about military defeat or victory but about morality and ideology. As 
Philippe Burrin observed, "on est passé en quelque sorte d'un régime coupable d'avoir 
lésé une personne collective, la France, à un régime coupable d'avoir lésé les droits de 
l ' h o m m e " . T h e  idea that the nation was "a collective person" which could be 
"betrayed" by surrender to an enemy, was much less fashionable than it once had been, 
and was no longer deemed worthy of providing a lense through which the past may be
Jean Kahn’s archives.
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scrutinised. There had been a gradual shift in the moral and conceptual framework, 
exterior to the event itself, by which it was thought about and judged.
An opinion poll in Le Figaro-Magazine in December 1994 ranked the reasons 
people had for reproaching Vichy. The most popular reproach, with 57%, was the policy 
of rounding up Jews. The policy of collaboration with the Germans was cited by 56% of 
those polled. Then came another antisemitical policy, that of the statut ju i f  of October 
1940. It was chosen by 52% of opinion. Further behind was the creation of the milice, 
with 36%. But the act which made this all possible, the abolition of the Third Republic, 
was by far the least commonly held reproach, gathering only 11% of opinion.^^ "Vichy" 
had come to signify "anti-semitism", to the exclusion of those aspects previously 
deemed important.^"^
Le Front national
During the 1980s and 1990s one of the most urgent messages to be transmitted 
was that intolerance, particularly when of an antisemitic or xenophobic nature, was 
dangerous. More than most conflicts. World War Two had come to be seen as a battle of 
good against evil, in which tolerance was clearly aligned with good, intolerance with 
evil. The French, having flirted so dangerously with the wrong side, were desperate to 
guard against the same thing happening again: the most efficient way to do so was to 
educate the young. So the effort of memory that formed the basis of these lessons took 
on a moral dimension -  hence the much-vaunted "devoir de mémoire" dealt with earlier 
in this chapter.
P oll referred to in F lood and Frey, 'The V ichy Syndrome revisited'. C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , 
vol. 19, n°2 (1995 ) p.246.
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The preoccupation with the antisemitic and xenophobic aspects of collaboration 
and occupation can partly be explained by the rise of the extreme right.^^ Paradoxically, 
this rise was facilitated in the first place by the relatively iconoclastic approach to the 
war years which began to gain the upper hand in the 1970s. In the context of a more 
frank and widespread debate about the period, contributors felt increasingly at liberty to 
dispel myths, break taboos and transgress "party lines". The fresh approach was 
productive, but the products were not to everyone's taste. During the decades of uneasy 
silence over the detail of collaboration, that is to say roughly until the 1970s, no 
politician would have dared say the things Le Pen and his supporters started saying, for 
fear of raising the spectre of Vichy. But by the time the Front national started its ascent 
in the mid-1980s, the spectre had already been raised, and people had started to talk 
about the relevant issues. Le Pen was able to profit from the relative freedom of 
expression to appeal to people who, up until then, had been lying low.
The late 1970s and, above all, the early 1980s were marked by the emergence of 
an unashamedly right-wing intellectual consciousness, hitherto unthinkable in a climate 
where the term "intellectual" had generally been synonymous with "Marxism", and 
often "resistance" and "deportation" as well. It was conveyed most articulately perhaps 
by the circle of rightist intellectuals, such as Yves Le Gallou, Yvan Blot and Bruno 
Mégret, gravitating around the Club de l'Horloge, founded in 1974. These three, and 
others like them, went on to be promininent in the Front national.
In parallel to this was a proliferation of neo-negationist theses minimising the 
scale or significance of the Final Solution. The most high-profile French proponents 
were Robert Faurrisson in the 1980s, and then Bernard Notin in the 1990s. Notin was 
forced out of his post at Lyon III University in 1994, after publishing "revisionist"
The "racisme-antisémitisme" rubric in the index to Le M onde  expanded from a sm all section  o f  one 
colum n in 1981 to alm ost a full page o f  three full colum ns by the m id-1980s.
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work.^^ Prominent members of the Front National had been known to express interest 
in these theses, although they could not afford to be too forthright. In 1987, and again in 
1997, Jean-Marie Le Pen opined that the gas chambers were no more than a "detail" of 
the history of the Second World War. In 1991 FN regional councillor Bruno Gollnisch 
pleaded for "respect de la liberté d’expression pour les enseignants qui exercent un 
regard critique sur l'histoire de la Seconde guerre mondi a l e" .However, he later denied 
having spoken up for negationism or revisionism.
The presence of such people on the political scene brought an urgency and 
intensity to the debate on Vichy, and quickened the sense that the past was supremely 
relevant to the present. The Front national started taking up to 15% of the vote in 
elections, and periodically France witnessed shocking acts of antisemitism such as the 
desecration of the Jewish cemetery at Carpentras in 1990. It seemed that the only 
reasonable discourse was one which put the accent on vigilance, affirming that there 
was a real danger of a return to extremism if people became too complacent. Many 
intellectuals decided to take the fight to the extremists and revisionists. Pierre Vidal- 
Naquet did so in 1987 with Les assassins de la mémoire, in which he dismantled 
negationist theses. The extremist positions of the Front national and its fellow travellers 
represented, in the eyes of many people, a return to the anti-Republican values that had 
underpinned the Etat français. Henry Rousso described the movement in the 1980s as 
"une droite qui puise ses références dans une tradition, dans un système de valeurs, dans 
une 'vision du monde' qui, à tort ou à raison, rappelle la décennie maudite 1934-1944".^^ 
For those who, in 1992, signed the petition in Le Monde demanding that president 
Mitterrand acknowledge Vichy's crimes, that initiative was seen not simply as an
Reported in Le M onde, 16 February 1994. 
Reported in Le M onde, 7 August 1991.
98 1987 , p .2 0 8 .
213
2 1 4
attempt to win an historical squabble, but as part of the contemporary political battle 
against the Front national. In the words of Jean-Marc Roberts, one of the signatories, "il 
ne faut pas lâcher sur Vichy, parce que je recomrais dans la vie politique d'aujourd'hui 
tellement d'attitudes, de pertes, de mots qui rappellent la Révolution nationale".
In 1993 Jo Amiel wrote in the introduction to his book about a rafle in a 
sanatorium that the work represented his "contribution à la défense de la vérité" in the 
face of mounting negationism. In February 1994 le Patriote résistant, the organ of the 
FNDIRP, was promoting a book on deportation entitled Le Grand livre des témoins. 
According to one advertisement, the book was not just a historical document, but a 
weapon to be used in the on-going battle against negationist tendencies: "Qu'il (the 
book) prenne une place importante dans le combat pour la vérité, contestée par des 
individus dont les campagnes de falsification poursuivent le but évident de nier la réalité 
des crimes commis". Holocaust negationism was denounced in Les Chemins de la 
mémoire, produced by the ex-servicemen's ministry, on two separate occasions: in 1991 
by the minister Louis Mexandeau, and in March 1993 by Roger Jouet, head of the 
Délégation à la mémoire et à l'information historique.
In such a way did the ramifications of the Vichy period reach forward, for good or 
for ill, into contemporary politics, injecting urgency into the debate about the kind of 
nation France wanted to be, and wanted to be seen to be. In such a way, also, did 
contemporary realities impinge on the narrative of the nation's recent history.
Since Robert Paxton, there had been a tendency to thinlc of Vichy not as a product 
of the defeat of 1940, but as the continuation of an established tradition of reactionary,
Conan and R ousso, p .53.
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xenophobic politics. In Alain Ferrari's 1998 film Milice, film  noir, for instance, an 
unbroken line joins the Front national of the 1990s to the defenders of l'Algérie 
française, the Etat français, the pre-war cagoulards, and so on. It would be fair to say 
that, partly as a consequence of the search for arguments against the Front national, this 
became the predominant interpretation, especially cherished by a media keen to have a 
discernible line of demarcation.
It may seem churlish to cast a critical eye over such a noble cause; however, 
historical accuracy does not always coincide with prescriptive notions of what ought to 
be the case. That is what makes it, at times, troubling and contentious. It is quite 
possible to call into question a lazy tendency to draw simplistic parallels between 
occupied France and Mitterrand's (and Le Pen's) France, and make sweeping 
generalisations which cast the Front national as the latest incarnation of the Etat 
français. No one would deny that there were many disturbing similarities. Front 
national activists could still be heard referring to the Republic as "la gueuse"; and 
whenever the name of Pétain was uttered at Front national rallies, there was warm 
applause. However, there were also many differences, and in order that comparisons 
may be drawn for "pedagogical" purposes, the differences were often passed over. It is 
important to recall that the majority of those who worked for, supported or tolerated 
Pétain did not do so primarily because they wanted to exclude a racial minority from the 
national community. There was a hard core which endorsed such policies, but support 
for Pétain and Vichy was much wider than that initially. This was because, in the 
desperate and confused circumstances of the time, people saw Vichy as the least bad 
way of conserving some form of autonomy while avoiding total annihilation. With the 
benefit of hindsight we can say that they made a grave error of judgement, and one
For exam ple at the "diner patriotique" in M etz on 11 D ecem ber 1998, as reported in Le N ouvel 
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which had terrible consequences for certain categories of people. Also, we ean (and 
must) criticise their willingness to exclude certain groups of people from the national 
group, thus leaving the road to persecution wide open. But this is very different from 
saying that, in 1940, the majority of French people were basieally Lepenites before their 
time.
In contrast the Front national in the 1980s and 1990s was, to all intents and 
purposes, a single issue party, and that single issue was race, or immigration.^®^ In 
voting for that party, an elector made a free choice to support policies that would make 
life more difficult for specific categories of people. His hands were in no way tied by 
the reality of a military defeat and the threats of an immensely powerful enemy, as they 
would have been in 1940.
So in dealing with the issues surrounding occupation and collaboration historians, 
but more so politicians and other public figures, had their room for manoeuvre 
restricted. As Mitterrand found to his cost, adversaries were not slow to draw attention 
to any views that could be considered suspect. Therefore, before offering any sort of 
analysis or opinion people took care to make it clear that they held no brief for Vichy. 
This meant refusing to voice publicly the view that the page ought to be turned, or that 
the obsession with Vichy's dark deeds imperilled balance and perspective. Naturally, 
when the extremist National Hebdo was complaining of "le déehaînement 
médiatique"'®"^ over the Touvier case, when Alain Sanders was protesting at "ce bruyant 
exhibitionnisme", and declaring that "je n'ai pas à m’excuser d'être français" on the Vél' 
d'hiv' anniversary,'®^ the mainstream moved instinctively in the other direction.
Other major them es, such as insecurity, are linked to the them e o f  im migration.
N ation a l H ebdo, 23 -29  April 1992. 
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Thus the persistence of the extreme right in castigating the "saturation" coverage 
of Vichy fostered a curious situation: the subject was omnipresent, and yet this 
omnipresence was rarely acknowledged by those responsible for it. Any attempt to put 
antisemitic acts in perspective, as only one aspect of war and commemoration among 
many, could easily be attacked as "minimisation", and comparisons could be drawn with 
Jean-Marie Le Pen's description of the gas chambers as a mere "detail". Thus even a 
tentative move in that direction was a dangerous course to take. There were those, of 
course, who were worried about this situation. Historians, politicians, and people who 
had been involved in other aspects of the war, were frustrated, but were wary of 
expressing their disquiet in public, lest they be identified with the Front national and its 
fellow travellers.'®®
A European and internationalist outlook
In the broadly universalist and internationalist context of the Mitterrand years, it 
was inevitable that one of the "lessons" given during commemorations would be that 
international cooperation, and in particular European integration, were necessary in 
order to neutralise the threat of another full-scale war. This was particularly true of the 
Allied landings in Normandy, which were crucial to the liberation of French territory, 
and at the same time part of the wider conflict between the Allies and the Axis, and 
therefore between democracy and fascism. In 1984 and again in 1994 the idea of 
commemoration was expanded far beyond strengthening the bond between citizen and 
state, to become an opportunity to forge and reinforce links across national boundaries. 
For Mitterrand, this would not weaken internal cohesion; on the contrary, the idea was
For exam ple Jean Kahn, former counsellor at the E lysée, as w ell as spokesm en from the FNDIRP and 
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that internal cohesion could actually benefit from a more wholehearted embrace of the 
outside world.
Gaul lists, on the other hand, had always maintained that France should not 
become too closely dependent on anyone else, least of all the USA. Although they 
would never say so explicitly, committed Gaullists considered the débarquement, an 
Anglo-American venture on French soil, to be a humiliation as much as a salvation. De 
Gaulle himself had gone so far as to refuse to attend the D-day 20th anniversary 
commemorations, whilst making a point of being present for the more Franco-centrie 
anniversary of the Provence landings.
In contrast, the D-day commemorations in 1984 were enthusiastically embraced 
by the governing socialists, and were marked by the inclusion of more nationalities than 
ever before. Traditionally, seven nations had been deemed worthy of representation: 
France, the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Holland, Belgium and Norway. Before 
the fortieth anniversary, five more nations claimed a right to participate. They were 
Luxembourg, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Denmark. In a spirit of 
inclusiveness, it was decided that these nations would be allowed representation, if only 
at a secondary level. On top of this came another claim, this time from the Soviet 
Union, which argued that the Normandy landings had been rendered possible by the 
battle of Stalingrad, and that the Soviet Union ought therefore to be invited. Once again 
the request met with a favourable response, and the USSR was permitted to attend, 
albeit in a passive role. Finally there was the problem of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which seemed to be positioning itself for a request. In the spring of 1984 it 
looked as if this might develop into a full-scale controversy, so François Mitterrand 
decided to act. On the eve of a Franco-German summit in April he announced that a 
memorial ceremony involving the two nations would take place before the end of the
expressed such v iew s strongly in private.
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year. The ceremony was duly held at Douaumont on 22 September 1984. Also, Jean 
Laurain was instructed to attend a German memorial service held at its cemetery in La 
Cambe, on 7 June.
While the participation of all these nations may seem to point to an atmosphere of 
international harmony, the truth is that most of the participating governments and heads 
of state were at least as concerned about their popularity at home as about foreign 
relations. They were keen to be seen paying homage to their own veterans. In 1984 this 
was still greatly appreciated by public opinion -  more so than any internationalist 
gestures. The British authorities, for example, held thi'ee exclusively British ceremonies, 
at Banville on the 5 June, and Bayeux and Arromanches on 6 June.
By 1994, France was a reliable partner of NATO, and one of the engineers of a 
reinvigorated process of European integration; German troops were to parade down the 
Champs-Elysees on 14 July 1994 for the first time in more than fifty y e a r s . I n  
October 1994 Mitterrand, accompanied by the Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez, 
would speak at a ceremony at the monument in Prayols commemorating the Spanish 
Republicans who, having fled Franco's Spain, joined the French Resistance.'®^ (The 
memorial had been officially opened in 1982, by socialist education minister Alain 
Savary.)'®^ In his speech, Mitterrand would evoke the international fight against 
fascism, and link this to the European project in which France and Spain were now 
partners.
It was to be expected, then, that all the potent symbolism of the major D-day 
ceremonies would point to the benefits of international cooperation and European
A s part o f  E urocorps.
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integration. Of the fourteen official ceremonies on 6 June 1994, eight involved at least 
two nations. The occasion was used not to affirm France's independence but to foster 
even closer relations with her European and North American friends. In his speech at 
Omaha beach on 6 June, Mitterrand was unequivocal both in his pro-European and 
internationalist stances: "l'Europe sauvée ne pouvait être qu'une autre Europe. 340 
millions d'Européens se sont dotés de lois communes. Un conflit armé est devenu, entre 
eux, inconcevable. Réconciliés, les adversaires de la bataille de Normandie marchent 
désormais du même pas"; or again, "du 6 juin date le signal: puisse s'organiser partout le 
dialogue pour la paix des pays du monde, des peuples, sous l'égide des Nations 
unies.""®
Mitterrand also gave an interview to Libération, published on 6 June, in which he 
said that one of the important lessons of the Normandy landings was that it was 
necessary to quicken the pace of European defence integration. When this point was put 
to Gaullist prime minister Edouard Balladur that evening, his lack of enthusiasm was 
palpable, although, since this was also his party's official policy, he could not disagree, 
and offered some pro-European and pro-Atlantic sentiment."' All in all, there was not 
such a large gap in policy between Matignon and the Elysée.
Mitterrand also took the opportunity to recall that European unity was conceived 
in the first place as a means of avoiding war."^ He had harsh words for those who did 
not share his view, declaring that "tous ceux qui, ici ou là, par nationalisme, par 
frilosité, ou par égoïsme, prêchent en faveur du repli sur soi, font preuve d'une bien 
courte vue et d'une grande imprudence.""^ Le Monde noted that Mitterrand was 
seeking, "habilement", to bolster relations between Europe and the United States
Le M onde, 8 June 1994.
E vening new s on F rance 2, 6 June 1994. 
Le M onde, 7 June 1994.
Le M onde, 7 June 1994.
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through the "retrouvailles solennelles des Alliés".""' So strong was the supranational 
flavour that a leader in The Times of 26 December 1994 denounced efforts during the 
previous summer to turn the commemorative events into "a celebration of European 
unity".
The grand pyramidal dramatisation that formed the foeal point of the 1994 
ceremonies departed from the classic "morts pour la patrie" approach to war 
commemoration. Entitled "au nom des hommes", it made no direct reference to either 
Germany or Nazism: the accent was on abstract themes like peace, co-operation, the 
future of Europe, rather than on the detail of "who did what and when". The tableaux 
vivants that were presented on stage were allegorical in character: there was no attempt 
to achieve a realistic re-enactment of the battles."® A spokesman for the state's Mission 
du cinquantenaire which, along with the local authorities, financed and organised the 
event, explained that "the goal is to broadcast a message of peaee and hope to younger 
generations.""®
Nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that, when the issue of German participation 
surfaced in 1994, as it had in 1984, the Elysée was firm in its refusal. Despite all the 
magnanimous talk of peace and reconciliation and the efforts to avoid offensive 
triumphalism, this was still the commemoration of a decisive military operation in 
which there was necessarily a winner and a loser. Mitterrand's political instincts told 
him that pro-European gestures had to be counterbalanced by deference to the hard facts 
of a war which had set certain nation-states, including France and Germany, against 
each other. The issue of Germany’s participation or non-participation caused something
6 June 1994.
D esquesnes, p. 173. H e also disapproved o f  the ending to the representation, in w hich one o f  the actors 
declared that "C'est beau de gagner la guerre en la détestant", com plaining that the m essage ought to have  
been more positive. A lain  R ollat made the sam e observation in Le M on de  o f  8 June 1994.
Scotsm an, 7 June 1994.
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of a stir in the media and among some politicians, and it was rumoured that Chancellor 
Kohl's request for an invitation had been turned down. As it transpired, Helmut Kohl 
had never formerly asked to take part in the ceremonies. Nonetheless, public opinion 
appeared to regret the fact that the head of the German government was not invited. 
President Mitterrand received scores of letters on the subject, the vast majority of which 
expressed disappointment at the treatment of Chancellor Kohl."^ A poll published by 
the Catholic weekly La Vie found that 56% of French people were "très ou assez 
favorable" to his presence. In an editorial for Le Figaro of 7 June 1994, F-O. Giesbert 
regretted that neither Helmut Kohl nor Boris Yeltsin had been invited. He wrote:
R ien ni personne n'est venu gâcher cet anniversaire où manquaient m algré tout M. Kohi qui est en 
droit de considérer que la victoire de l'Allem agne sur elle-m êm e a com m encé, le 6 juin  1944, sur 
les p lages normandes. M. E ltsine n'aurait pas été de trop. A vec ces deux sym boles là, la 
célébration eut été parfaite."^
However, it is probable that, had Kohl been invited, the protests would have been just as 
numerous.
8 May 1995 was the last significant commemoration at which France was 
represented by François Mitterrand. In attending the ceremony in Berlin, he underlined 
one of the few unambiguous aspects of his career: his belief in the European project, at 
the heart of which lay Franco-German reconciliation. Moreover, in his address he went 
so far as to pay tribute to the German soldiers, who were "courageux, quel que fût leur 
uniforme", and who "acceptaient la perte de leur vie". In a somewhat contradictory
Jean Kahn's archives.
118 D esquesnes, pp. 163, 191 (note to former).
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manner, in view of his internationalist sensibility, he also admired the "patriotism" of 
the Wehrmacht. The fact that they were fighting for "une mauvaise cause" was 
mitigated, according to Mitterrand, by the fact that "ils aimaient leur patrie"."^
In this way did the president ensure that his exit from the world stage was 
accompanied by something resembling a bang, rather than a quiet whimper. He could 
afford to be more reckless here than he had been at previous commemorations, where he 
had to be seen to be safeguarding national consensus even when attempting to put his 
message across. Of course, Mitterrand's belief in the need for a Franco-German "motor" 
at the heart of Europe, and for a European identity to take hold in France, had been a 
constant since the early 1980s. However, with the opening of Europe towards 
Germany's traditional spheres of influence in the east, the partnership was looking less 
solid than it once was. Every opportunity - no matter how contentious - was taken to 
counteract this process.
Clearly he was prepared to risk political strife in France - including allusions to 
his own ambiguous war itinerary - in order to reaffirm his commitment to the European 
ideal or, perhaps more accurately, to simply get something "off his chest". Amongst his 
own staff and political family there was disquiet. The speech that Jean Kalin had helped 
prepare had not contained that passage; Mitterrand had improvised the most 
controversial p a r t s . H i s  opponents were more vocal in their disapproval. Jean-Paul 
Piérot's editorial in L'Humanité spoke of the shock and disbelief that greeted news of 
Mitterrand's speech; "plus d'un téléspetateur français n'en crut pas ses oreilles lorsqu'il 
entendit les propos", he affirmed.'^' Professor Joseph Rovan said that "son jugement
il9 Le M onde, 10 M ay 1995.
Interview w ith Jean Kahn, 10 March 1999. 
10 M ay 1995.
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d'aujourd'hui rejoint ce qu'il était en 1941, un jeune militant de d r o i t e " G a u l l i s t  
deputy Pierre Lellouche trained his guns on the president's willingness to subordinate 
everything else, including sound moral and historical judgement, to the European 
project: "Je regrette qu'au nom de la construction européenne, de l'amitié franco- 
allemande, à laquelle je crois, on fasse une réécriture permanente de Phistoire". 
Alfred Grosser contested Mitterrand's allusion to the "courage" of the Wehrmacht 
troops, pointing out, as German defence minister Vo Ike Rühe had done, that the real 
moral courage was shown by the few German people who resisted Hitler.'^"'
The present applied to the past
This episode reminds us that there is a fine line between focusing on aspects of the 
past that seem relevant to the present, and simply falsifying the past according to 
present prejudices or preoccupations. Historical, or any other, reality, is always 
"refracted thiough the observer's own p r i s m " . T h e r e  is an ever-present temptation to 
see things not as they are, but as we are. Alain Duhamel has made the same point in 
different words: "les Français, comme les autres peuples, sont prisonniers (. . .) de leurs 
passions et de leurs mythologies. Ils ne croient pas ce qui est mais ce qu'ils voient et ils 
ne voient pas ce qui est mais ce qu'ils croient,"'^® Similarly, the historian Georges Duby 
has reminded us that, in reconstituting the past, "nous faisons intervenir notre propre 
culture, notre propre subjectivité."'^^
Le M onde, 11 M ay 1995.
On R M C  radio station; reported in Le M onde, 12 M ay 1995.
C roix, 11 M ay 1995.
F rance: Im age & Identity, ed. by Jeff Bridgford (N ewcastle: N ew castle-upon-T yne Polytechnic  
Products, 1987), p.2.
L a P o litiqu e  Im agin aire  (Paris: Flamm arion, 1995), p .9.
I'Express, 14 February 1992, p .51.
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There are times when this "intervention" is deliberate and cynical: for example, in 
July 1982 the ceremony marking the fortieth anniversary of the "rafle du Vel' d'hiv'" 
was ignored by the communist party's organ THumanité^^^, most probably because of a 
completely unrelated affair: the PLO's armed struggle against Israel in the Lebanon, 
which the French communist party supported. Around this time l'Humanité was full of 
damning reports of "l'agression israélienne au Lihan". During the commemorative 
ceremonies, on the other hand, there had been many impassioned messages of support 
for Israel's actions. It is unlikely that this omission had much of an impact on collective 
memory, but it demonstrates that the potential for abuse is always there.
I have suggested in this chapter and throughout this study that during our period 
there was a move away from an interpretation of war and occupation based on national 
sovereignty and national identity. However, that "prism" cannot be disregarded 
altogether. A survey in 1992 asked French people to define themselves with reference to 
a geopolitical space. In reply to the prompt, "Avez-vous le sentiment d'appartenir 
d'abord. . 37% replied "à la France". The next most popular response was "A votre
région ou pays d'origine", with 24%, followed by "votre région actuelle", on 23%. "Au 
monde" was chosen by 9%, while "à l'Europe" came last, with only 5%.'^® So despite 
being one of the more artificial and more recently established of the above determiners, 
the national dimension remained pre-eminent. An idea that was given concrete form 
towards the end of the eighteenth century was looking likely to survive into the third 
millenium: that idea was that, while men and women may have many levels of identity, 
it is the nation that provides them with their principal sense of belonging.'®® We should
July 1982.
F ran coscop ie  1992  (Sécodip  poll). A  similar poll conducted in 1995 had com parable results, although  
there w ere only tw o identities in the frame, French and European. The prompt w as "Vous 
personnellem ent vous sentez-vous. . and the responses w ere as follow s: "Seulem ent fiançais" - 29%; 
"Plus français qu'européen" -  29%; "Autant français qu'européen" - 36%; "Plus européen que français" - 
2%; "Seulem ent européen" - 1%; "Ni fi-ançais ni européen" - 2%; "Sans réponse" - 1%.
M ichael Ignatieff, B lo o d  an d  B elonging  (London: Chatto & W indus, 1993) p .3.
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not be too surprised, then, if, from time to time, a collective sense of history still seemed 
to be at the beck and call of national prejudice (the last word being used in as neutral a 
sense as possible). And this was not simply a matter of political expediency, although it 
is seldom politically damaging to reiterate one’s commitment to one's country. Even 
François Mitterrand was unequivocal about where his loyalty ultimately lay: "Je suis par 
goût assez internationaliste. Mais si la collectivité nationale à laquelle j'appartiens se 
trouve en danger, alors je réagis en patriote".'®'
For the liberation of Paris, for instance, the exceptional nature of the military 
operation engendered a certain confusion over the identity, that is to say the nationality, 
of the "real" liberators of the capital. It was such an attractive role that, fifty years on, it 
seemed that everyone was claiming to have played it. The presenter of the evening news 
bulletin on TFl referred to "tous ces résistants qui ont repris tout seuls leur capitale".'®^ 
The Guardian reported the remarks of an American present at the 1994 commemorative 
events: "I had no idea that the French liberated Paris by themselves. I always thought 
the Americans got here first and joined Ernest Hemingway at the Ritz."'®® The 
Independent, meanwhile, refers to the British Royal Signals as "the first liberators of 
Paris."'®"' Logic dictates that at least two of these claims could not be accurate.
When the time came to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the victorious 
(for the Allies) finale to the Second World War in May 1945, national differences of 
interpretation were still a factor. Despite Maastricht and all the progress made in the 
field of European integration; despite the War's supposed status as a universal struggle 
between good and evil, freedom and slavery, democracy and despotism; despite the 
multi-national character of the commemorative events, there was evidence, still, of the
E lie W iesel, F rançois M itterrand: m ém oire à deux voix  (Paris: O dile Jacob, 1995). 
25 A ugust 1994; my italics.
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deep-rooted, visceral tendency to seek the reassurance of an ingrained sense of 
belonging, often accompanied by an irrational mistrust of "the other".
Writing in the Financial Times of 10 May 1995, Ian Davidson complained that the 
fiftieth anniversary of the German surrender had been exploited by each nation for its 
own purposes: "the solemnity of the remembrance (. . .) is being hijacked for the public 
relations purposes of the governments of today". Historical accuracy had suffered, he 
claimed, from each country's insistence on its own interpretation: for Britain, the 
motivating factor was nostalgia; for Russia, memory of a time when it fought on the 
right side; for Germany, it was a liberation from her own Nazi ideology; for France, 
meanwhile, "it is a reminder that Charles de Gaulle, by force of will, transformed 
France from an ignominiously defeated nation into an élite companion of the 
victorious".
It is tempting to conclude that the only possible approach must be that of the 
purist, refusing to let subsequent values obstruct a clear view of the historical facts. Yet 
this is to neglect the truth that all facts are seen through a filter of values. It is also, in its 
extreme form, to proclude a pedagogical approach to history: for the main justification 
for teaching history to young people is that valuable lessons can be learnt from it -  
lessons that apply to the present. But in order to draw these lessons, some sort of 
judgement must be passed on the period concerned. Crudely speaking, the past must be 
divided into good and bad - what we approve of and what we disapprove of. Unless we 
are content to let the conduct of historical actors remain uncommented, making this 
division requires us to impose our own judgements, which inevitably involves the 
imposition of our own values. Therefore, by investing history with purpose and 
relevance, one must also, to some extent, superimpose modes of thought that are not 
necessarily those of the time.
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CH A PTER  SEVEN  
WHO CONTROLS COLLECTIVE MEMORY?
The medium and the message
One of the crucial points that ought to be emerging from this study is that, just as 
the present is shaped by the past, the past is very much dependent on the present. The 
relationship is a dialectical one, in that, while present concerns and outlooks can alter 
the way we view our past, it is that very past that has helped shape our present concerns 
and outlooks. On one side we have Marx's historical determinism: "The tradition of all 
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living". On the other 
side we have the likes of Orwell, who demonstrated in 1984 that if the will, organisation 
and technology were in place, it might be possible to eradicate the past completely, and 
construct an entirely new one. Reality is sometimes much less relevant than the manner 
in which it is perceived and represented. Whatever exists outside of consciousness, and 
expression of that consciousness, might as well not exist. This is especially true of our 
modern world in which the medium is often much more influential than the message. As 
Alain Finkielkraut has noted, Lenin's famous deference towards "the stubborn facts" 
would be out of place today: "Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, les faits ne sont pas têtus, 
les faits sont précaires, dociles, malléables. On peut les accommoder à toutes les sauces: 
les plier aux volontés du dogme, ou les absorber dans le ventre mou de l'opinion".'
If the medium shapes the message, it is important to determine how that medium 
or media functioned during the period that concerns us, with regard to the 
commemoration of war and occupation. These events were organised by official bodies
L'avenir d'une négation  (Paris: S eu il, 1 9 8 2 ), p. 14.
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such as the state or associations of anciens, which were themselves "media" in that they 
were transmitting information. But in order to reach a wider public they relied on what 
is more commonly referred to as "the media", that is to say, the press, radio and 
television. L'Histoire magazine of May 1984^ published a survey which asked people 
how the memory of Liberation had been "transmitted or maintained" in their experience. 
One element of the media, television, was the most common choice, ranked alongside 
"récits de famille" on 40%. The next most popular response was "official ceremonies", 
on 26%. "Books" and "school" were next with 25% and 23% respectively.
While it would be inaccurate to depict the French collective conscience as 
completely in thrall to television, that medium did, along with radio and the press, 
exercise considerable influence. And where once the audiovisual sector was controlled 
by the state, the process of liberalisation that took place under Mitterrand helped to 
revolutionise practices and attitudes.® Television and radio made the most of their new 
freedom, and adopted a much more irreverent attitude towards state authority."' The 
government could no longer rely on these media to tell the people what it wanted them 
to hear. French-Je wish radio stations, for example, knowing the composition of their 
audience, were unlikely to see the need to tailor their content to suit the government, or 
to suit a wider French audience.®
The modern media are notoriously efficient when it comes to amplifying or 
simply manufacturing popular trends. During the 1980s and 1990s the French media
 ^ n° 67.
 ^ François Mitterrand had com e a long w ay as far as broadcasting freedom  was concerned. A s M inister 
for Information under the Fourth Republic, he had presided over a system  o f  stringent control o f  
broadcasting w hich, from our perspective, seem s alm ost totalitarian. In a speech to the N ational A ssem bly  
in 1949, he explained that it w as the role o f  radio and television  to serve the national interest. Political 
disinterestedness was clearly out o f  the question. "La radiodiffusion française a quotidiennem ent à faire 
de la politique, une politique nationale des intérêts de la France." (G rosser 1996, p .87).
Program m es such as L es G uignols, France's S pittin g  Im age, w ould have been unthinkable under the 
previous system .
 ^ There is now  a French-Jewish cable telelv ision  channel also.
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helped to stimulate and nourish a demand for diverse aspects of the nation's past. 
Antoine Prost noted that there occurred at this time "une mobilisation médiatique sans 
précédent en faveur de l'histoire".® Ménière identified the trend in his Bilan de la 
France'. "Archives, patrimoines anciens et récents: les années quatre-vingt sont 
marquées par une frénésie d'appropriation de tous les objets du passé".^ In their 
introduction to a special historical edition o f Autrement in March 1987, Nadine Gautier 
and Jean-François Rouge started from the observation that "le passé est un produit à la 
mode". It seemed inconceivable that, during Giscard d'Estaing's septennat, the teaching 
of history in schools had been regarded as something of an anachronism, and had 
looked set to be abolished altogether in its traditional form.
For the most part, state authorities were happy to indulge, and even encourage, the 
interest in history and the "engouement patrimonial". Mitterrand's culture minister Jack 
Lang initiated a project laiown as "les journées du patrimoine", whereby historically 
interesting state-owned buildings were opened to the public for a weekend. To give an 
indication of their popularity, the two "journées du patrimoine" of 1994 attracted 
together more than six and a half million French people.^ However, some of the 
implications of this fascination would ultimately lead to problems for the authorities. 
This was true in particular of the period of war and occupation.
Memory in vogue
The past was making a comeback, but its packaging had changed. Quite simply, 
memory was seen as a more attractive word than history, in the same way as advertisers
® 1996, p.31.
 ^p .240.
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prefer the word home to house. History was a dry, hierarchical, academic discipline; 
memory was authentic, alive, closer to "the people". Narratives of the past which were 
blatently imposed from on high, by politicians, teachers or churches, were treated with 
suspicion. One had only to be true to oneself; anything that was genuine came from 
"within". In this context, "la mémoire est devenue le recours ultime, gage d'authenticité 
et source illimitée d'informations".^ The term history suited certain purposes, but, if one 
wanted to capture the public imagination, it was better to talk of memory, which had the 
"soul" that people craved.
From March to July 1984 an extraordinary series of full-page advertisements 
appeared in Le Monde. Each one of the six advertisements contained in its heading a 
reference to "la mémoire courte".'® Three of them, indeed, were commissioned by a left- 
wing association calling itself "La Mémoire courte". And it was this organisation which 
sparked off the minor "memory war" with the first advertisement, on 16 March. Entitled 
simply "la mémoire courte", its purpose was to remind people of all the crimes 
perpetrated by "les hommes de la droite et de l'extrême droite" throughout history. 
Although they denied wanting to wake the old demons which had so frequently "poussé 
les Français à la violence", the authors alluded to most of these past conflicts. Vichy, 
needless to say, featured prominently. The language used was uncompromisingly 
ideological, and the message was that the past could not be forgotten. "Nous n'avons 
pas la mémoire courte. Nous n'oublierons pas qui nous sommes, d’où nous venons et 
d'où viennent nos adversaires.""
On 27 March came a "Réponse à ceux qui ont la mémoire trop courte", using the 
same format as before. The authors were the members of a rival association called
 ^ D, N ico la id is in A utrem ent, April 1994, p. 11.
The advertisem ents were reproduced in Vingtièm e sièc le  n°5 (January 1985). This was a special edition  
dealing w ith "les guerres franco-françaises".
“ Le M onde, 16 March 1984; bold print in original.
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"Dialogue et vérités". Again, the history of France was selectively summarised, but this 
time the left were the criminals, and the right the victims or heroes. Inevitably, "la 
Mémoire courte" saw fit to use its right of reply, and another text appeared on 11 May, 
urging people once more to remember the mistakes of the "réactionnaires". On 30 May, 
"la mémoire courte" ran another of its texts, this time on a specific subject: the battle 
over education. Both the tone and the historical references were typically provocative.
The last two texts in the series dealt specifically with the Occupation. The first, 
which appeared on 13 July 1984, was commissioned by the "Association pour défendre 
la mémoire du Maréchal Pétain", whose motives were not difficult to discern. The title 
was from one of Pétain's speeches: "Français, vous avez la mémoire courte". There 
followed a list of the good things he had done for the French people, including 
protecting them from "la toute-puissance allemande et sa barbarie". The text concluded 
by calling for reconciliation, quoting François Mitterrand as saying that "les 
réconciliations d'aujourd'hui dominent les vieilles ruptures". The final text in the series 
was in the name of "les fils et filles des déportés juifs", and was a response to the "texte 
publicitaire tentant avec impudence de réhabiliter Pétain". It was also intended to 
coincide with the forty-second amiiversary of the Vél' d'hiv' arrests. In contrast to that of 
13 June, the title this time was, "Français, vous n'avez pas la mémoire courte". Recent 
French history was recalled once again. In this case, of course, all the evidence 
suggested that Pétain had no right to be "rehabilitated".
At the very least, this "bataille de mémoire" demonstrates that the notion of 
collective memory was not an irrelevance in 1980s France, and also that the Second 
World Wai' and the German occupation had a privileged and disputed place in that 
memory. Memory had always been a weapon in the struggle for power, but, by the 
1980s one had the distinct impression that it was becoming an end in itself.
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Strictly speaking, then, it was not simply history that was back in vogue, but a 
more subjective way of dealing with the past, commonly known as collective memory. 
In the words of Conan and Rousso, "la mémoire" benefited from "une certaine fortune 
éditoriale et médiatique" in the 1980s and 1990s.'^ No longer a neutral word denoting a 
mental faculty, "memory" became a positive, desirable value and also a slogan 
commanding immediate attention; anything that involved remembering was inherently 
good, worthy, ethical. In 1988 Jacques Le Goff observed that memory was "un des 
objets de la société de consommation qui se vendent bien".'® Memory, in its different 
forms, was marketed with the professionalism we normally associate with conventional 
consumer items or modern political parties. Commemorations were subject to 
sponsorship deals, media contracts, spin-doctoring, and gave rise to spin-off products. 
Rémy Desquesnes, in an article on the commemorative ceremonies marking the fiftieth 
anniversary of the D-Day landings, entitled one passage "les gagdets du cinquantième". 
In it he described how the commemorations were exploited for commercial profit by the 
marketeers of Normandy: "Dans tous les grands magasins, on trouvait au rayon des 
produits alimentaires toute une gamme de produits labélisés cinquantième anniversaire: 
camembert, Calvados, pommeau, vin de Bordeaux supérieur, champagne, biscuits."'"' 
But the most popular item was a lapel badge in the form of the US Paratroopers' 
grasshopper mascot. The fashion for badges -  or "pin's", as they were called, evidently 
came into play. History and schoolboy fad were married to great effect: more than two 
million lapel badges were produced. Advertisers sought to benefit from "l'effet 
cinquantième" by making reference to D-Day in their posters and slogans. The RATP 
used a photo of an LCP landing craft with the caption, "Nous avons bien amélioré le
1994, p.22.
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Statut de 2  ^ classe, depuis 50 ans". Another series of posters showed the different 
chronological stages of the allied assault on de Gaulle's "Lip" watch.'®
As Annette Wieviorka and others observed, memory was increasingly being 
presented in the form of a "spectacle".'® In fact this was not an entirely new 
phenomenon. In France the tradition of liesse populaire had long been seen as 
indispensable to all but the most solemn national commemorations. The presiding 
authorities had always realised that it was not enough to preach at people via speeches 
and other educational initiatives, and had sought to involve people in less cerebral ways. 
Parades and bals populates are merely an older form of memory-as-spectacle. That 
said, in a modern world in which, every day, millions of messages are sent out to grah 
our attention, some kind of spectacle has to be provided in order to make any 
impression at all on the collective conscience. To quote Pierre-Henri Jeudy, "Comme il 
s'agit de convaincre le public le plus large de la grandeur unique de l'événement, tous 
les moyens sont bons pour tirer les bénéfices d'une sauvegarde de nos mémoires 
collectives". Jeudy denounced the "tournure kitsch" that this had brought to 
commemorative ceremonies.'^ Not for the first time, the press was critical of a 
phenomenon it had helped develop. Peter Philipps of Die Welt reproached the 
commemorations of the Normandy landings for their "Hollywood" tendencies.'^
The new version of memory-as-spectacle could no longer limit itself to the 
traditional forms of war commemoration, involving a solemn ceremony at the 
monument aux morts. While these continued to function as important focal points, new 
modes of commemoration were also introduced. The sites of commemoration became 
increasingly diverse and imaginative; they were chosen or modified in order to give a
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^M a C roix, 14 July 1992.
In L ibéra tion , 6 June 1994.
Le M onde  press review  o f  8 June 1994.
2 3 4
2 3 5
more immediate and engaging evocation of the event in question. For the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Normandy landings, in 1994, it seemed natural that the ceremonies 
should have taken place on the beaches themselves. Yet this form of commemoration 
had only been tried for the first time a decade earlier, for the fortieth anniversary. That 
had been the initial departure from the monument aux morts form for the Normandy 
landings, and it was representative of the wider trend towards more diverse and 
innovative forms of remembrance.'^
Using the fiftieth anniversary year of 1994 as a point d'orgue, local and regional 
authorities in Normandy succeeded in developing a successful brand of World War Two 
memorial tourism. The hundreds of thousands of clients (620 000 in 1994, one third of 
them school children) were not left to gaze at ruins and monuments: the past was 
brought alive as a spectacle, by means, notably, of a 360 degree cinema screen, a live 
reconstitution of military operations, and a sound-and-light spectacular. "Devenue une 
attraction", says Rémy Desquesnes, "I’histoire peut attirer les foules et être source d'une 
véritable culture populaire". He then adds, approvingly, that these things "font beaucoup 
plus pour la connaissance de l'histoire qu'un savant cours professoral".^®
This last point is contentious, since it appears to assume that the immediate impact 
of the "spectacle" is all that counts. The truth is that, if they are to convey a durable 
message, these populist forms of history must be complemented by a more sober, 
detached version, which may not give such instant gratification. There is no guarantee 
that anything will remain after the noise and light has died down. The central event of 
the 1989 bicentenial of the French Revolution was a grandiose spectacle organised by a 
publicist. It captured flamboyantly the post-modern, cosmopolitan spirit of the time, and 
was hailed as a great success. However, those involved have subsequently expressed
Interview w ith Serge Barcellini, 6 M ay 1999.
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disappointment that there has been no lasting legacy of the bicentenial focal point; all 
that remains is a hazy memory of another colourful parade down the Champs-Elysées.
In fact the Normandy region did manage to avoid that trap, and to temper 
spectacle with solemnity. The endless rows of white crosses in the war cemeteries do 
not fail to leave a lasting impression. And the memorial, museum and conference centre 
at Caen, in which the visitor is literally led downwards into hatred, persecution and war, 
can hardly be accused of levity. The impact of the memorial complex is not lost on 
those who visit, and a recurring motif in the visitors book is "plus jamais ça!"^' In the 
final analysis the organisers of memory in the region have not succumbed to the 
temptation to turn everything into a sound-and-light spectacular.
Professional historiography took stock of the shift in emphasis from history to 
memory with the publication between 1984 and 1992 of Les Lieux de mémoire, edited 
by Pierre Nora. The state followed suit in 1992, when the government department 
known as the Mission permanente aux commémorations et à l'information historique 
changed its name to Délégation à la mémoire et à l'information historique. As its 
director Serge Barcellini explained, it was felt that everyone else "faisaient de la 
mémoire", and the government did not want to appear to have been left b eh in d .T w o  
years earlier the Mission permanente had taken out advertising space in the French 
press. The text of the advertisements employed the word "memory" thirty three times, 
while "history" was used only five times.^®
These changes bear witness to the rapprochement, or at least a change in the 
relationship, between history and memory that took place during our period. "Memory"
A lluded to by Hemd-Pierre Jeudy in L ibéra tion , 6 June 1994.
Interview o f  6 M ay 1999.




became so ubiquitous, and so attractive a catch-word, that scholarly and official history 
had to descend from its pedestal, overcome its distaste and try to grapple with it. In the 
1980s an association of history teachers called "Nous sommes des professeurs de 
mémoire'' was created. Evidently the bias towards memory was not deemed 
incompatible with a mission to promote historical loiowledge.
Plainly the balance of power between history and memory was being reversed. 
The former was now at the beck and call of the latter. In France, mainstream 
historiography had seen part of its task as bringing some sort of order to a chaos of 
competing and overlapping memories, and giving the product respectability by applying 
the label "national history". For Lucien Febvre, amongst others, it was also a system of 
redistributing the weight of the past so that the burden was not too much to bear.^ "^  
During our period, in contrast, the prevailing fear was not that the past may burden the 
present, but that part of it may be lost. History was placed at the service of an all- 
powerful memory. Historians were regularly exhorted to fulfill their "devoir" of 
remembrance, and took to justifying their enterprises in these terms. No longer was 
history the master of memory, or even much of an alternative or antidote to it.
If we talk of a rapprochement between history and memory, we must suppose that 
they had previously been separated. At the begimiing of the twentieth centuiy,^^ 
historians were starting to talk about their discipline in scientific terms, and a distinction 
was made between, on one hand, a dispassionate academic discipline, and on the other, 
"la mémoire partisane". This memory was necessarily plural, since it was subjective, 
belonging to different groups or individuals. History gave itself a more universal
Prost, 1996, p .301.
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vocation, since it endeavoured to remove from its field of vision the encumbrances of 
background, nationality, ideology.
One of the consequences of this development was a shift in the relationship 
between history and collective identity. Scientific history did not inform identity, since 
identity by its very nature implied a lack of balance. In identifying with any collective 
entity, one was forced to discard other possible identities, to commit oneself (even if 
there was no conscious choice being made) to certain narratives, ideas and values over 
others. Memory was held to be capable of fueling pride or hatred, cementing allegiances 
or sparking violence, while history, as a science, ought to be able to defuse such 
a r d o u r . "Dès qu'il y a trace, distance, médiation, on n'est plus dans la mémoire vraie, 
mais dans l’histoire," affirmed Pierre Nora.^^ Put bluntly, what he is saying is that 
memory is biased, history unbiased. More poetically, François Bédarida has said that "la 
mémoire a pour objectif la fidélité, l'histoire la vérité.^^ According to these 
formulations, then, memory is all about unconditional attachment, history is subject to 
one condition: objective truth.
War and occupation, as remembered collectively during the Mitterrand years, 
provided moments of tension which illustrate these definitions. In particular there was 
friction between the living witnesses to the events and those who analysed them as 
history. One of the more revealing clashes took place at a lecture given by Daniel 
Cordier, comrade and biographer of Jean Moulin, at the Sorbonne in 1982. On this 
occasion Cordier was speaking as a historian, rather than as an eye witness. He backed 
up his arguments with documents and careful analysis. His lecture caused a rumpus, 
however, because it departed from the idealised, heroic memory of resistance which
A lain Brossât, 'Libération, fête folle', m L 'E xpress, 18 A ugust 1994. 
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some of the audience had retained. These witnesses were deeply offended that someone 
-  even someone with Cordier's credentials -  could wish to tarnish the image d'Epinal 
that had been an article of faith for so long.^^ In a similar vein, L'Express of 18 August 
1994 reported that, at a conference coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the 
liberation of Paris, a former member of the Resistance, incensed by what he was 
hearing, stood up and launched a tirade against historians; "Soyez tranquilles, messieurs 
les Historiens," said the former résistant. "Quand nous serons morts, vous aurez raison".
The relationship between history and memory may have evolved, but the two 
ideas remained interdependent. Popular or partisan memory continued to be sustained to 
some extent by what historians choose to feed it; historians had their interest stimulated 
by popular memory. In Claude Berri's 1997 film Lucie Aubrac, the heroine is seen 
teaching her pupils about the importance of transmitting memory, and insisting that 
"c'est à travers la mémoire que l’histoire s’écrit". Jacques Le Goff defined memory as "le 
vivier où puisent les h isto riens".A s Thomas Ferenczi pointed out, in his relationship 
with memory the historian is a double agent, simultaneously the "indispensable 
auxiliaire" and the "inévitable i n t r u s In the final analysis, history is written by human 
beings with beliefs and opinions. These cannot be completely bypassed, nor is such a 
bypass desirable. History is a social practice, before it is a pure science. It is therefore 
governed by the rules and forces that govern society. Collective memory, conversely, 
does not amount to the creed of a blind faith, which each member of the group has by 
heart. There is room for variegation, and even a spirit of fairness and moderation. 
Collective identity, therefore, is not simply unbridled bigotry based on falsified 
historical narratives.
R ecounted by D om inique Schnapper, 'la citoyenneté à l'épreuve; les m usulm ans pendant la guerre du 
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Any move back towards a more fragmented, memory-based method of framing 
the past can have both positive and negative consequences. Taking the positive 
interpretation, one can applaud a realisation of the important role memory plays in the 
formation of identity, and in the education of present and future generations. One can 
evoke for example the Centre de la Mémoire at Oradour-sur-Glane, which constitutes 
an unrivalled reminder of man's capacity for barbarity in certain circumstances. Or one 
could mention the dignity given back to French Jews by acknowledgment of the 
treatment meted out to themselves or their ancestors by the Vichy government and the 
occupying forces. In this case, a specific group held onto a truth that both official 
history and the wider popular memory would rather have banished.
Yet it remains true that memory is no substitute for history, and lacks the solid 
foundations which would enable it to resist the vagaries of fashion. It may be observed 
that, while the war years, particularly Vichy, were "in" during our period, this had not 
always been the case, and there was nothing to guarantee that it would remain so. When 
it pleased popular opinion, led by the media, to become fascinated by another aspect of 
the past, what would be left of the memory of Vichy? Memory, in its popular - 
sometimes populist - form, is necessarily fickle because it is democratic. Group 
memories are prone to excessiveness and intolerance, and it would be unwise to 
abandon the ideal of an objective, universal narrative of the past to a laissez-faire 
system where the most sensational or aggressive versions were allowed to dominate.
An over-zealous media?
Regarding the war period in general there emerged an appreciable gap between 
the priorities of the media (and public opinion, in so far as it was represented by the
2 4 0
241
media) and that evinced by the political, judicial, and administrative "establishment". 
The practice and discourse of investigative journalism had become widespread in 
France by the 1980s, and the seemingly endless supply of political "affairs" that marked 
the late 1980s and early 1990s testified to the vibrancy of that style of journalism. 
Significantly it was left to a journalist, Pierre Péan, to reveal the truth about François 
Mitterrand's involvement with the extreme right and Vichy.^^ Historians had been 
unwilling or unable to do so.
Mitterrand could claim a direct role in provoking this discussion, by virtue of his 
cooperation with Péan during his research for Une Jeunesse Française. The president 
had given Péan access to everything he needed to write his book, but was "stunned" by 
what he considered to be the scandal-mongering and treacherous nature of the final 
version.^^ Admittedly, the decision to cooperate could be construed as a damage 
limitation exercise on Mitterrand's part. Previously he had allegedly avoided the subject, 
both in public and in private. Elie Wiesel noted that in all his conversations with the 
former president, "il ne mentionnait jamais V ichy".T ow ards the end of his second 
term, however, it was clear that silence would only be interpretated as guilt, so he had 
little to lose from a more open approach.
The damage limitation exercise was itself a limited success. Mitterrand was 
heavily criticised for his prior duplicity. Some of his supporters disowned him. The 
furore was aggravated when Mitterrand appeared on television to explain himself. He 
described former Vichy chief of police René Bousquet as a man of "exceptional 
stature", and justified the anti-Jewish laws of 1940 and 1941 by pointing out that they 
only affected non-French Jews. Only his staunchest allies did not desert: Jack Lang
In Une Jeunesse fra n ça ise  (Paris: Fayard, 1994).
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praised the president for encouraging discussion of the period. The extreme right also 
defended Mitterrand, and complained that there was in fact no "scoop", since it had 
already tried to draw attention to Mitterrand's past, but that no one had taken any notice. 
In July 1991 the neo-fascist magazine Le choc du mois had published pictures of 
Mitterrand taking part in a xenophobic demonstration in the 1930s, but there was little 
reaction in political or media circles, probably because of the disreputable origin of the 
article.
The media, along with some "anti-establishment" historians, borrowed the 
language of investigative journalism when dealing with the subject of Vichy. It 
sometimes seemed as if the period was viewed as a massive scandal waiting to be 
discovered. The reality was rather different, as historians had been working away 
quietly for a number of years before Vichy became popular with journalists. The bulk of 
the facts about the period had already been revealed. Vichy was not Watergate or 
Rainbow Warrior: the misdeeds had not been hidden from the people by the political 
class. Quite simply, in the decades that followed liberation, the mass of French people, 
the media included, had not had any great desire to dwell on those details. Certainly, 
those who governed France could be accused of having been over-cautious when faced 
with an upsurge in public curiosity, but that is not the same as a "cover-up". As is often 
the case with media-led obsessions, perspective was completely lost for a time. There 
had never been so much candour in official attitudes to war and occupation as there was 
towards the end of the Mitterrand years (although that candour was of course relative). 
This is not to say that there was no more progress to be made. Nonetheless, 
improvements were largely overlooked by journalists and other opinion formers.
Belief in the existence of a law of silence was often deep-seated and passionate. 
Zeev SternhelL one of the "anti-establishment" historians, was bitter in his criticism of
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"l'historiographie française traditionnelle", and in particular of the eminent historian 
René Rémond. In response, Rémond was moved to denounce the "fable" of a taboo over 
Vichy, ascribing it to simple ignorance of the sterling work that French historians had 
accomplished on the subject. So much for professional historiography: in the public 
arena, according to Rémond, things were even more clear-cut: "Quant aux débats 
publics dans les médias, ce serait plutôt l'obsession que le refoulement."^^ In other 
words, it was because people genuinly wanted to assume their nation's past by coming 
to a frank knowledge of it that Vichy was such a topical subject, not because the whole 
of France was running scared from a few troublesome researchers.
Articles devoted to Vichy, while being published thick and fast, still ritually 
explained that the period was covered by an unwritten law of silence. For much of the 
Mitterrand presidency, one could hardly open a newspaper or magazine without being 
confronted by some aspect of the German occupation, much of it "revealing" details of 
Vichyite misdeeds. The television reviewer in Le Monde still insisted in 1994 that "Le 
sujet traité ici (the press under Vichy) est encore largement tabou aujourd'hui, tout 
comme le régime de Vichy lu i-m êm e".T he  historian Rémy Desquesnes, again in 
1994, was more explicit: "Ainsi s'est imposé depuis cinquante ans (. . .) une mémoire 
collective, version arrangée de l'histoire faisant l'impasse sur tout un tas de choses qui 
ne se disentpas"?'^
In 1995, despite the fact that Jacques Chirac had just accepted collective 
responsiblity for Vichy's crimes on behalf of the French nation, a remarkable 34% of 
French people thought, or at least felt compelled to say, that "On ne parle pas assez de
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RTV, 13-14 March 1994,
37 In C on tem porary  F rench C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995), p. 187; m y italics.
2 4 3
2 4 4
l'extermination des juifs pendant la g u e r r e " .With constant repetition, the supposed 
cover-up had become a received idea, a self-evident truth that required no empirical 
back-up. It was also a neat, if facile, trope which automatically conferred "news value" 
on the subject treated. There would be little sense, admittedly, in a writer introducing 
his article by pointing out that the subject had become banal, unless he was purporting 
to explain why. There was a temptation to stress the negative or shocking points (which 
also provides a pat explanation for the alleged "cover-up"; the topic was too shocking to 
be revealed) at the expense of a certain distance which might enable one to grasp the 
nuances of a complicated issue.
For instance, the deportation of people living on French territory was condoned by 
no one, and no one contested the basic facts about the internment and deportation 
camps. So in actual fact, there was not much of substance to be "exposed" about them. 
Yet any non-specialist who happened to glance at a typical expose of the "camps" could 
be forgiven for thinking that they were concentration camps of the same nature as 
Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Unless explicitly informed otherwise, this is the 
connotation that the word "camp" has for most people in the context of World War 
Two. It is only in reading, watching or listening closely that one receives the 
information that these were deportation or internment camps, most of which had been 
built by the Popular Front government for refugees of the Spanish Civil War. The use 
made of them by Vichy was, of course, utterly unacceptable, but not quite in the same 
league of horror as the Nazi concentration camps. Anne Brynberg, herself the author of 
a book entitled Les Camps de la Honte, was moved to express unease at the 
sensationalist nature of some work on the camps and Vichy generally; "This kind of
IFOP poll for l'E vénem ent du je u d i, 27 July-2 A ugust 1995. In a sim ilar poll in 1991 the corresponding 
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exaggeration about the Vichy régime, which is in no way comparable to Hitler's 
Germany, is potentially dangerous", she said.^^
One could also detect a tendency to cry scandal before seeing the evidence. In 
November 1991 Serge Klarsfeld claimed to have discovered, the previous month, a 
census of Jews living in the Paris region (the former Seine department) which had, 
apparently, been concealed by the authorities since the War."^  ^ The "revelation" caused 
much consternation and excitement, and appeared to constitute damning evidence of the 
state's role in the "cover up" of the incriminating detail of collaboration. Le Figaro ran 
with the headline "les fichiers de la honte dormaient dans un placard".
In April 1992, René Rémond was appointed at the head of a commission charged 
with shedding light on the affair. Rémond's interim report, made public at the end of 
1992, caused a stir, but not in the way that was expected. It claimed that the controversy 
had been misplaced, since the fichier discovered by Klarsfeld was simply a list of those 
arrested, not the census ordered by the Germans. The file that did exist had not been 
concealed, and had in fact been used constantly in the administration of pensions, while 
the census file had been destroyed between 1948 and 1949: in other words, there had 
been nothing to hide for forty five years. The interim report concluded, with a hint of 
exasperation, that "le fichier dont la prétendue découverte a soulevé une vive émotion a 
été détruit, ce qui rend partiellement sans objet une partie de la controverse"."^^ 
However, the calming of a controversy does not excite the media as much as its 
revelation, and the interim report received less attention than Serge Klarsfeld’s initial
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declaration had done. By this time the press and media were more interested in the 
imminent presidential decree establishing a day of commemoration of Vichy's crimes.
This episode highlighted the pressure the authorities were under to prove their 
"transparency" with respect to the war years. In the "fichiers juifs" affair, the minister 
for ex-servicemen Louis Mexandeau was initially taken to task by the Commission 
nationale de l'informatique et des libertés for his passivity in the face of Klarsfeld's 
claims. François Bédarida, notably, told the commission that "le passif de ce ministre 
n'invite pas à lui faire co n fian ce" .Y e t Mexandeau, and the Commission were 
described as "légers" by René Rémond, for having prematurely validated Klarsfeld's 
claim. In a climate which was hostile to any perceived concealment of facts or 
documents, it would have been difficult to make a sound judgement. Louis Joinet, 
adviser to the prime minister on human rights, and a participant in the decision-making 
process, admitted franlcly that the pressure had affected judgement: "J'ai commis une 
erreur en novembre 1991 en croyant qu'il s'agissait du fichier du recensement de 1940. 
Nous étions pris sous le feu de diverses p r e s s i o n s A  revealing comparison can be 
drawn between the reaction of the authorities in 1991 and their reaction to a similar 
situation in 1979. Then, a government spokesman had flatly denied that files containing
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references to racial origin existed, and the matter was not pursued. By the 1990s the 
climate no longer permitted such a peremptory response."^^
The state under pressure
During the controversy surrounding the Vél' d’hiv' anniversary and the 
responsibility of the French state, the pressure brought to bear on the French authorities 
was at its height. Again, the press and media played a prominent role. It was Le Monde 
which, in June 1992, had carried the petition that had started the whole affair. On the 
whole they were unsparing of Vichy and also of Mitterrand, who was refusing an 
official avowal of culpability (details in chapter four). One of the more hard-hitting 
cartoons in Le Monde depicted the president sweeping a piece of paper marked "Vichy" 
under a tomb-like memorial to the Vél' d'Hiv' v ic tim s.T h e  evening news programme 
on Antenne 2, reporting on the Vél' d'hiv' commemoration of 16 July 1992, referred 
frankly to the "antisémitisme" of the Vichy régime, and showed footage of a rally held 
at the velodrome in 1941 in which a speaker, denouncing Jews in violent terms, was 
applauded by a huge crowd. In direct contrast, the judges who, three months previously, 
had dismissed the case against Paul Touvier, had based their judgement on the 
interpretation that Vichy was not invested with "une idéologie précise", that is to say 
that it was not essentially or coherently antisemitic."^^
The temptation to tar Vichy with the same brush as Nazi Germany, criticised by 
Anne Brynberg (above, p.244) was again present in the attaeks on the authorities. The 
"Véf d'Hiv' '42" committee, authors of the June petition, accused the State of being
The O bserver, 7 July 1996. 
18 July 1992.
Le F igaro , 15 April 1992.
2 4 7
2 4 8
"deaf as well as dumb", and claimed that an official declaration need not be seen as an 
attack on the Republic. After all, "personne n'a pensé que le geste de Willy Brandt 
s'agenouillant à Auschwitz (in fact it was at the former Jewish ghetto in Warsaw) était 
dirigé contre la République de Weimar ni contre la République f é d é ra le " .Evidently 
there were those in France who hoped for an equivalent moment of collective contrition: 
the Vél' d'hiv' committee, in its response to Mitterrand's speech on the 14 July, reiterated 
its wish for "un acte politique engageant la nation toute entière". To compare Vichy 
France to Nazi Germany was to enter into extremely dangerous territory, but it seemed 
at the time that this was the direction that the most vocal critics had chosen to take. The 
preoccupation with the antisemitic aspects of the Vichy régime, and the clamour for a 
grand gesture of remorse, left little room for a distinction between the Etat français and 
the Third Reich, Yet it was partly because the distinction between the Etat français and 
the Third Reich seemed to be blurring that Mitterrand was wary about giving the wrong 
impression to the outside world. A high profile official gesture may have been construed 
as an implicit admission that France was just as guilty as Germany.
One can identify a phenomenon of "over-correction" in relation to war and 
occupation, whereby the minimisations of the past became exaggerations in retrospect. 
Again, the phenomenon was particularly noticeable in the press and media. One of the 
most noteworthy examples was the nationality of the Jews who were rounded up for 
deportation from France. For the record, 52 000 of the 76 000 Jewish deportees were 
not French c itizens.B u t, either by error or deliberate omission, many accounts gave to 
believe that Jews who were French citizens were treated in the same way as those who 
were not. An Envoyé spécial documentary on the internment camp at Drancy reported
Le M onde, 16 July 1992.
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that, in 1941, "70 000 Français sont arrêtés par la police". The narrator also described 
Drancy as "un camp (. . .) qu'on remplissait de Français pai'ce qu'ils étaient juifs". Yet 
elsewhere in the programme the more accurate term "Juifs déportés de France" was 
em ployed.Sim ilarly, a reader's letter published in Le Monde on 13 July 1992 protested 
against a previous correspondent’s implication that Vichy had not persecuted French 
citizens who were Jews. In the letter it was claimed, falsely, that "les milliers de 
victimes de la rafle du Vél' d'hiv'" were French.
In fact, most of the arrested Jews were recent immigrants, fleeing persecution in 
Eastern Europe. However, overlooking this fact took the shock factor up a notch: to 
deport one's fellow citizens is even more appalling than to deport "foreigners". Or 
perhaps these commentators considered that it would be offensive to differentiate 
between two grades of such an awful crime, given that deportees all ended up in the 
same hellish predicament; perhaps the accumulation of years of fascination with Vichy's 
antisemitic policies led them simply to assume that French Jews were targeted in the 
same way and to the same extent as non-French Jews. After all, even the deportation 
memorial on the lie de la Cité is dedicated to the "deux cents mille martyrs français 
morts dans les camps de la déportation".^^
Whatever the reason, confusion had installed itself by 1992 to a much greater 
extent than a decade earlier: Le Monde of 14 July 1982 immediately made reference to 
"la grande rafle des juifs étrangers ou apatrides" These terms are reiterated several 
times on the first page. What is more, the article affirms that there were instructions 
given that any children born in France were to be left alone. Whether or not these 
instructions were properly executed, they confirm that there was some sort of attempt to





privilege French citizenship over racial origin. By 1992, such details (which do not 
excuse anything, but simply reveal more of the truth) seemed to have gone out of 
circulation altogether.
There was also a minor polemic over the alleged omission of the Véf d'hiv' 
episode in a dictionary of street names. Again the normally meticulous Le Monde lost 
sight of the facts, which led it into a double erro r.In itia lly  the newspaper had accused 
Jacques Hillairet, author of the Dictionnaire historique des rues de Paris,^^ of having 
deliberately failed to mention the rafle in the appropriate section. When it was pointed 
out that it was in fact included in the supplement. Le Monde published a corrigendum in 
which it nonetheless regretted that some bookshops did not offer the supplement with 
the dictionary. Once again the head of Editions de Minuit was obliged to write, this time 
to say that the supplement was contained within the main body of the dictionary! Le 
Monde finally admitted that it had been wrong on both counts.
These examples point to the existence of a kind of neurosis which transformed 
necessary vigilance against complacency into indiscriminate suspicion. It was assumed, 
until proven otherwise, that everyone speaking or acting in an official capacity was 
implicated in the "cover-up". But there was no evidence of a cover-up in any strict sense 
of the term.
Not surprisingly, complaints about the excesses of the media were extremely 
common among the different acteurs de mémoire of World War Two. A recurring 
theme was the alleged obsession with unearthing the scandalous and the sensational, to 
the detriment of more nuanced or more positive elements. A study of the monde 
combattant for the ex-servicemen’s ministry, carried out in 1991, referred to an article in 
Le Grand Invalide, the newsletter for the war-wounded, "qui s'insurge contre la
17 July 1992,
Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1992.
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recherche scandaleuse du sensationnel qui semble prévaloir, chez les journalistes, sur le 
souci objectif d 'inform er".M . Girard, president of the FNPG,^^ told me that he had no 
desire to talk to the press; "les journalistes," he said, "cela ne nous intéresse pas".^^ Paul 
Thibaud saw the media as a pernicious influence, in that it had granted itself the right to 
narrate and interpret, taking over from those with first hand experience. For Thibaud, 
Thierry Wolton's "revelations" about Jean Moulin were an example of these 
phenomena: "L'opération Moulin-KGB est en phase avec le pseudo-moraliste niveleur 
de valeurs, démagogique, prétentieux que le post-totalitarisme médiatisé produit et 
reproduit parce que c'est l'idéologie immanente des animateurs de télé, procureurs 
universels manipulant des jurys de ly céens" .E lysée  counsellor Jean Kahn has 
expressed similar views, and has made it clear that François Mitterrand shared his 
disenchantment with the press and media.
Interestingly, Jewish groups did not appear to share that disillusionment, which 
suggests that they had largely succeeded in imposing their agenda. CRIF^^ president 
Jean Kahn, speaking on France 3 in July 1993,^^ praised the media warmly, saying that 
"ils font un travail que je qualifie de remarquable" with regard to the activities of Vichy. 
Jewish memorial activist Henry Bulawko also told me that he was happy with the work 
done by the press and the media.
Jean Kahn's archives.
F édéra tion  nationale  des prison n iers  de guerre. 
Interview o f  26  March 1999.
E sprit n°198 (January-Apr il 1994).
C on seil rep ré sen ta tif  des institu tions ju iv e s  de France. 




On the whole, whatever happened to collective memory during our period had 
little to do with deliberate government policy. The "Big Bang" of the 1970s had opened 
up an appreciable gap between "official" memory and a plethora of "mémoires 
souterraines",^^ all clamouring for attention. And it is clear that, in any modem 
democracy, the state does not have a monopoly of intervention in the domain of 
commemoration and collective memory. As we have seen, there are forces at work - 
notably the media - which are much more influential than a governmental department 
could ever be.
Throughout most of the history of the French Republic, the state had had an 
exceptionally privileged access route to the hearts and minds of its members. But by the 
Mitterrand years this was no longer the case, and the state had little influence on the 
contents of the collective conscience. Often it merely reacted, at times half-heartedly, at 
times more decisively, to something that was outwith its control. In many instances it 
could only "officialise" what was already done. The new commemoration of the Vichy 
government's "racist and antisemitic crimes and persecutions", decreed in February 
1993, is a good example. Serge Barcellini, former head of the Délégation à la mémoire 
et à l'information historique, described the new ceremony as "une prise en compte 
officielle" of something that was commonly accepted anyway. The role of the official 
bodies was to belatedly accord its approval.
That said, official approval still carried some weight. In claiming that "la mémoire 
collective française est malade de ce non-dit" (i.e. Mitterrand's refusal to accept 
responsibility on behalf of France) the signatories of the petition in Le Monde in July 
1992 were admitting that collective memory craved some sort of offieial backing. The 
implication was that there existed a deficit in the collective memory of a people that
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could be made good by a declaration from an elected representative. Collective memory 
was imagined as a kind of virtual bank account into which the authorities could make 
top-up payments when necessary. These top-up payments took the form of additional 
commemorative ceremonies, recognition of historical events, official apologies for past 
deeds, and so on.
However, the relationship between official history and collective memory is at 
best complex, at worst unfathomable; it is difficult to discern a general pattern, each 
case apparently working according to its own dynamic. Collective consciousness reacts 
to and influences the state that frames it, and the state reacts to and influences collective 
consciousness, while both react separately to outside factors. Similarly, it is difficult to 
gauge to what extent the intellectuals who felt moved to sign the petition, and speak on 
behalf of "la mémoire collective française" were representative of France as a whole. It 
would perhaps be helpful to borrow Denis Peschanski's notion of "le grand public 
éclairé" - designating those people who have a relatively high level of education, who 
read books, who are interested in history, politics and current affairs -  when we use the 
epithet "collective" with regard to our top ic .R eading  newspapers like Le Monde, one 
is liable to come away with the false impression that such issues captivate the nation, 
when in fact most people are indifferent or mildly baffled. Mitterrand's 1993 decree and 
Chirac's declaration in 1995 were welcomed on the whole, but they hardly constituted a 
panacea for the collective psyche, as the petitionists seemed to expect.
Nevertheless the French state has implicitly acknowledged that there is a 
meaningful relationship between official memory and collective memory. It is one of 
the few democratic nations to have built up a centralised body to coordinate




remembrance and commemoration of war. Since 1920 the Ministre des Anciens 
combattants et Victimes de guerre has incorporated some sort of service dealing with 
the memory of conflicts in which France participated. At first the provision was 
minimal, its remit covering only "Etat civil et sépultures".^  ^Then, in 1946, a Comité du 
souvenir et des manifestations nationales was established. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, it was accepted that memory and commemorations ought to be 
organised at ministerial level.
In 1981, the arrival of the socialists and communists heralded another 
reorganisation within the ministry. The new government created the Commission de 
l'information historique pour la paix in 1982. The director, Serge Barcellini, led a team 
of six people, and his mission was primarily pedagogical. In 1983 the body was 
renamed Direction des statuts et de l ’information historique, and by 1984 it employed 
180 people. However the change of majority after the 1986 general elections led to a 
severe reduction in the service, and yet another change of designation: now it was called 
the Mission permanente aux commémorations et à l'information historique, and had a 
much reduced staff of twenty. It was enlarged again in 1988, and given back 
responsibility for war cemeteries and official statutes {états civils). Finally, in March 
1992, all the services connected with memory and commemoration were brought 
together in a Délégation à la mémoire et à l'information historique.
Now the four prerequisites for a comprehensive memorial policy^"  ^ were in place 
as part of the same structure: to the original patrimonial component, the sepultures 
service, had been added a ceremonial element, the Comité du souvenir et des
Tom bs w ere the first state "politique de mémoire" to be democratised. A fter the Crimean War o f  1854- 
55 it w as decided that ordinaiy soldiers, and not just officers, were worthy o f  proper burial, and this was 
taken in hand by the state.
A s form ulated by Serge Barcellini in, for exam ple, L es C hem ins de  la  M ém oire  n°18 (April 1992). He 




manifestations nationales. The last two prerequisites, education (or "pedagogy") and 
vigilance (lest the same thing happen again), were explicitly covered by the Commission 
de l'information historique pour la paix which, as the name suggests, was charged with 
the paradoxical task of promoting peace through propagating information about war. As 
we saw in chapter six, this two-pronged approach, combining pedagogy and vigilance, 
had become the dominant one by the 1980s.
Far from being coy about its role as organiser of national memory, this branch of 
the French government was proud of its capacity for intervention. There was an implicit 
recognition at the start of a new decade (the 1980s) and a new political era, that French 
people had become fascinated by certain aspects of their own past, and that the state 
would have to deal with that fascination. In his forward to Les Chemins de la mémoire 
of October 1991, Serge Barcellini recognised that "les batailles de la mémoire sont à 
l'ordre du jour". The implication was not that this situation was to be regretted, but that 
it required an even more committed mobilisation on the part of the official bodies, and a 
recognition of the significance of commemoration. Barcellini confirmed that 
development also: "la journée nationale commémorative" became "le principal outil 
dont se sert le gouvernement pour intervenir dans le domaine de la politique de 
m é m o i r e " . Thus commemoration was treated as a "tool" at the disposal of the 
government for furthering its ends. Fortunately, the reality of this is less sinister than it 
sounds, because in a democracy the ends of the government are, broadly speaking, those 
of the citizens. If they do not like the way in which the "tool" is being used, they are 
free to express their disapproval.
Serge Barcellini, head of the Mission permanente which was about to become the 
Délégation,^^ pursued the "tool" metaphor when he wrote in Les Chemins that the new
Vingtièm e S ièc le  n° 45; m y italics.
Serge B arcellin i had been head o f  the C om m ission , then the M ission , and finally the D éléga tion .
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Structure meant that, from then on, "I'Etat dispose d'un véritable outil au service de sa 
politique (de mémoire)". The Délégation would henceforth be equipped to "participer 
pleinement à la mise en œuvre de cette grande politique de mémoire dont la France a 
b e s o i n " . I n  an interview in 1993, Barcellini was unequivocal about the relationship 
between the Délégation and the state: "La Délégation, c'est I'Etat (. . .) Quand elle 
organise une commémoration Jean Moulin, c'est l'Etat qui commémore Jean Moulin.
So the philosophy of the state memorial services under Barcellini was voluntarist, 
in so far as voluntarism was still possible: the state could and should take a proactive 
role in shaping the memory of its citizens, especially where that memory included a 
momentous, consequential conflict like the Second World War. Barcellini was probably 
right to believe that a well-organised and energetic state body could have some 
influence. In 1983 his service issued a circular proclaiming the "année Jean Moulin" 
which encouraged local and regional authorities, educational establishments and other 
vectors of memory to commemorate the occasion as fully as possible. One of the 
suggested methods of doing so was to rename streets after the Resistance hero. The idea 
was taken up by a large number of municipalities, and by the end of the year there were 
hundreds more rues, allées and voies Jean Moulin than there had been the previous 
year.^ ^
The role of the state, then, was to suggest, sponsor and coordinate, but not to 
enforce. Barcellini has admitted as much.^® In spite of the Délégation'^ desire to be as 
proactive as possible, he did not conceive of the official bodies as dictatorial in nature. 
The memorial policy adopted in 1982 had always sought to be open and pluralistic, he 
claimed. "La Mémoire des guerres et conflits contemporains est pluraliste et ouverte. Ce
n°18 (April 1992); my parentheses.
Raim ond, 'Un exem ple de politique publique de la mémoire: la délégation à la m ém oire et à 
l'information historique', p.7,
Raim ond, p .86.
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sont cette pluralité et cette ouverture qui assurent les fondements de la nation 
française"/' In 1981, the relevant ministerial department was liaising only with the 
French Ex-Servicemen's Association. By 1993, links had been forged with a whole 
range of concerned parties, including history teachers, museums, libraries, and diverse 
"associations de mémoire".
The diversity extended to the type of commemorative activity that was covered in 
Les Chemins. No longer was official commemoration synonymous with a wreath at a 
cenotaph. It had become extremely eclectic, and traditional ceremonies were featured 
alongside stamp collecting and sporting events. However, the very fact that there was a 
ministerial department with a coherent policy and structure framing all the diversity 
suggested that this was not a completely "laissez-faire" set-up. Presumably pluralism 
ended where the founding ethos began. War "memory" and "historical information" 
were still conceived of as national matters, in which the nation-state could and should 
have some input.
And for all its heterogeneity, the canon of commemorative events admitted to the 
pages of Les Chemins remained fairly "safe". Pierre-François Raimond, having analysed 
the content of the newsletter from September 1990 to June 1993, found that the memory 
of Resistance and Liberation dominated all others when it came to World War Two. He 
divided the articles into forty-eight specific categories, and calculated the number of 
articles for each category. He also categorised events according to whether they were 
financed and organised completely by the Délégation (or its predecessors), whether they 
were financed and organised in partnership with someone else, whether there was a state 
representative present at the ceremony, or whether there was simply a mention of it in 
Les Chemins. The most popular theme was found to be "Résistance", with ninety nine
70 In terv iew  o f  6 M a y  1999 .
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mentions; then came "Résistants Martyrs", with eighty six, followed by "Liberation", 
mentioned in sixty five articles. In contrast, the headings "8 mai capitulation", 
"collaborateurs", "Vichy" and "camps en France" received, respectively, fourteen, three, 
ten and fourteen mentions. There was no official presence at any of the events in the last 
four categories, whereas a representative of the state was dispatched on six occasions to 
events from the first three categories. In fact there were more articles (five) devoted to 
the memory of French Resistance against the Japanese in Indochina than there were on 
collaborators (three).
This seems entirely in accordance with Barcellini's strategy of trying to salvage as 
much national self-esteem as possible from World War Two. Anticipating the 
momentous but delicate fiftieth anniversary year of 1990, his department had issued a 
fiche de pilotage which outlined the major themes and events for the year to come. 
Under the heading, "le sens des commémorations du cinquantième anniversaire" was 
the entry, "Un fil conducteur - la Résistance à l'ennemi". This despite the fact that dry, 
objective history would not view French resistance to the enemy as the leitmotiv of that 
year. In the same fiche de pilotage we notice that collective memory is regarded as 
imperfect and improvable. The French soldiers who fought in the failed campaigns of 
1940 deserved more recognition: "commémorer la Bataille de France c'est d'abord 
rendre hommage aux combattants de '40 qui méritent mieux que l'image inscrite dans 
notre mémoire collective".
To redress the balance to some extent, it should be noted that there was a 
respectable number of references (forty-five) to commemorations relating to the 
deportation of Jews from France. Also, in 1991 the Délégation supported a cassette and 
book package entitled 1942 -  Vichy, l'antisémitisme d'Etat; and in March 1993 the text
n°16, February 1992, For reasons that remain obscure, the word "mémoire" was usually given  a capital 
M in  L es Chem ins.
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of the decree establishing the day of commemoration of the "racist and antisemitic 
crimes and persecutions" of the Etat français was reproduced in Les Chemins.
Yet Barcellini was concerned at the penchant for Vichy-related scandal that 
animated the media -  now "facteur de mémoire privilégié"^^ - and some sections of 
public opinion, and felt that there was a need for an antidote, in the form of a more 
considered and sober, perhaps even patriotic, approach. In his foreword to Les Chemins 
of December 1991, he complained that collective memory was at the mercy of media 
scandal-mongering, and that, in consequence, "on a tendance à oublier tout ce qui n'est 
pas affaire, à omettre la part non scandaleuse de la mémoire".
Although Barcellini was a socialist, he had a surprisingly Gaullian conception of 
war commemoration.^'' While he recognised its validity in certain contexts, he believed 
that the "focalisation" around Vichy would pose a problem as soon as "Vichy devient 
supérieur à L o n d r e s " . That predicament, he added, was not far away. He also 
questioned the wisdom of the new commemoration of Vichy's "racist and antisemitic 
persecutions", held for the first time in July 1993.
While it has a duty to serve its citizens, the state also has a duty not to jump on 
any bandwagons that happen to be passing. One of these bandwagons, in Barcellini's 
estimation, was that of human rights, which had made a "très forte poussée" since at 
least 1982,^^ He included under this heading a specifically Jewish memory, which was 
"en plein développement" at the time, and to which he was unwilling to give an 
impression of "surdimensionnement".^^ Barcellini did not share the resolutely "droit-de-
Jean Kahn's archives. 
Raimond, p .86. 
Raim ond, p .84. 
Raim ond, p.86. 
Raim ond, p.86. 
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I'hommiste" sensibility of the ex-servicemen's minister under whom he worked initially, 
Jean Laurain. He admitted that he deliberately sought out material for Les Chemins that 
did not square with the predominant human rights philosophy/^ In particular he went to 
visit associations representing "le monde combattant" to encourage them to find ways of 
passing on the memory of their experience of the war years.
For Barcellini, the putative universalism of the human rights discourse had no 
place in a national ministry for ex-servicemen. "La mémoire des guerres, c'est d'abord 
une mémoire de l'identité nationale", he declared. In wartime, continued Barcellini, "on 
est mort pour la France. On n'est pas mort pour l'humanité. On n'est pas mort pour sa 
c o m m u n e . Strictly speaking, of course, this is true. Yet it ignores the wider issues at 
stake in conflicts between nations, particularly since the Second World War. Allied 
propaganda notwithstanding, it is surely useful to see that war in terms of an immense 
battle for freedom, democracy and tolerance, as well as a fight between nation states for 
territory and power. Thus we return to a recurring problem: in remembering World War 
Two, people feel compelled to make a choice between these two interpretative 
templates. One is either for a national approach or a universalist approach, when in fact 
both are not just valid but necessary.
The commemorative arm of the ex-servicemen's ministry had to try to find a 
compromise between these approaches. It also had to try to strike a balance between the 
general and the particular, that is to say between an over-arching national memory and 
its various subdivisions. In 1990 the Mission permanente placed an advertisement in 
L'Histoire drawing attention to its function as an "outil de mémoire".^'' The text outlined
Raim ond, p.86.
Raim ond, p .86. The practice o f  introducing "mort pour la France" to the é ta t c iv il o f  those concerned  
started during the First W orld War, by a law o f  2  July 1915, m odified  by that o f  28 February 1922. 
(B arcellin i and W ieviorka 1995 p. 11) This second law served as the legal basis for the inscription o f  
"morts pour la France" on war monum ents.
11° 129 (January 1990).
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the Mission's objectives in conserving the memory of war. On the one hand there was a 
"volonté de rassemblement", which would unite dispai'ate memories around "les temps 
forts de leur histoire nationale"; on the other hand, ran the text, "la mémoire des guerres 
et conflits contemporains favorise l'expression des mémoires particulières: mémoire 
juive, arméniemie, africaine, harki." There was also the European element to be added 
to the mixture: "la mémoire des guerres et conflits contemporains est un des fondements 
de la Mémoire de l’Europe". It is not always clear how this compromise can work itself 
out in practice, however. Either the experience of a group is remembered in its 
specificity, or some of that specificity is sacrificed in order to enable a wider public to 
participate. As we have seen throughout this study, this often gives rise to tensions 
between different groups, each firmly defending its own memorial territory.
However, by 1993 Barcellini had been succeeded at the Délégation by Roger 
Jouet, who did not share his misgivings about the prevalent human rights discourse. 
Jouet believed that it was essential that the ideals of human rights, European integration, 
and peace, be linked to the commemoration of war.^' Interestingly, under Jouet, the logo 
of the Délégation was changed from a militaristic symbol - a soldier's helmet cut 
through by blue, white and red stripes - to something more civilian-friendly - four faces 
in profile, also in white, blue, white and red.
La paix civile
Ultimately, representatives of the state are obliged to consider the cohesiveness of 
that state. Serge Barcellini confirmed this when he said that certain aspects of the past 
are "difficile à manier pour des hommes dont une des tâches fondamentales est de
R aim on d , p .86 .
261
2 6 2
préserver l'unité de la n a t i o n " . In this respect the ex-servicemen's ministry and the 
Elysée were at one. The main difference in approach was that François Mitterrand was 
prepared to forget about certain aspects of the nation's past in order to preserve unity, 
whereas, for a government department whose raison d'etre was the transmission of 
memory, forgetting was not an option. According to Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, who 
interviewed Mitterrand on television in September 1994, the president "estime avoir 
pour charge de maintenir la paix civile entre les Français, et que cette paix passe par 
l'oubli du passé^^P
One of the president's key roles is that of guarantor of national unity, and he must 
think carefully before doing or saying anything that may jeapordise it. Mitterrand 
acknowledged this as early as 1982 when he said that "le Président de la République 
française ne peut pas avoir d'autre passion que celle de l'unité n a t i o n a l e Simplified 
accounts of the Mitterrand presidency give the impression that these early years were 
entirely devoted to the socialist experiment, and that little thought was given to national 
unity. The above declaration suggests, on the contrary, that Mitterrand always knew 
where his duty lay. That said, he had been manifestly more sensitive to this aspect of his 
position since the divisive ideological confrontations of the early 1980s, and had re­
invented himself as a supra-political figure in time for the 1988 presidential elections. 
During the election campaign he had devoted the last three pages of his "lettre à tous les 
Français" to what Le Monde termed "son souci primordial -  la paix civile".
So there were times when, in the interests of national prestige or harmony, the 
Elysée seemed intent on stalling the commemorative initiatives that came from the ex-
Raim ond, p.49.
T eyssier, p .518; my italics.
Speech at Guéret (L im ousin) town hall, 3 M ay 1982.
8 April 1988. A m ong Mitterrand’s other conciliatory declarations at this tim e were: "Nous ne som m es  
pas les 'bons', ils ne sont pas les 'méchants"’ (speech at Rennes, 8 April 1988); "Je veux que la France soit 
unie et e lle  ne le sera pas si elle est prise en main par des esprits intolérants, pas des partis qui veulent 
tout, par des clans ou par des bandes" (declaration o f  candidature on A ntenne  2, 22  March 1988).
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servicemen's ministry. It was inevitable that the Elysée would not support all the 
projects proposed by its ministry, particularly when that ministry's "clients", the ex- 
servicemen, were clamouring for commemorative attention. Former Elysée adviser Jean 
Kahn has dossiers packed full of letters from associations of former soldiers, resisters, 
deportees, internees, prisoners of war, and others, requesting some form of presidential 
benediction for their commemorative ceremonies. This was the case with regard to the 
anniversary of the defeat of 1940, for instance. As we saw in chapter five (p. 169), the 
president was unwilling to dwell on what was, for him and many others, a painful 
memory.
Serge Barcellini has said that Mitterrand seemed more reluctant to back the 
ministry’s initiatives during his second septennat than he had been before re-election. 
The president undoubtedly felt that the glut of unavoidable anniversaries, coupled with 
a growing public interest in certain aspects of the past, would give him enough to do. In 
November 1991 Elysée counsellor Jean Kahn wrote a disapproving note to the president 
in which he reported that "depuis deux ou trois ans, le secrétariat d'Etat aux anciens 
combattants tente d'endiguer une frénésie muséographique
When the controversy surrounding the "Véf d'hiv'" anniversary broke in 1992, it 
raised the question of whether the president's obligation towards national unity made it 
impossible for him to "inculper son pays" by recognising collective guilt for past 
misdeeds. Mitterrand's reasoning, like that of his predecessors, was that national 
reconciliation was the priority, and that rattling old skeletons would benefit no one. For 
Mitterrand, French history was a potentially inexhaustible source of schism, and had to 
be handled with care:
N ote o f  27 N ovem ber 1991. Jean Kahn's archives. 
André Frossard in L e F igaro , 1 July 1992.
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m on point de vue depuis de longues années, c'est qu'il faut tenter de mettre un terme à la guerre 
civ ile  permanente entre Français; que si l'on prend tous les élém ents de l'histoire où les Français se  
sont déchirés, si l'on n'essaie pas d'y mettre un terme, on ne se conduit pas com m e il faut par 
rapport à la France.^*
This recalled Pompidou's statement justifying the pardon for Paul Touvier in 1972. He 
had said that it was time to "jeter le voile" and forget the years when "les Français 
s'entre-déchiraient et s'entre-tuaient". It also echoed the view of Georges Kiejman, 
former Under-Secretary of State for Justice, who declared in October 1990 that "Au- 
delà de la nécessaire lutte contre l'oubli, il peut paraître important de préserver la paix 
civile".Mitterrand himself professed to see no conflict between truthful memory and 
national unity, but had a clear sense of what he saw as a presidential duty. Defending his 
record against his detractors he exclaimed: "Que me veut-on? La mémoire doit rester 
fidèle et j'ai tout fait pour la servir. Serait-il honteux de servir aussi l'unité nationale? A 
chacun son d e v o i r . In the same interview he defended statements he had made in an 
1991 interview, in which he had expressed discomfiture over the prospect of French 
people being tried for war crimes, and had admitted trying to slow down legal 
proceedings against René Bousquet. Alluding to the period of occupation and 
collaboration, he had said, "on ne peut pas vivre éternellement sur ces choses-là".^^
In spite of its undoubted fascination with the more sombre aspects of the war 
years, the public seldom failed to approve of appeals for national harmony. A Sofres 
survey in 1995 asked whether "il faut condamner le régime de Vichy et continuer d'en 
parler pour ne pas oublier" or whether "il faut tourner la page au nom de la
Quoted by Nathan Bracher in 'Mitterrand and the lessons o f  history', in C on tem porary  French  
C ivilisa tion , vol. 19, n°2 (1995).
E sprit, M ay 1992, p.6.
Le P ro g rès de L yon, 23 April 1994.
Olivier W ieviorka, N ous entrons dans la  carrière  (Paris: Seuil, 1993).
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réconciliation nationale". 45% of respondants said that "il faut condamner", while 48% 
thought that "il faut tourner la page".^^ Already in September 1994 an IPSOS poll had 
found that 61% of French people approved François Mittenund's preoccupation with 
national reconciliation, which, in a series of television appearances, he had offered as an 
excuse for concealing his flirtations with the extreme right and V i c h y . T h e s e  
tendencies led some commentators to conclude that public opinion was returning to its 
former indulgent stance towards Vichy, perhaps a sign that saturation point had been 
reached. Denis Peschanski even detected a rehabilitation of the good Vichy/ bad Vichy 
approach theorised by Robert Aron in the 1950s .These  ideas, he claimed, had seen 
"un regain de faveur dans le milieu savant au début des années 1990"; he made explicit 
reference to Henry Rousso. However, there is a distinct lack of evidence to support this 
affirmation.
What people really wanted, it seemed, was to deal with their past without tearing 
the social fabric apart. In April 1994 76% of those polled by IFOP said that French 
people accused of crimes against humanity "doivent être j u g é s However, the second 
half of the prompt was "sans que cela nuise à la réconciliation nationale". It is an offer 
few would refuse. A real test of the public will to try alleged war criminals whatever the 
cost would have replaced this with "même si cela nuit à la réconciliation nationale".
The value of this argument was diminished to some extent by its ubiquity. 
"National unity" and "social peace", like "freedom" and "democracy", are things that 
everyone supports, because everyone has a different conception of what they mean. 
Those far out on the political right, for instance, were strongly in favour of national 
reconciliation - as long as it meant forgiving acts of wartime collaboration. The theme
Sofres, 1995, p.45. This disillusionm ent continued through to M aurice Papon’s trial in 1997, w hich was 
plagued by uncertainty over its validity and usefulness.
IP SO S  for L e N ouvel O bservateur, 29 Septem ber 1994.
1 9 9 7 , p .lO .
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of the sixth annual "Université" held by the right-wing Club de l ’Horloge was "la 
seconde guerre mondiale est-elle terminée?" In the introductory pamphlet, the tone was 
set to the affirmative: "le moment est venu de dépasser les fractures de notre histoire 
pour refaire l'unité de la nation f rança i se" .Everyone was in favour of unity, but only 
on their terms.
Moreover, there was a danger that the vigorous and free debate that defines 
democracy might be stifled from above if every contentious claim was deemed 
"divisive". There is an extremely fine line to be drawn between healthy discussion and 
destructive division. At the Club de VHorloge conference referred to above, speakers 
openly advocated selective memory in order to avoid recrimination. M. Leroy insisted 
that "la mémoire de la guerre peut et doit être celle de tous les Français, réconciliés dans 
le souvenir des heures glorieuses et des souffrances partagées". This sounds 
magnanimous, but, in practice, it would involve undoing a rather different process of 
reconciliation that had been going on since the 1970s: that of the French with a more 
self-critical version of their wartime activities. It is doubtful whether M. Leroy’s 
conception of national harmony would have had room for the trial of Paul Touvier, the 
Véf d'hiv' ceremonies, the enquiry into the "fichiers juifs", or, later, the Matteoli 
Commission.^^
IFOP poll in Le Journal du dim anche, 24 April 1994 
H eld in N ice  in 1990; reported in Le M onde, 10 October 1990
97 Set up in 1997 by A lain  Juppé in order to establish the whereabouts and ow nership o f  goods 
alleged ly  stolen from Jew ish fam ilies by the N azis.
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CH A PTER  EIGHT
CONCLUSION: THE DEREGULATION OF REMEMBRANCE
Clearly, the relationship between commemoration, collective memory and 
collective identity with regard to the war years did not become any simpler during our 
period. Nonetheless, it is possible to arrive at a number of conclusions, the first of which 
is that, on one level, commemoration carried out the same function in 1995 as it had 
always done: it united people in belief in a glorious past. To paraphrase Henri 
Amouroux, commemoration not only encourages unity, it presupposes it. The great 
national myths, principally de Gaulle's 18 June rallying call, the Resistance, and 
liberation, were still a force, albeit a diminished one. One has to bear that in mind in 
dealing with all the changes that occurred.
However, it is also clear that these changes did indeed occur. For one thing, the 
great national myths had to face up to serious scrutiny for the first time since the 1950s. 
They may not have been banished completely, but they were certainly no longer looked 
at in the same way. In fact they were regarded precisely as myths, which suited certain 
purposes but which could not be believed in as gospel truth. The reality of a civil war in 
which Frenchman fought against Frenchman had begun to supplant that of la France 
résistante', indeed the guerre franco-française, a term first coined in the 1960s, was 
itself beginning to take on the allure of a national myth.
As part of this reconstruction of collective memory, collective identity was also 
revised. By the end of our period, "la France" meant something different, for most 
people, than it had fourteen years earlier. Formerly "la France", when it was invoked in 
commemorative discourse, was an ideal as much as a geo-political space. The dominant 
notion of Frenchness simply excluded any aspects - such as Vichy - that did not fit in
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with the ideal. For de Gaulle and many of his generation, "la vraie France" was "la 
France résistante", or to be more precise, "la France combattante". There was no room 
for collaborationist or attentiste France in that self-definition.
But in 1995 Jacques Chirac provided the symbolic flourish for a fa it accompli 
when he declared that it was in fact "la France" which had persecuted Jews during the 
Occupation. It was the culmination of a process that had been intimately tied up with 
commemoration. Much of the pressure to admit that Vichy was France's business was 
focused on the ceremonies marking the anniversaries of the mass arrests at the Vél' 
d'hiv', and the fiftieth anniversary, in 1992, can be seen as a turning point. François 
Mitterrand refused to say that France was implicated, but he must have realised that, 
sooner or later, someone in his position would have to.
One of the problems for Mitterrand and others of his generation was that they 
were used to thinking in terms of "la France", when in fact it was perhaps more 
appropriate to think of "les France". This was a sensitive subject, because, in the 
aftermath of a conflict in which the nation had been divided and conquered, the priority 
had been to re-establish the Republic as the "one and indivisible" entity it was supposed 
to be. Paradoxically, as the serious threats to the nation's unity retreated into the past, 
fewer people saw the need to safeguard that unity at all costs.
Therefore when individuals defined themselves with reference to a group, they 
were less likely to turn to the nation-state. Jewish deportees, for example, started to 
define themselves as Jewish, rather than French deportees. Not only did this impinge on 
"le mythe de l'unicité de la déportation",^ it meant that France could not perpetuate an 
interpretation according to which it was the victim and Germany the aggressor. The fact 
had to be faced that Jewish people were deported and murdered not because of their 
Frenchness but because of their Jewishness. At the same time, other minority groups
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took the opportunity to make their voice heard, and to construct for themselves a 
specific collective memory. It has to be said, too, that the people who governed the 
country were by no means unanimously hostile to these developments. In any case, the 
effect of all this was to undermine the capacity of the nation to remember as a nation 
rather than a eollection of disparate groupings.
Another development that occurred during our period had to do with the lessons 
drawn from the war and occupation. If we accept that one of the objectives in 
remembering the past is to apply it to the present, then the "lessons learned" will 
necessarily change according to the needs and preoccupations of that present. Hence the 
prevalent commemorative theme of human rights and universal values, which displaced 
a discourse that placed great value on national integrity and national heroism. Again, 
one might observe that this switch of emphasis took place at a time when there was no 
real external threat to territorial integrity. That could be taken for granted, and indeed 
sovereignty could even be voluntarily dissolved within European institutions. 
Commemoration of war was necessarily revised in the light of the new context.
Finally, we saw during our period a change in the balance of commemorative 
power within France. The state was no longer in a position to dictate the play, and this 
was largely due to the new-found power and independence of the press and, especially, 
the televised media. The Vél' d'hiv' affair, like that of the fichiers juifs or the transit 
camps, demonstrated that the media were determined to ask difficult questions about the 
nation's past. It is easy to forget how docile the media had been before the 1980s and 
1990s, and the sudden penchant for investigative style journalism.
Of course, the French state being what it is, it did not simply hand over the keys to 
national memory to pressure groups and journalists. The state's department for war 
commemoration actually grew considerably during our period, although this was largely
* Rita Thalmann, interview  o f  3 June 1999. A lso  quoted p .150.
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a consequence of the increasing public fascination with the nation's recent past, and an 
attempt to bring a degree of order to the multitude of commemorative initiatives.
The Délégation à la mémoire et à l'information historique, under the direction of Serge 
Barcellini, tried as far as possible to be voluntarist in its approach, and often acted as an 
antedote to media hype. Yet Barcellini himself admitted that the state's role was often 
simply to officially approve or disapprove of what had already happened.
In short, the commemorative market had been opened to competition, and the 
central state authorities could no longer regulate as they once had. The system of 
dealing with collective memory, if not quite laissez-faire, was no longer as dirigiste as it 
once had been. This in turn had produced a new version of the national memory of war 
and occupation, as manifested by commemorative practice and discourse. The new 
version was, in comparison to its precursors, sceptical, self-critical and fragmented.
In this respect it was fitting that the last ever French head of state to have taken 
part in the war should have presided over a thorough examination and revision of the 
nation's collective memory, before passing the baton to the next generation. It was 
fitting, too, that his successor, Jacques Chirac, should have completed the process by 




My primary sources are, for the most part, interviews and newspaper, magazine 
and periodical articles. Details are given in the main body o f  this thesis. In 
addition, the following books were used as primary sources:
Barcellini, Serge and Wieviorka, Annette, Passant, souviens-toi (Paris: Plon, 
1995)
Institut Charles de Gaulle, Actes des Journées internationales tenues à 
rUnesco, Paris, 19-24 novembre 1990 {tome premier: dans la mémoire des 
hommes et des peuples) (Paris: La Documentation française-Plon, 1991), in 
particular Nicole Racine-Furlaud's article on 'Mémoire du 18 juin 1940'.
Martin-Roland, Michel, Il faut laisser le temps au temps. Les mots de François 
Mitterrand (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1995)
Ministère de la Défense, Il y  a 50 ans, la libération. Allocutions de François 
Léotard, Ministre de la Défense (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 1994)
Mitterrand, François, Discours: 1981-1995 (Paris: Europolis, 1995)
Raimond, Pierre-François, 'Un exemple de politique publique de la mémoire: la 
délégation à la mémoire et à l'information historique' (unpublished masters 
dissertation. Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1994)
Rémond, René, Le fichier juif: rapport de la commission presidee par René 
Rémond au Premier ministre (Paris: Pion, 1996)
Wiesel, Elie, François Mitterrand: mémoire à deux voix (Paris: Odile Jacob, 
1995)
Other cited works
Amiel, Jo, La Rafle: un sana très ordinaire, 1942-1944 (Paris: les éditions du 
cerf, 1993)
Amouroux, Henri, La page n'est pas encore tournée (Paris: Robert Lafont, 
1993)
Azèma, Jean-Pien*e and Bédarida, François, La France des années noires, vols 
1-2 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993)
272
Berstein, Serge, La France de l'expansion (Paris: Seuil, 1989)
Bridgford, Jeff, ed., France: Image & Identity (Newcastle: Newcastle-upon- 
Tyne Polytechnic Products, 1987)
Chagnollaud, D. and Méchet, P., Enquêtes Louis-Harris 1995 (Paris: Denoël,
1995)
CNRS, éd.. La mémoire des Français: 40 ans de commémorations de la 2ème 
guerre mondiale (Paris: éditions du CNRS, 1986)
Cohen, Asher, Persécutions et sauvetages: Juifs et Français sous l'Occupation 
et sous Vichy (Paris: les Editions du Cerf, 1993)
Conan, Eric and Rousso, Henry, Vichy: un passé qui ne passe pas (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994)
Duhamel, Alain, Les Peurs Françaises (Paris: Flammarion, 1993)
Duhamel, Alain, La Politique Imaginaire (Paris: Flammarion, 1995)
Ferro, Marc, The Use and Abuse o f History (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984)
Ferro, Marc, L'Histoire sous surveillance (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1985)
Finldellamit, Alain, l'avenir d'une négation (Paris: Seuil, 1982)
Gildea, Robert, The Past in French History (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1994)
Girardet, Raoul, Mythes et mythologies politiques (Paris: Seuil, 1986)
Goyet, Bruno, Etudes des commémorations en France dans les années 1980 
(thesis for DBA in Political Studies at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris,
1991)
Grosser, Alfred, Les identités difficiles (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996)
Halbwachs, Maurice, translated by Coser, Lewis, On Collective Memory 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1992)
Ignatieff, Michael, Blood and Belonging (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993)
Jakubowicz, Alain, Touvier: histoire du procès (Paris: Editions Julliard, 1995)
Khon, Hans, Making o f the Modern French Mind (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 
1955)
Le Goff, Jacques, Histoire et Mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1988)
273
Malet, Emile, éd., Resistance et mémoire, d'Auschwitz à Sarajevo. Actes du 
colloque de Lyon, octobre 1992 (Paris: Hachette, 1993)
Ménière, Laurent, éd.. Bilan de la France 1981-1993 (Paris: Hachette, 1993)
Namer, Gérard, La commémoration en France de 1945 à nos jours (Paris: 
l'Harmattan, 1987)
Nora, Pierre, éd., Les lieux de mémoire vols. 1-3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1984, 1986,
1992)
Ozouf, Mona, Festivals and the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass./London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988)
Péan, Pierre, Une Jeunesse française (Paris: Fayard, 1994)
Peschanski, Denis, Vichy 1940-1944: Contrôle et exclusion (Paris: Editions 
Complexe, 1997)
Prost, Antoine, Douze leçons sur l'histoire (Paris: Seuil, 1996)
Renan, Ernest, Oeuvres complètes: Tome 1 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947)
Rousso, Henry, Le syndrome de Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1987)
Smith, Anthony D., National Identity (Penguin: London, 1991)
Teyssier, Arnaud, La 5ème République 1958-1995 (Paris: Editions
Pygmalion/Gérard Watelet, 1995)
Todorov, Tzvetan, Les abus de la mémoire (Paris: Arléa, 1995)
Wieviorka, Annette, Déportation et génocides. Entre la mémoire et l'oubli 
(Paris: Pion, 1992)
Wieviorka, Olivier, Une certaine idée de la Résistance (Paris: Seuil, 1995) 
Winock, Michel, Parlez-moi de la France (Paris: Pion, 1995)
uncited works
Alexandre, Philippe, Plaidoyer impossible (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994)
Andersen, Benedict, Imagined Communities (Verso: London & New York,
1991)
Ardagh, John, France Today (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1987)
274
Asselin, Jean-Charles and others, eds., Etudes sur la France de 1939 à nos 
jours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985)
Becker, Jean-Jacques, Histoire politique de la France depuis 1945 (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1994)
Bernard, Philippe, l'Immigration (Paris: Le Monde-Editions, 1993)
Bernstein, Richard, Fragile Glory: A Portrait o f  the French (London: The 
Bodley Head, 1991)
Blanc, Rousso and De Tourtier-Bonazzi, La Seconde Guerre mondiale: guide 
des sources conservées en France (Paris: Archives nationales, 1994)
Bloch, Marc, translated by Peter Putnam, The Historian's Craft (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1954)
Braibant, Guy, Les Archives de la France. Rapport au premier ministre (Paris: 
La Documentation française, 1996)
Braudel, Fernand, translated by Sarah Matthews, On History (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980)
Braudel, Fernand, The Identity o f France, vol.2 (London: Collins, 1990)
Cairns, John C., France (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965)
Candau, Joël, Mémoire et identité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1998)
Cerny, Philip G., The Politics o f Grandeur (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1980)
Charpentier, Gérard M., Les peuples francophones dans le monde contemporain 
(Québec: Guy Saint-Jean, 1985)
Chaunu, Pierre, La France: Histoire de la sensibilité des Français à la France 
(Paris: Laffont, 1982)
Citron, Suzanne, le mythe nationale: l'histoire de la France en question (Paris: 
les éditions ouvrières, 1989)
Cohn, Bernard An Anthropologist among the historians and other essays 
(Delhi: O.U.P, 1990)
Colombani, Jean-Marie, Mitterrand: le roman d'une vie (Paris: Mille et Une 
Nuits, 1996)
Colombani, Jean-Marie, La France sans Mitterrand (Paris: Flammarion, 1992) 
Combe, Sonia, Archives Interdites (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994)
275
Cook, Malcolm, éd., French Culture since 1945 (London: Longman, 1993)
Crubellier, Maurice, La mémoire des Français (Paris: Henri Veyrier, 1991)
De la Gorce, Paul-Marie and Moschetto, Bruno, Que sais-je: la 5ème 
République (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992)
De Sà Rêgo, Carlos, Une Nostalgie de grandeur (Paris: Ramsay, 1985)
Duby, Georges, éd., Histoire de la France (Paris: Larousse, 1992)
Duhamel, Alain, De Gaulle, Mitterrand: la marque et la trace (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1991)
Duhamel, Jérôme, Vous les Français: 56 millions de Français en 2200 
sondages (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989)
Duhamel, Jérôme Grand inventaire du génie français en 365 objets (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1990)
Duhamel, Olivier and Jaffré, Jérôme, L'état de l'opinion (Sofres) 1989-1995 
(Paris: Seuil, 1990-1995)
Duhamel, Jaffré, Méchet, eds., L'état de l'opinion (Sofres) 1996 (Paris: Seuil,
1996)
Farmer, Sarah, Oradour: Arrêt sur mémoire (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1994)
Faurisson, Robert, Réponse à Jean-Claude Pressac sur le problème des 
chambres à Gaz (Colombes: RHR, 1994)
Faux, Legrand and Perez, La Main Droite de Dieu (Paris: Seuil, 1994)
Fillaire, Bernard, in collaboration with the FNDIR and UNADIF, Jusqu'au bout 
de la Résistance (Paris: Stock, 1997)
Finger, Blanche and Karel, William, Opération vent printanier (Paris: La 
Découverte, 1992)
Finldellcraut, Alain, la mémoire vaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1989)
Flower, J.E., éd., France Today (London: Methuen, 1971)
Forbes, Jill and Kelly, Michael, eds., French Cultural Studies: an introduction 
(Oxford: O.U.P., 1995)
Fourastié, Jean, Les trente glorieuses (Paris: Fayard, 1979)
François, Michel, éd.. La France et les Français (Paris: Gallimard, 1972)
276
Frossard, André, Excusez-moi d'être français (Paris: Fayard, 1992)
Gellner, Ernest, Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1987)
Girardet, Raoul, L'idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (Paris: La Table 
Ronde, 1972)
Girardet, Raoul, éd., le nationalisme français (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966)
Gouze, Roger, Mitterrand par Mitterrand (Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur, 1994)
Grafmeyer, Y. and Raymond, J.-D., eds.. Français, Qui êtes-vous? (Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1981)
Grosser, Alfred, Affaires extérieures (Paris: Flammarion, 1984)
Haddock, B. A., An Introduction to Historical Thought (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1980)
Hayes, Carlton J. H., France: A Nation o f Patriots (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1930)
Hayward, Jack, ed., De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in France 
(London: Hurst and Co., 1993)
Hirschfeld, G and Marsh, P., eds.. Collaboration in France (Oxford: Berg, 
1989)
Hobsbawm, Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: C.U.P,
1992)
Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence, The Invention o f  Tradition (Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1995)
Hoffmami, Malchazar and Ross, eds., The Mitterrand Experiment (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987)
Institut d'histoire du temps présent. Histoire et temps présent - journées d'études 
des correspondants départementaux (Paris: CNRS éditions, 1980)
Institut d'histoire du temps présent, Ecrire l'histoire du temps présent. Actes de 
la journée d'études de l'IHTP (Paris: CNRS éditions, 1993)
Jeanneney, Jean-Noël, Le passé dans le prétoire (Paris: Seuil, 1998)
Jelen, Christophe, La France éclatée (Paris: Nil, 1996)
Kantin, G. and Manceron, G, Les Echos de la mémoire. Tabous et enseignement 
de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Paris: Le Monde éditions, 1991)
277
Kimmel, A. and Poujol, J., Certaines idées de la France (Frankfurt am Main: 
Diesterweg, 1982)
Klarsfeld, Serge, Vichy-Auschwitz: le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la 
question juive en France -1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1983)
Labbé, Dominique, le vocabulaire de François Mitterrand (Paris: Presses de la 
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1990)
Lacouture, Jean, Citations du président de Gaulle (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1968)
Le Goff, J. and Nora, P., eds.. Constructing the Past (Cambridge University 
Press/Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1985)
Manson, Jean, éd.. Leçons de ténèbres. Résistants et déportés (Paris: Pion, 
1995)
McMillan, James F., 20th Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992)
Mermet, Gérard, Francoscopie 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994 (Paris: Larousse, 
1989,1990, 1991, 1993, 1995)
Mermet, Gérard, Démocrature: comment les médias transforment la démocratie 
(Paris: Aubier, 1987)
Mitterrand, Danielle, En toutes libertés (Paris: Ramsay, 1996)
Mitterrand, François, Réflexions sur la politique étrangère de la France (Paris: 
Fayard, 1986)
Mitterrand, François, Mémoires interrompus (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1996)
Molho, Danièle, François Mitterrand (Toulouse: Editions Milan, 1995)
Mossuz-Lavau, Janine, Les Français et la Politique (Paris: Editions Odile 
Jacob, 1994)
Namer, Gérard, Mémoire et Société (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987)
Nicolet, Claude, l'idée républicaine en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1982)
Nevers, Guy, Les Français vus par les Français (Paris: Barrault, 1985)
Nourissier, François, translated by Foulke, Adrienne, The French (London: 
Hutchison, 1970)
Paris, Erna, Unhealed Wounds: France and the Klaus Barbie Affair (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1985)
278
Parker, Noel, Portrayals o f Revolution (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1990)
Pickering, W.S.F., Durkheim on religion: A selection o f  readings with 
bibliographies (London and Boston: Routledge & Keegan, 1975)
Porch, Douglas, The French Secret Services (London: MacMillan, 1995)
Price, Roger, A concise History o f France (Cambridge: CUP, 1995)
Rémond, René, La Politique n'est plus ce qu'elle était (Paris: Calmann-Lévy,
1993)
Roberts, J.M., The Penguin History o f the World (London: Penguin, 1992)
Rosoux, Valérie-Barbara, La mémoire du Général de Gaulle: culte ou 
instrument? (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Bruylant-Académia, 1998)
Rudorff, Raymond, The Myth o f France (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970)
Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993)
Samuel, Raphael, Theatres o f Memory, volume 1: Past and Present in 
Contemporary Culture (London/New York: Verso, 1994)
Sanson, Rosemonde, Les 14 juillet (Paris: Flammarion, 1976)
Segalen, M, ed.. L'autre et le semblable (Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1989)
Sieburg, Friedrich, Dieu est-il Français? (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1930)
Silverman, Maxim, éd.. Race, Discourse and Power in France (Aldershot: 
Avebuiy, 1991)
Smith, Anthony D., Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995)
Stolérie, Lionel, Entrer dans le 2F siècle: Essai sur l'avenir de l'identité 
française (rapport du groupe "Horizon 2000"présidé par E. Le Roy Ladurie) 
(Paris: La Découverte/La Documentation française, 1990)
Todd, Emmanuel, The Making o f Modem France (London: Blackwell, 1991)
Tombs, Robert, éd.. Nationhood and Nationalism in France (London: 
HarperCollins, 1991)
Tombs, Robert, France 1814-1914 (London: Longman, 1996)
Twain, Mark, Speeches (New YorlUOxford: OUP, 1996)
279
Verdie, Mirelle, éd., L'Etat de la France et de ses habitants. 1989 edition 
(Paris: La Découverte, 1989)
Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, Les Juifs, la mémoire et le présent (Paris: La Découverte, 
1991)
Weber, Eugen, Peasants into Frenchmen (London: Chatto and Windus, 1979)
Weber, Eugen, My France: Politics, Culture, Myth (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1991)
Weil, Simone^, L ’Enracinement Gallimard, 1949)
Wieviorka, Michel, La France raciste (Paris: Seuil, 1992)
Wright, Gordon, France in Modern Times (New York/ London: Norton, 1995)
Zarate, Geneviève, Enseigner une culture étrangère (Paris: Hachette, 1986)
Zeldin, Theodore, The French (London: Collins Harvill, 1988)
G L A S G O W  
u n i v e r s i t v  
l i b r a r y
280

